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–Jamin Raskin, Professor of Law, American University,
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INTRODUCTION
America is suffering from a definitional crisis regarding the term
“marriage.” This crisis has crystallized in the context of the debate over same2
sex marriage. Because Americans cannot agree on what marriage is or should
be, we cannot agree on whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.
Moreover, Americans have historically—and in recent years, sometimes
3
deliberately—conflated notions of civil marriage and religious marriage. This
has resulted in the imposition of a religious definition of marriage on the larger
society. As a consequence, the definitional crisis is not mere disagreement about
the humanity of same-sex couples—rather, the crisis also carries constitutional
implications because of the tangled histories of religious and civil marriage.
Nevertheless, the status quo (opposite-sex marriage only) remains largely

2. Throughout this Article, I use the terms “same-sex marriage” and “same-sex civil marriage”
interchangeably to connote all two-party civil relationships in which one or both of the parties, for
whatever reason, do not conform to a “one biological man, one biological woman” paradigm. The
terms do not include incestuous, bestial, plural, polygamous, polygynous, polyandrous,
polyamorous, monoamorous, child-adult, child-child, or group marriage models.
3. See infra Part I.B (discussing the ecclesiastical roots of modern-day civil marriage in
America).
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undisturbed: In all but one of the fifty states, marriage is presently defined—
5
either explicitly or implicitly—as the legal union of one man and one woman.
Most of the present-day definitional tension arises because American
governments have historically intertwined the civil and religious roots of
marriage. According to the Pew Research Center, the two most common
6
demographic indicators for opposition to same-sex civil marriage are age and
7
religiosity. Indeed, young adults and “seculars” actually favor same-sex civil
8
marriage by substantial margins. The most commonly-cited reason for
opposing same-sex civil marriage is that it goes against one’s own religious

4. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is only state to bestow full marriage rights on samesex couples. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the
Massachusetts Legislature’s failure to extend civil marriage to same-sex couples violated the
Massachusetts Constitution’s equal protection guarantees; giving the Massachusetts Legislature 180
days to enact same-sex civil marriage); see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565
(Mass. 2004) (responding to question from Massachusetts Senate regarding the permissibility of
same-sex civil unions in lieu of same-sex civil marriage; holding that the same state constitutional
infirmities lay with permitting only same-sex civil unions as with failing to permit same-sex civil
marriage).
As this Article is going to press, the Massachusetts Legislature has just voted to authorize a citizen
petition proposing a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex civil marriage. Cf. Doyle v.
Sec. of the Commonwealth, SJC-09887, slip op. at *1 (Mass. Dec. 27, 2006) (in response to suit seeking
order forcing the legislature to vote on the petition, holding that, while no judicial remedy existed to
force a vote on the petition, “[t]hose members who now seek to avoid their lawful obligations . . . ,
ultimately will have to answer to the people who elected them”). The Legislature must authorize the
petition in its 2007 legislative session before the measure can be placed on the statewide ballot in
2008. Authorization requires a “yes” vote from twenty-five percent of the legislators in two
consecutive legislative sessions; the 2006 session was the first. It is unclear whether the petition will
pass in 2007, and if it appears before the voters in 2008, it is unclear whether the measure will be
adopted. See Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage Vote Advances in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007,
at A12.
In 2006, a Boston Globe survey showed that approximately fifty-six percent of Massachusetts
residents support same-sex civil marriage. See Michael Powell & Robin Shulman, Mass. Gay Marriage
Law Contested, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2007, at A3.
5. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 208 & n.11 (N.J. 2006) (cataloguing marriage laws in all
fifty states).
6. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE ON SOCIAL
ISSUES 8 (2006), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/social-issues-06.pdf. [hereinafter PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS] (reporting that, as of August 2006, persons age sixtyfive or older were thirty-five percent more likely to oppose same-sex civil marriage—termed “gay
marriage” in the study—than were persons age eighteen to twenty-nine (seventy-three percent to
thirty-eight percent)).
7. Id. (reporting that persons who attended religious activities “weekly or more” were forty
percent more likely to oppose same-sex civil marriage than were persons who attended “seldom or
never” (seventy-five percent to thirty-five percent)).
8. Id. (reporting that same-sex civil marriage enjoyed “relatively high levels of support” from
persons under thirty and persons characterized as “secular” (fifty-three and sixty-three percent,
respectively)). In the study, “seculars” includes those whose self-described religious preference was
“[n]o religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic.” Id. at 26. However, across the entire population, the
more frequently one attends religious functions, the likelier one is to oppose same-sex marriage:
Seventy-five percent of persons attending “[w]eekly or more” opposed “gay marriage,” while fiftyfive percent of persons attending “[s]eldom or never” supported it. Id. at 8.
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beliefs. These statistics are consistent with the Pew Research Center’s
conclusion that opposition to homosexuality and gay rights is derived primarily
10
from religious beliefs.
This is not to say that one could not both hold religious beliefs opposed to
homosexuality and support same-sex marriage as a civil right. Indeed, the very
fact that a small percentage of Evangelical Christians favor same-sex civil
11
marriage shows this to be possible. One likely reason for this welcome
statistical variance is that many religious believers do not consider it appropriate
for their beliefs to drive generally-applicable public policy—said differently,
12
these believers prefer that spiritual and worldly authority remain separate. It
13
seems that, despite their philosophical differences, religious believers and
14
“Secularists” (atheists, humanists, etc. ) have nevertheless found common
15
ground.
These highly-textured statistics motivated me to investigate the extent to
which religious beliefs are the driving force behind statutory and constitutional
initiatives to prohibit judicial or legislative recognition of same-sex civil
marriage. My findings were unsurprising: The overwhelming majority of
9. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN OPPOSITION TO HOMOSEXUALITY 14
(2003), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-homosexuality.pdf. [hereinafter PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS] (reporting that, as of November 2003, sixty-two percent of
respondents claimed that same-sex civil marriage—termed “gay marriage” in the study—went
against their religious beliefs, and that, of those respondents opposed to same-sex civil marriage,
forty-five percent offered explicitly religious grounds as a justification for holding that position (this
last question was asked in an open-ended format)).
10. Id. at 1–5 (reporting that no major religious group has a majority expressing favorable views
of gays and lesbians, while sixty percent of seculars hold positive views of homosexuals). See also
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS, supra note 6, at 8 (reporting that, along religious
lines, same-sex civil marriage enjoys a majority of support only among seculars (sixty-three
percent)).
11. See PEW FORUM, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS, supra note 6, at 8 (reporting that fourteen percent
of White Evangelicals favored “gay marriage”).
12. As we have seen, however, the more religiously-committed one is, the less likely one is to
believe that such separation is theologically acceptable. See PEW FORUM, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS,
supra note 6, at 8; PEW FORUM, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, supra note 9, at 1–6.
13. From simple definitions: “secularism” is defined as “[t]he doctrine that morality should be
based solely on regard to the well-being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all
considerations drawn from belief in God or in a future state.” XIV OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 849 (2d
ed. 1989) (alteration added). Conversely, “religion” is defined as a
[r]ecognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his
destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship; the general mental
and moral attitude resulting from this belief, with reference to its effect upon the
individual or the community; personal or general acceptance of this feeling as a standard
of spiritual and practical life.
XIII OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 569 (2d ed. 1989) (alteration added).
By definition, then, it seems that one cannot be both a “theist” and a “non-theist”: One belief
system claims “there is not a god” while the other claims “there is a god.” Rationally speaking, God
either exists or she doesn’t—she cannot both exist and not exist, for that would be the very definition
of a logical contradiction.
14. See infra text accompanying note 144.
15. See infra notes 145–50 (describing the Secularist position on same-sex marriage; noting that
most of these positions are derived both from personal morality and from an objection to using
religious beliefs as a ground for social policy).
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support for bans on same-sex civil marriage has come from religious believers,
and the so-called “secular justifications” for these bans are mere pretexts for
religious beliefs that homosexuality, homosexuals, and same-sex couples are evil
or sinful. Opponents of same-sex civil marriage derive their preferred definition
of marriage almost entirely from the Christian precept that one-man, one16
woman marriage was “ordained by God” and is therefore inherently superior
to same-sex unions. The ongoing effort of the radical Christian right to impose
its religious beliefs on Americans of all faiths and traditions has begun in
piecemeal fashion—at the state level through state statutes and constitutional
amendments, and at the federal level through the federal Defense of Marriage
17
18
Act and the various proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
This Article discusses how, because of America’s history of blending
religious and civil marriage, as well as the preservationist’s ongoing campaign
to codify religious marriage in the law, our current definition of “civil” marriage
is impermissibly derived from religious precepts, without a sufficient—or

16. E.g., 150 CONG. REC. H6587 (2004) (statement of Rep. Pence) (“Marriage was ordained by
God . . . .”); 152 CONG. REC. S5525 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
It is my belief that the State of ‘marriage’ can exist only between a man and a woman. The
Bible tells us that marriage must be defined this way, and that the marriage vow between
a husband and wife, meaning between a man and a woman, is sacred.
....
. . . [T]hroughout the annals of human experience, the relationship of a man and woman
joined in holy matrimony has been a keystone to the stability, strength, and health of
human society. I believe in that sacred union to the core of my being.
Id. (alteration added); 152 CONG. REC. H5295 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Carter) (“I
believe [marriage] is part of God’s plan for the future of mankind. The sacredness of a marriage is
based, to this Nation, and, quite frankly, every Nation on Earth, it is how the based governing we
have in our lives starts.” (alteration added)); id. at H5297 (statement of Rep. Gingrey) (“[T]hose of us
who support this constitutional amendment feel that this is all about marriage that result, or
potentially can result, in the procreation of children. This is what our Constitution has implied for
223 years and, indeed, what the word of God has implied for 2,000 years.” (alteration added)); id. at
H5301 (statement of Rep. Pence) (“I believe that marriage matters, that it was ordained by God,
instituted among men, that it is the glue of the American family and the safest harbor to raise
children.”); id. at H5306 (statement of Rep. Beauprez).
I think very often about the fact that we proudly profess that we are founded on JudeoChristian principles.
....
. . . [M]arriage, since the beginning of time, as close as I can tell, ha been between a man
and a woman. If it was, indeed, good enough for our Creator, and it was indeed our
Creator’s plan, that we were created different for an absolute divine purpose, I think we
best not be messing with His plan today.
Id.; 150 CONG. REC. H7894 (2004) (statement of Rep. Bartlett).
In the Christian community, and we are a Christian Nation . . . marriage is generally
recognized as having started in the Garden of Eden. You may go back to Genesis to find
that and you will note there that God created Adam and Eve. He did not create Adam and
Steve. A union between other than a man and a woman may be something legally, but it
cannot be a marriage, because marriage through 5,000 years of recorded history has
always been a relationship between a man and a woman.
Id.
17.
18.

See discussion infra Parts II.A, V.A.1.
See discussion infra Part II.
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rational—secular justification. What is the remedy? Courts should take a hard
look at the substantive justifications offered in support of same-sex marriage
bans, bearing in mind that (1) these justifications are universally offered by
religious believers but are infrequently offered by credentialed Secularists, and
(2) they are the result of a studied use of pretextual, secular-sounding language
to cloak a religiously-motivated bias against homosexuals and same-sex couples.
In Part I, I describe the definitional problem, briefly explore the roots of civil and
religious marriage in America, and survey the variety of religious and
irreligious beliefs about the morality of homosexuality and same-sex unions. In
Part II, I describe what same-sex marriage bans are, introduce the proposed
Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) as exemplary of all such bans, and
determine that fundamentalist religious beliefs are the common trait held by the
vast majority of witnesses who testified before Congress in favor of the FMA. In
Part III, I introduce the concept of “preservationism”—a unifying theory to
explain the invidious religious purpose underlying the “secular” justifications
for same-sex civil marriage bans. In Part IV, I discern the background neutrality
principles underlying modern-day Establishment Clause jurisprudence, briefly
delineate the two primary interpretive methods that the Supreme Court
currently applies to Establishment Clause claims, and determine that the Lemonendorsement test is the appropriate vehicle for analyzing the First Amendment
implications of same-sex marriage bans. In Part V, I raise—and dismiss—the
primary substantive objections to same-sex marriage that are continually raised
by opponents of same-sex marriage (and key sponsors of the Federal Marriage
Amendment), demonstrating that all of them fail to have a rationally secular
relationship to banning same-sex civil marriage. I then apply the Lemonendorsement test to the sectarian definition of marriage that same-sex marriage
bans enshrine into the law, showing that a reasonable observer would conclude
that such bans endorse one form of religious marriage over another, which
creates a sizeable class of political outsiders and violates neutrality principles. In
Part VI, I conclude that, if the Establishment Clause really means what it says,
same-sex marriage bans impose and endorse one set of religious precepts
19
regarding marriage, resulting in an unconstitutional establishment of religion.

19. Dissenting voices in two recent same-sex marriage cases raised this same Establishment
Clause objection sua sponte. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1032–35, 1037 (Wash. 2006)
(Bridge, J., concurring in dissent) (cataloguing the self-evident religious bias and motivations
underlying Washington’s 1998 Defense of Marriage Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010(1),
26.04.020(1)(c), (3) (West Supp. 2006); concluding that “[a] religious or moral objection to same-sex
marriage is not . . . a legitimate state interest” (emphasis in original)); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 675, 747–48 & n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (Kline, J., concurring and dissenting opinion) (noting
that the religious rationales employed in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1971), and Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rested upon
a “religious doctrine that cannot influence the civil law and, in any case, is not universally shared”;
cataloguing the objections of several amici that “the ban on same-sex marriage has no secular
legislative purpose, and the state’s reliance on the common understanding of marriage is a pretext
for naked religious preference which impermissibly prefers certain religious beliefs over others”
(internal quotations omitted)), review granted and opinion superseded, S147999 (Cal. Dec. 20, 2006).
Prof. Lynn Wardle recently catalogued the most commonly-used arguments in favor of same-sex
civil marriage, noting that the Establishment Clause argument has come up several times in the
literature, but not in the courts. Lynn D. Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why
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I. DEFINING “MARRIAGE”
A. A Brief History and Overview
The idea that the state should—or even could—legally recognize same-sex
relationships is relatively new. Baker v. Nelson, the first lawsuit seeking a
20
marriage license for same-sex plaintiffs, was brought in Minnesota in 1971.
Although the Baker plaintiffs were unsuccessful, the case signaled to the nation
that the modern gay-rights movement had marriage equality on its agenda.
Many states began to assess the potential constitutional infirmities of their
common-law definitions of marriage or antiquated marriage statutes.
Consequently, some states affirmatively outlawed the legal recognition of same21
22
sex unions through judicial fiat, statute, or state constitutional amendment.
The number of states outlawing these unions has grown substantially since 2003
when Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of

and How, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 439, 465 n.129 (2006) (alterations added) [hereinafter Wardle, Federal
Constitutional Protection].
As these cases and articles show, I am not the first person to write in this area, but I am among the
first to examine the question in detail in the literature since Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005), were
decided. Without doubt, these cases significantly changed the constitutional landscape—particularly
in terms of (1) the heightened requirement of government neutrality toward religion after McCreary
County and (2) what constitutes a permissible morals-based rationale for same-sex marriage bans
after Lawrence. If the Washington and California marriage cases are any indication, the courts and
amici are picking up on this change.
20. 191 N.W.2d at 186.
21. E.g., id. at 186 (holding that the Minnesota marriage statute “does not authorize marriage
between persons of the same sex and that such marriages are accordingly prohibited”); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (holding that, although the then-applicable Kentucky
marriage statutes did not specify the gender of the parties to a marriage, “the relationship proposed
by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is
not a marriage”).
22. A typical ban might read: “Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or
performed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of the same gender are not valid in North
Carolina.” N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (West Supp. 2006). Other bans, instead of explicitly calling
out same-sex couples for exclusion from marriage, might state the ban in more positive-sounding
terms: “To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one
woman.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted 1998). A number of bans also prevent the state from
enacting laws that emulate marriage or provide its legal benefits to non-opposite-sex couples: “Only
a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state
and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a
legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
qualities, significance or effect of marriage.” OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (adopted 2004). See also VA.
CONST. art. I, § 15-A (adopted 2006).
[O]nly a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political
subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to which
is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.
Id. (alteration added). See also discussion infra Part II.
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Public Health. The November 2006 election cycle alone saw voters weighing in
on seven state-level constitutional amendments to prohibit same-sex marriage;
24
six were ratified. To date, Arizona is the only state in which voters have
repudiated an attempt to amend a state constitution to ban same-sex civil
25
marriage. As of this writing, forty-five states have some form of a same-sex
26
marriage ban on the books. Five of these states nevertheless provide some legal
27
rights to same-sex couples. The remaining five states and the District of
28
Columbia have not passed a statutory ban or a constitutional amendment. Of
these, Massachusetts is the only state to affirmatively recognize same-sex
29
marriage; courts in the other five jurisdictions have so far refused to force their
30
respective legislatures to recognize civil marriage rights for same-sex couples.
31
No state allows marriages between more than two individuals.

23. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
24. See CNN.com, America Votes 2006, Key Ballot Measures, http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2006/pages/results/ballot.measures/ (reporting on the balloting results from the
November 2006 election cycle for same-sex civil marriage bans proposed in Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
25. See id. (reporting on the failure of Arizona Proposition 107 on November 7, 2006).
26. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Laws (Nov. 2006), http://hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Arizona&CONTENTID=28225&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Conten
tDisplay.cfm (cataloguing state laws regarding same-sex marriage) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); see also
National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage (Oct. 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/cyf/samesex.htm. (last visited Jan. 6, 2007).
27. See Human Rights Campaign, Relationship Recognition in the U.S. (Apr. 2005), http://hrc.
org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=26860&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Con
tentDisplay.cfm (listing California, Connecticut, Hawai’i, Maine, and Vermont as states that provide
some form of legal rights to same-sex couples) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); cf. Human Rights Campaign,
Statewide Marriage Laws, supra note 26 (listing California, Connecticut, Hawai’i, Maine, and
Vermont as having statutory bans on same-sex marriage).
28. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Laws, supra note 26 (listing
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia as
the only jurisdictions without an affirmative ban on same-sex civil marriage).
29. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Opinions of the Justices
to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
30. E.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (refusing to find a due process or equal
protection violation under the New York Constitution for the legislature’s failure to permit same-sex
civil marriages; holding that permitting such marriages was within the power of the legislature and
would not be unconstitutional under the state constitution); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)
(refusing to find a due process violation under the New Jersey Constitution for the legislature’s
failure to permit same-sex civil marriages; holding that failure to provide same-sex couples with the
legal rights, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage violated the state constitution; holding further
that, in fashioning a remedy for the equal-protection violation, the legislature was not compelled to
call the resulting legal arrangement “marriage,” although it was within the legislature’s power to do
so); Dean v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 90-13892, slip op. at *4–8 (D.C. Super. Dec. 30, 1991)
(challenging the 1981 version of the District of Columbia’s Marriage Act, which has been
subsequently amended to provide limited domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples, while
still reserving “marriage” for opposite-sex couples), available at 1992 WL 685364, aff’d on other
grounds, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); see also Tom Hester, Jr., N.J. Gov. to Make Gay Unions Official,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 21, 2006 (announcing decision of New Jersey legislature to remedy the
equal-protection violation in Lewis through same-sex civil unions), available at http://pewforum.
org/news/display.php?NewsID=12246 (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
31. See infra notes 40–41 (discussing polygamy); see also infra Part V.A.3.c; notes 397–400
(discussing the teleological argument against same-sex marriage).
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32

Thirty-five years after Baker v. Nelson, a majority of Americans still oppose
33
allowing same-sex couples the right to marry. However, a majority also believe
34
that it is important to give same-sex couples some legal protections. Moreover,
35
the size of that majority is growing and has been for at least a decade.
Presumably, this is because more and more Americans are beginning to
understand the hardship wrought upon gay and lesbian families who are
denied the panoply of state and federal rights, benefits, protections, and
36
responsibilities afforded by civil marriage. If this liberalizing trend continues, a
majority of Americans may soon come to believe that civil marriage should be
made available to same-sex couples. At that time, we could expect that several
jurisdictions might amend their definitions of marriage to permit same-sex civil
marriage.
But what is the definition of marriage? Why should we amend it? Why
should we not amend it? In undertaking this inquiry, we immediately encounter
difficulty. Currently, marriage is defined on both semantic and substantive
levels. First, the semantic: Those opposed to giving same-sex couples access to
marriage claim that, because marriage has only ever been between “one man
37
and one woman,” that this is all that marriage could ever be. Tactically, this

32. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1971).
33. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PRAGMATIC AMERICANS, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that fiftysix percent of respondents opposed same-sex civil marriage).
34. See id. at 1 (reporting that, as of August 2006, fifty-four percent of Americans support giving
same-sex couples access to civil unions).
35. Cf. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGION AND POLITICS: CONTENTION AND CONSENSUS 1–2
(2003), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf. (reporting that, between
June 1996 and July 2003, the percentage of overall opposition to same-sex civil marriage dropped
thirteen points, from sixty-five percent to fifty-three percent, while, over the same period, support
for same-sex civil marriage rose eleven points, from twenty-seven percent to thirty-eight-percent).
36. A recent report released by the presently-named Government Accountability Office
identified 1,138 discrete federal-level benefits that attach to legal marriage. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. See also Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990
(Wash. 2006) (Madsen, J., plurality opinion) (cataloguing several ways in which same-sex couples
and families headed by same-sex couples are disadvantaged because they cannot access the statelevel rights and obligations available to married couples; describing this disparity as a “clear
hardship”). The state-level benefits that attach to marriage are so numerous and vary so widely that
cataloguing them here would be impractical.
37. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“Marriage
is embraced and intuitively understood to be what it is. Marriage is a union between a man and a
woman.”); 152 CONG. REC. S5440 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“When it comes
to same-gender couples there is a problem of definition. Two women or two men simply do not
meet the criteria for marriage as it has been defined for thousands of years. Marriage is, as it always
has been, a union between a man and a woman.”); id. at S5441 (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“[T]he
basics of it say marriage is the union of a man and a woman, as it has been as an institution for
thousands of years.” (alteration added)); id. at S5450 (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (“[T]he one-man, onewoman family structure is a crucial foundational element of the American democratic society . . . .”
(alteration added)); id. at S5456 (statement of Sen. Vitter) (“marriage is truly the most fundamental
institution in human history”); id. at S5459 (statement of Sen. Thune) (same-sex couples are “trying
to define marriage in a way that is contrary to what I believe is the tradition of this country, not only
the tradition of this country, but since the beginning of time”); id. at S5474 (statement of Sen.
Martinez) (“Our traditional and religious understanding of marriage is under attack by those who
wish to redefine the meaning of marriage and family.”); 152 CONG. REC. S5533 (daily ed. June 7,
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tautology is useful in deflecting criticism of an anti-same-sex marriage position,
because it inevitably leads to a “yes it is, no it isn’t” banter that distracts from
the substantive issue at hand.
Logically, however, this self-defining model of marriage is visibly
38
undermined by its question-begging and circular reasoning. By assuming the
conclusion they wish to reach—that “marriage is marriage”—opponents of
same-sex marriage have provided themselves with a pithy sound-bite—albeit
39
one that fails to offer a substantive justification for itself. As a lexicographical
matter, the proposition “marriage is marriage” is inherently circular; it is
impossible to divine the meaning of “marriage” without looking to sources of
information beyond the word itself. Typically, however, opponents offer no
additional normative reasons to explain why this definition of marriage is the
only possible one, or for that matter, why any particular definition of marriage
should remain static.
Moreover, the factual claim itself—that marriage has always been between
only one man and one woman—is only half true: Polygamous marriage models
have existed in many non-Western civilizations throughout history, and several
40
currently exist today. Narrowing the “marriage is marriage” definition to
encompass only Western civilizations—or only the United States—also fails:
Before Utah joined the Union, the early Mormon Church openly practiced
polygamy, which establishes that the proffered definition is premised on
41
historical inaccuracies. Moreover, polygamous sects in Utah and the
42
surrounding areas persist today.

2006) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“Throughout human history and culture, the union between a man
and a woman has been recognized as the cornerstone of our society.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5293 (daily
ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Neugebauer) (“Thousands of years and many civilizations have
defined a marriage as the union between one man and one woman.”); id. at H5295 (statement of Rep.
Carter) (“The reality is marriage has always been a union between a man and a woman.”).
38. See Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 181, 190
(2005–2006) (describing the definitional argument as “circular and conclusory”); see also Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (dismissing the definitional argument as “tautological and
circular”), superseded by constitutional amendment and subsequent statute, HAW. CONST. art I, § 23
(adopted 1998) (reserving power to define marriage to the legislature); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1
(West Supp. 2006) (defining marriage as between one man and one woman), cited in Carpenter,
supra, at 190 n.31.
39. See Carpenter, supra note 38, at 191–92 (“Perhaps the man-woman definition is the best one;
but to reach that conclusion we need substantive arguments supporting the definition . . . , not
simply the definition itself.”).
40. See, e.g., PRISCILLA OFFENHAUER, FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., WOMEN IN ISLAMIC
SOCIETIES: A SELECTED REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE 40–41 (2005) (cataloguing the
history and prevalence of state-sanctioned polygamy throughout the Islamic world, including
practices that persisted into the Twentieth Century in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia,
Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen). According to Offenhauer, legal polygamy
persists into the Twenty-First Century in several of these nations, including Egypt, Iran, and Yemen.
Id.
41. See generally, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (acknowledging the history
and then-current practice of polygamy in the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons) in the Utah Territory and surrounding areas).
42. See Bill Hanna, Sect’s Texas Outpost Looking Permanent, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 1,
2007, at B1 (cataloguing history of the Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints from 1890–2006,
ending with the June 2006 arrest of Warren Jeffs, the sect’s leader). The Fundamentalist LDS Church,
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These brief analyses show why limiting our inquiry to only the semantic
level proves unhelpful in discerning a normative definition of “marriage.”
Nevertheless, because the definitional argument is commonly encountered, it is
43
addressed below in greater detail.
44
Same-sex marriage advocates must sidestep this semantic quagmire and
instead examine the substantive issues that give rise to our definitional crisis.
For our purposes, a primary method of defining substantive marriage will be to
identify and distinguish marriage’s civil and religious aspects. This cannot be
achieved without identifying exactly what marriage is designed to do—i.e.,
identifying the purposes it is intended to serve. We must keep in mind,
however, that any purpose we identify must clear the constitutional hurdles
45
designed to check unbridled majoritarian will. We may not develop or
46
implement a model of marriage that inherently violates the Constitution.
Opponents of same-sex marriage claim that marriage is instrumental in
47
achieving ends that only opposite-sex couples can meet. As such, we can
characterize their preferred conceptions of marriage as very narrow. For
example marriage is, according to opponents, designed to provide an “ideal
environment” for raising children; by definition, this model must include only
one father and one mother, whose “gender complementarity” will teach
48
children proper sex roles within adult relationships. This “ideal environment”
is often said to be the best method by which social values and knowledge can
pass between generations; ergo, the government should encourage “responsible
49
procreation,” or procreation within the confines of a pre-existing marriage.
Whether by chance or by design, same-sex couples fall outside this
articulation of marriage—because same-sex couples are inherently monogendered, they cannot procreate without assistance, and they cannot provide
children with both a “mother” and “father” in the classic sense. As a result,
opponents conclude that marriage should not be made available to same-sex
couples.
Each of the opponents’ arguments proceeds in a fashion similar to this one.
By intentionally characterizing the purpose, nature, and function of marriage
very narrowly, they are conveniently able to prevent same-sex couples from
falling within the definition. Under this narrow sense of marriage, opponents

an offshoot of the larger Mormon church, has practiced polygamy and child marriage throughout its
entire history, up to and including the present day. See id.
43. See infra Part V.A.2.b.
44. In the interests of full disclosure, I admit that I fall into this category.
45. “If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
46. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s ban on interracial
marriage for violating both due process (by impermissibly burdening the fundamental right to
marry) and equal protection (by drawing an impermissible racial classification) under the federal
Constitution).
47. See infra Part V.A (raising and dismissing the key arguments used to justify bans on samesex civil marriage).
48. See infra Part V.A.2.e.
49. See infra Parts V.A.2.c, f.
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thus conclude that marriage-qua-marriage cannot, by definition, be made
50
available to same-sex couples, because “what they want does not exist.”
Conversely same-sex marriage advocates take a broader view, frequently
conceiving of marriage as a choice-based institution that is designed to allow
individuals to make autonomous decisions as to partner, family structure, and
51
effective methods of values-transfer to children. Indeed, one of the primary
rebuttals to the “ideal” environment characterization of marriage is the very
existence of divorce—if marriage is truly only about providing a mother and
father for as many children as possible, then governments should necessarily
make it much harder for married couples (and particularly those with children)
52
to obtain a divorce. Moreover, if marriage were only about encouraging
“responsible procreation,” couples that are infertile, elderly, or who do not want
53
children should not be permitted to marry at all. Yet, such prohibitions do not
exist and seem intuitively absurd—but why? If Supreme Court precedent is any
guide, marriage has been substantively reconceived as a private-ordering
54
system that is not expressly tied to procreation and child-rearing; thus, it
would appear that marriage-qua-marriage—at least as opponents have
55
conceived of it—does not exist. If this is indeed the case, then, as a friend of

50. See Carpenter, supra note 38, at 186 (explaining the definitional argument).
51. Cf. generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude,
Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27 (2003) (evaluating the fit of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), within the larger body of autonomous choices that are currently protected by the Court’s
fundamental privacy-rights jurisprudence).
52. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see infra Part V.A.2.e.
53. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see infra Part V.A.
54. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a prisoner’s right to marry could
not be burdened by a requirement that the prisoner first receive permission from the prison warden
before being permitted to marry another inmate or a citizen). Turner did not assume that prisoners
have any right to conjugal visits or other sexual relations with their spouses. See id. at 95–96; accord
Arthur S. Leonard, Going for the Brass Ring: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 572,
587 (1997) (“By acknowledging that the state could refuse to allow prisoners to have sex with their
spouses while incarcerated, the [Turner] Court implicitly rejected any contention that procreation is
an indispensable attribute of marriage.” (alteration added)) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996));
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare not Speak Its Name, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 n.36 (2004) (noting that Turner held “without assuming that prisoners have
any right to conjugal visits, that prisoners have a right to marry”); Note, Litigating the Defense of
Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2691 (2004) (“Of
particular importance [to the evolution of marriage] was the extension, in Turner v. Safley, of the
right to marry to [sic] circumstances under which procreation and child rearing were literal
impossibilities.” (alterations added and footnote omitted)); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965) (holding a statutory ban on contraception to be an unconstitutional violation of a married
couple’s due process right to privacy in procreative decisionmaking).
55. See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 32 (2003) (in
supporting broader marriage equality, suggesting that “family law is moving from a conception of
marriage as an institution with a uniform meaning to a more variegated view that assesses marriage
in terms of discrete groupings, or ‘bundles,’ of rights and responsibilities”).
An argument also exists that marriage as opponents would have it has never existed: In many
societies, marriage began as a means to transfer wealth and property within bloodlines and class
structures. While this history does not challenge the teleology of marriage, it does challenge the
opponents’ claimed reasons for having marriage at all.
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mine once said, “What’s the big deal with letting two people own property
together?”
This definitional question has traditionally sounded in two constitutional
56
doctrines: due process and equal protection. It is important to briefly examine
these doctrines before addressing the substantive Establishment Clause
question, because the level of scrutiny and analytical methods employed in
57
these areas will prove to be highly relevant.
First, the definitional question we face implicates “fundamental rights”
under substantive due process. Opponents of same-sex marriage seek to define
the right to marry very narrowly, while supporters seek a broader definition. (In
other due-process cases, the outcome turned on whether the narrow or broad
58
definition of the right prevailed, just as it does here.) If a court construes the
claimed right to marry narrowly, then same-sex marriage advocates have a
59
difficult road to hoe: “[T]he right to marry someone of the same sex” is not
fundamental, because same-sex civil marriage is not “deeply rooted in this
60
Nation’s history and tradition;” as a result, the government’s interest in

56. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960 (Mass. 2003) (“The plaintiffs
challenge the marriage statute on both equal protection and due process grounds.”); Lewis v. Harris,
908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006) (noting that plaintiffs presented both due process and equal protection
claims); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006) (same); Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006) (same).
57. See infra Part V.
58. E.g., compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (holding Georgia’s sodomy
statute to be constitutional, because the fundamental due process “right to privacy” did not include
a “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”), with id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“This case is about the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,
namely, the right to be let alone.” (quotations and citation omitted)), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 567 (2003) (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”). Compare also
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (holding that the
fundamental “right to parent” does not include awarding procedural due process rights to a natural
father seeking paternity rights, when (1) the natural father is not the mother’s husband, (2) the
presumption of marital paternity has gone unrebutted, and (3) the mother’s husband wishes to
“embrace the child” within a “unitary family”), with id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the
fundamental due process conception of “‘liberty’ must include the freedom not to conform” to preexisting conceptions of “family” and “parenthood”).
In his Michael H. plurality opinion, Justice Scalia attempted to fix the method of inquiry for
fundamental due process claims as “refer[ring] to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” Id. at 128 n.6.
While four Justices signed on to the plurality opinion, Scalia’s conception of fundamental due
process claims received only two votes: his and Justice Rehnquist’s. See id. at 132 (O’Connor,
Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part).
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalia’s opinion. . . . On occasion the Court has
characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that
might not be the most specific level available. I would not foreclose the unanticipated by
the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
59. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9.
60. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (holding that there is no fundamental
liberty interest in committing suicide or in assisting someone to commit suicide, because committing
suicide is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”) (citation omitted).
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providing only opposite-sex couples with civil marriage receives rational-basis
review. Analytically, same-sex marriage advocates are thus required to establish
two propositions: (1) preventing same-sex couples from marrying is not
rationally related to the state’s interests in sustaining opposite-sex marriage and
(2) allowing opposite-sex couples to marry is also not rationally related to the
state’s interests. Stated differently, same-sex marriage advocates are essentially
required to establish that the state’s purported interests in maintaining opposite61
sex marriage are not legitimate. This is very difficult for two reasons: (1) there
are many reasons that governments have opposite-sex marriage, and courts will
probably find at least some of them to be legitimate; and (2) it is more likely than
not that courts will determine opposite-sex marriage rationally advances these
interests. Of all courts-of-last-resort to review due-process claims for same-sex
marriage, only Goodridge has held that the state’s asserted interests did not
62
survive rational-basis review under a due process claim; this is partly because
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed the right in question to be
“the right to marry the person of one’s choice, subject to appropriate
63
government restrictions in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare.”
No court yet has found a fundamental right to same-sex marriage per se.
Second, our definitional question also raises equal-protection concerns.
64
Laws that limit marriage to heterosexuals single out sexual minorities for
disparate treatment based on a single trait. If courts begin to find that sexual
minorities—particularly homosexuals—comprise a suspect class, they would
begin to undertake a heightened scrutiny of the classifications drawn by
heterosexuals-only marriage laws. Technically speaking, having a heterosexual
sexual orientation is not a prerequisite to marriage: As many opponents delight
in noting, homosexuals remain free to get married—they just have to marry
65
someone of the opposite sex. Nevertheless, under heightened-scrutiny review,
a court would examine the classification to determine what group is most likely
to be disparately impacted by the law. Clearly, same-sex civil marriage bans
have no legal effect on heterosexuals, who continue to enjoy the right to engage
in a course of action consistent with the nature of heterosexuality: entering into a
relationship with someone of the opposite sex and subsequently marrying that
individual. But these bans have a substantial legal effect on homosexuals, who
are prevented from engaging in a course of action consistent with the nature of

61. Cf. generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional
amendment prohibiting the state or local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to
protect homosexuals as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (invalidating a state statute criminalizing homosexual—but not
heterosexual—sodomy as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group).
62. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
63. Id. at 958.
64. This term is used to represent all manner of non-heterosexual individuals.
65. See, e.g., Orson Scott Card, Civilization Watch: Homosexual “Marriage” and Civilization, THE
RHINOCEROS TIMES (Greensboro, N.C.) (online ed.), Feb. 15, 2004 (“[I]t is a flat lie to say that
homosexuals are deprived of any civil right pertaining to marriage. To get those civil rights, all
homosexuals have to do is find someone of the opposite sex willing to join them in marriage.
(alteration added)), available at http://www.ornery.org/essays/warwatch/2004-02-15-1.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2007). But see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 (holding that “the right to marry means little
if it does not include the right to marry the person of one’s choice”).
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homosexuality: entering into a relationship with someone of the same sex and
then marrying that person. As a result, homosexuals as a class are prevented
from engaging in a desired course of action based on a single trait, and the
marriage bans that draw these classifications would face an uphill battle within
a heightened-scrutiny regime.
Unfortunately, the equal-protection heightened-scrutiny claim has not
66
caught on in either federal or state courts. As such, rational-basis review is
currently all that is available for same-sex marriage advocates. Therefore,
advocates must undertake an analysis similar to the one outlined above for due
process. Essentially, they must establish that a heterosexuals-only definition of
marriage irrationally discriminates against homosexuals as homosexuals. Said
differently, advocates must establish that the state has no legitimate interest in
excluding homosexuals from marriage when it makes marriage available to
heterosexuals.
Because marriage is, in due-process terms, an individually-based right and
not a couple-based right, it makes sense to characterize the equal-protection
claim here along the lines of sexual orientation—a classification based on sexual
orientation impacts individuals and not couples. However, the equal-protection
violation could also be characterized as challenging the disparate treatment of
opposite-sex and same-sex couples. Regardless of how the argument is cast, the
67
methodology of the rational-basis analysis remains the same.
All told, advocates have had more success making equal-protection claims
than due-process claims: All courts that have ruled in favor of same-sex couples
have invoked equal protection; these cases have universally resulted in civil
unions. Only Goodridge resulted in “marriage,” most likely because the
Massachusetts Court also invoked due process; to date, it is the only court to
have done so. Had Goodridge found only an equal-protection violation, the case
68
might well have resulted in civil unions, just like the others.

66. But see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211–21 (N.J. 2006) (noting that, in light of the general
equal-protection guarantees of the New Jersey Constitution and the state’s history of positive
treatment of homosexuals, the interest of same-sex couples in receiving the benefits of marriage
outweighed the state’s interest in denying same-sex couples these benefits). The Lewis Court did not
make an express finding that homosexuals are constitutionally entitled to heightened scrutiny for
equal-protection claims. See id. at 211–24.
67. But see generally Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy,
34 RUTGERS L.J. 107 (2002) (arguing that same-sex marriage bans constitute straightforward sexdiscrimination violations and are therefore entitled to intermediate scrutiny under the federal
Constitution); but see also infra note 404 and accompanying text.
68. Compare Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969 (in response to both due-process and equal-protection
violations, construing “civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the
exclusion of all others”), with Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221–24 (ordering on equal-protection grounds that
same-sex couples be given the rights and benefits of civil marriage, but not requiring that the
resulting legal arrangement be termed “marriage”) and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (same).
See also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60–67 (Haw. 1993) (characterizing the equal-protection violation
as based in sex discrimination, which triggered heightened scrutiny under the Hawai’i Constitution;
remanding claim for further review under the heightened-scrutiny standard), superseded by
constitutional amendment and subsequent statute, HAW. CONST. art I, § 23 (adopted 1998) (reserving
power to define marriage to the legislature); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (West Supp. 2006) (defining
marriage as between one man and one woman). The Baehr Court is the only court-of-last-resort to
date that has found a ban on same-sex marriage to expressly trigger any constitutionally-mandated
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As these brief discussions show, the definitional question can be resolved
in favor of same-sex civil marriage within the scope of either doctrine: Under
substantive due process, we must adopt a broad definition of the “right to
marry,” regardless of whether a fundamental right is implicated; under equal
protection, we must identify homosexuals as a suspect class deserving of
69
70
heightened scrutiny. In rarer instances—i.e., Goodridge or Lewis —we might
determine that the state’s interest is so lacking that neither of these actions is
prerequisite to holding in favor of same-sex civil marriage or civil unions.
The arguments for same-sex civil marriage are numerous, nuanced, and
complex. Because I am not advancing a due-process or equal-protection
71
argument in favor of same-sex marriage, rehearsing them here is not necessary.
For our purposes, it is important to keep in mind the courts’ consistent
application of rational-basis review and the accompanying analytical method.
B. The Establishment Clause and Our Religious Heritage
In our pluralistic society, religious beliefs and sectarian texts like the Bible
are considered by many to be unacceptable grounds for developing generally72
applicable social and political policy. The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment reflect the Framers’ understanding that, when society conflates
worldly and spiritual authorities, it undermines both. Religions cannot flourish
when subjected to governmental meddling, and republican governments cannot
survive when they are hijacked by religious dogma. The English settlement of
New England began as a direct result of religious persecution against the
Puritan belief system; the Settlers’ own experiments with religious governance
showed that striving toward an ideologically-homogenous state led to
dangerously unstable and tyrannical results—i.e., the Salem witch trials. Against
this instructive history, the Framers drew the Religion Clauses to establish two
primary goals: (1) keeping the government out of the pulpit (the Free Exercise
Clause), and (2) keeping the pulpit out of the government (the Establishment
Clause).
The American legal system has historically assumed that there is no
inherent Establishment Clause problem with the form of marriage it inherited

heightened scrutiny, and Baehr is the only case so far to hold for same-sex marriage on a sexdiscrimination theory.
69. 798 N.E.2d at 969.
70. 908 A.2d at 221–24.
71. As we will see, the argument is not “give us same-sex marriage.” Instead, it is “you haven’t
given a good enough reason not to give us same-sex marriage.” These statements are cognitively
different: one demands a positive assignment of rights, which would shift the scales from being
weighted against same-sex marriage to being weighted for it; the other merely rids the scales of
religious arguments—this may or may not weight the scales in favor of same-sex marriage, but it
certainly makes room for more discussion based on genuinely secular arguments.
72. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, http://www.au.org; People for
the American Way, http://www.pfaw.org; American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org;
see also infra Table 2 and accompanying text. But see “Our Fight Is Your Fight,” EQUALITY, Fall 2006, at
9, 11 (interview with Dolores Huerta, co-founder of the United Farmworkers of America) (reporting
that a California legislator explained his vote against California’s 2006 marriage-equality bill with
the statement, “I vote my religion.”).
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from the English common law. Indeed, advocates of same-sex marriage have
brought an Establishment Clause claim in only one case, Dean v. District of
74
Columbia [Dean I]. It is ironic, then, that in dismissing the Dean I plaintiffs’
challenge as “patently frivolous,” the trial judge cited to the Bible and to specific
Judeo-Christian beliefs regarding the immorality of sodomy and the sinfulness
75
of possessing a homosexual status. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs abandoned
76
their Establishment Clause claim on appeal.
The Dean I trial court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court’s cases Lemon
77
78
79
v. Kurtzman, McGowan v. Maryland, and Bowers v. Hardwick. The Court has
subsequently altered both Lemon and McGowan since Dean I, and their
applicability to First Amendment challenges has been largely supplanted by
newer articulations of the constitutional values underpinning the Establishment
80
81
Clause. Moreover, Bowers was overruled explicitly in Lawrence v. Texas; as a
result, it is an outstanding question whether bare religious disapproval of
homosexual conduct still constitutes a legitimate justification for reserving civil

73. For a brief overview of the development of English ecclesiastical laws and their subsequent
adoption into American legal canons, see Rev. Ellen M. Barrett, Legal Homophobia and the Christian
Church, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019 (1978). See also Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Same-Sex Marriage: The
Cultural Wars and the Lessons of Legal History, 38 FAM. L.Q. 427 (2004) (tracing the tangled history of
religious and civil marriage in early America; delineating extant sources of pre-American religious
marriage laws, including the Code of Hammurabi, the Torah, the New Testament, Roman consent
laws, Anglican and Catholic traditions in Europe, and the English common law).
74. Civ. A. No. 90-13892, slip op. at *4–8 (D.C. Super. Dec. 30, 1991) (challenging the 1981
version of the District of Columbia’s Marriage Act, which has been subsequently amended to
provide limited domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples, while still reserving “marriage”
for opposite-sex couples), available at 1992 WL 685364, aff’d on other grounds, 653 A.2d 307 [Dean II]
(D.C. 1995).
75. Dean I, slip op. at *4 n.18.
76. See generally Dean II, 653 A.2d at 307.
77. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (announcing the three-part “Lemon test”; holding that two programs
providing state aid to non-public sectarian schools constituted excessive government entanglement
with religion). See also infra Part IV (discussing the Lemon test and its evolution).
78. 366 U.S. 420, 442, 444–49 (1961) (holding that, despite their explicitly religious origin, statewide Sunday Closing Laws did not violate the federal Constitution, because they had a reasonable
secular purpose that existed independent of any incidental religious one; noting that “the
‘Establishment’ Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions”). It would seem,
then, that McGowan presents a specific challenge to the thesis presented here—if there is a
sufficiently secular reason for basing our modern-day definition of marriage upon a religious one,
why then would opposite-sex marriage laws fail constitutional scrutiny? This characterization of
McGowan slightly misconstrues the question before us. As I will discuss below, the question is not
whether there is a “reasonable” secular purpose behind having opposite-sex marriage; this is
undoubtedly true. Instead, the question is whether there is a “reasonable” secular purpose behind
banning same-sex civil marriage. As I will establish, there are no such purposes. Therefore, even
under McGowan’s rule, same-sex civil marriage bans cannot pass constitutional muster. See infra Part
V.A (raising and dismissing the key arguments used to support same-sex marriage bans).
79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
80. See infra Part IV (discussing McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), and Van Orden
v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005)).
81. 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
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marriage to opposite-sex couples only. No cases since Dean I have raised the
Establishment Clause question addressed in this Article. Only recently have
83
84
government officials and commentators begun to recognize the importance of
82. After Lawrence, many commentators have questioned what morals-based legislation—if
any—could survive its reasoning. See generally, e.g., Tribe, supra note 54; Sunstein, supra note 51.
83. 152 CONG. REC. S5465 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Dayton).
What we ought to do is leave marriage up to God. In the religious marriage services of my
faith, the minister says that marriage is an institution created by God. Thus, we should
leave the definition of marriage to those ordained by God, the leaders of the respective
organized religions, and we should redefine the legal term for marriage to civil union or
some other words and make that legal contract, with its rights, protections, and
responsibilities, available equally to any two adult citizens as the equal protection clauses
of our Constitution require.
That would be an American, a Christian, and a just resolution to this situation, one that
elevates and enlightens us, one that continues the progress in our country toward
acceptance and understanding, one that honors our common humanity.
Id.; id. at S5469 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
[I]t should be the right of every religion, under the freedom of religion, to decide the
sacramental laws of marriage as defined by that religion. But when it comes to the
contractual right, the civil right, that is determined by the State. That is why when you go
to get married, you do two things—find a minister, a rabbi, a priest, whatever, but then
you have to go to the courthouse of your State and get a license. Why? Because you are
entering a contractual relationship. That is what this amendment would take away. Again,
I would defend to the death the right of a religion to determine its own sacramental laws
of what it determines a marriage to be, but also defend the right of a State to set up its own
contractual laws within and under the umbrella of equal rights for all and
nondiscrimination under the Constitution of the United States.
Id. (alteration added). See also 152 CONG. REC. H5294 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Cleaver) (“[T]he domain of the church is the place where definitions should be made with regard to
marriage. Every denomination has struggled with this issue.” (alteration added)); id. at H5309
(statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“The vocal proponents of the MPA [FMA] show their strong and
willful hatred of the gay and lesbian community. This egregious amendment would enshrine
discrimination against a specific group of citizens and intolerance of specific religious beliefs into
our Nation’s most sacred document.” (alteration added)); 150 CONG. REC. H7922 (2004) (written
statement of Rep. Jones) (“[W]e . . . must resist the temptation to have the State engage in a religious
battle. Separation of church and state is the basic principle of this Nation and it exempts us from this
unnecessary action. Separation of church and state gives ministers, rabbis, imams, priests, [and]
reverends . . . the freedom to practice their faith and choose to marry, or more importantly not to
marry, any two people before them.” (alterations added)); id. at H7924 (statement of Rep. Wexler)
(“Not only does this amendment completely disregard [our] basic liberties but it actually erodes the
religious freedom upon which our great nation was founded.” (alteration added)); id. at H7931
(statement of Rep. Meehan) (“[I]f we leave the Constitution intact, every church, every community,
and every State will be free to define marriage as they choose.” (alteration added)); id. at H7932
(statement of Rep. Honda) (“The legal right to marry—be it man-to-woman or same-sex—is and
must remain separate from the religious one.”).
84. See, e.g., BARRY W. LYNN, PIETY & POLITICS: THE RIGHT-WING ASSAULT ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 203 (2006).
The Federal Marriage Amendment . . . would say to Unitarian ministers, ministers like
myself in the United Church of Christ, and Reform rabbis, ‘Even though you have
ecclesiastical authority to perform same-gender marriage rituals, we the state will not
recognize those.’ That preference for state ‘blessing’ of only certain marriage rituals seems
clearly to violate the idea of equal treatment of all faith traditions in America.
Id. See also Editorial, Massachusetts diocese might no longer marry: Episcopal priests would stop acting as
agents of the state, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), October 11, 2006, at 16A (describing the
Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts’s proposal to stop performing legal marriages as “a healthy
separation” between “ministers and priests” and “agents of the state”).
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separating church from state in the course of resolving the definitional crisis
regarding marriage.
American society and governments have historically—and in the past few
years, deliberately—conflated civil marriage with religious marriage. In colonial
times, English ecclesiastical marriage served as the model for what is frequently
85
termed “traditional marriage.” Despite its religious moniker, ecclesiastical
marriage was derived in part from the feudal system of property, by which
parents arranged marriages between the children of similarly-stationed families
in order to protect family interests in land. The church’s role in marriage was
twofold: (1) to provide a divine blessing for the marriage, and (2) to stand in loco
gubernationis for the Crown, similar to how a modern-day state or federal agency
governs under the auspices of its respective executive branch. As a result, the
church served both religious and legal needs because the English monarchy had
86
no administrative system akin to the modern American system.
With the rise of the American administrative state, the church found its role
in the legal—or “civil”—part of marriage increasingly limited: Parties seeking
only a “civil” marriage can circumvent the religious aspects of marriage entirely,
as each state vests certain government officials with the power to solemnize a
marriage. Religious leaders have retained the power to solemnize a marriage on
behalf of the government—and legal presumptions favoring validity may arise
as a result of a religious marriage ceremony—but the parties generally must file
87
for a marriage license from the state before a marriage becomes fully valid.
Modern conceptions of what constitutes a “civil marriage” are relatively
universal: “Civil marriage” occurs when the government recognizes the legal
existence of a relationship between certain kinds and numbers of individuals,
and as a result of that relationship, vests in those individuals a bundle of legallyenforceable rights, benefits, and responsibilities. Both opponents and advocates
of same-sex marriage proffer definitions of marriage that fall within this generic
teleological conception of marriage: What opponents of same-sex marriage call
“traditional marriage” is the “one-man, one-woman” model of civil marriage
that prevails in all jurisdictions save Massachusetts; as mentioned above, samesex marriage advocates characterize civil marriage as a two-party, choice-based
institution, regardless of the gender of the parties. Both of these definitions
classify relationships along lines of quality (i.e., gender of the parties) and

85. Opponents of same-sex marriage have adopted the phrase “traditional marriage” as a
clarion call to their fundamentalist constituencies. Lawmakers and fundamentalist political activists
alike frequently use code words—e.g., “traditional marriage,” “ideal environment,” “gendercomplementarity,” “values-transmission”—to signal their support for insinuating one set of
fundamentalist Christian values into the law. See discussion infra Part III.A (identifying code words
as a key part of the modernization of anti-gay discourse).
86. See also generally Barrett, supra note 73.
87. But see State v. Denton, 983 P.2d 693 (Wash. App. 1999) (validating a marriage when, despite
their failure to formally file for a marriage license, the couple had gone through a religious ceremony
and had held one another out as husband and wife for a period of several years). See also IRA MARK
ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 73–79 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the formal
requirements for licensing and solemnizing a marriage; identifying potential procedural defects in
meeting these formal requirements; discussing various judicial methods of addressing procedural
defects).
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quantity (i.e., number of parties), but they give a different weight to each of the
factors. Advocates place almost no weight on the quality of the parties, while
opponents give each factor equal importance.
Religious notions of “marriage” vary widely and depend both upon the
creed of the religious institution and upon the particular adherents.
Teleologically, modern permutations of “religious marriage” range from twoparty marriage (including same-sex marriage) to man-woman marriage (so—
called “traditional marriage”) to polygamy. Table 1 summarizes the positions of
major American and world religions regarding the nature of marriage.
This list of religious beliefs is far from exhaustive, and it is not intended to
characterize non-Judeo-Christian faith communities one-dimensionally. It is
indeed likely that theological and philosophical divisions exist within Buddhist,
Islamic, and Hindu traditions that parallel the theological divisions among Jews
and Christians over the issues of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. For our
purposes, however, this table is sufficient to show that, both in America and
worldwide, there is no religious consensus on the meaning of “marriage.”
Opponents of same-sex marriage have pointed out that, regardless of this
diversity of belief, the vast majority of religious observers in America belong to
groups that either oppose or are theologically suspicious of homosexuality and
89
same-sex marriage. Undoubtedly, the opponents’ suggestion is that such an
incredible majority of believers cannot be wrong about the meaning of marriage.
While it is true that a huge majority of believers belong to faith traditions that
profess belief in exclusively opposite-sex marriage, it is an oversimplification to
assume that every believer within each one of those faith traditions also believes
that same-sex religious marriage is theologically unsound. Such a suggestion
belies the complexity of most faith systems and willfully mischaracterizes the
ongoing theological shift occurring within several large, mainstream churches.
Consider: the list of religious groups in the “Traditional Marriage” column
is the largest of any column. However, a nearly-equal number of religious
groups are listed in the “Traditional Marriage”-Plus column, and if we add in
the number of religious groups in the Two-Party Marriage column, the total
exceeds the number of groups listed in the first. Of the groups listed under
“Traditional Marriage”-Plus, a significant number have simultaneously affirmed
opposite-sex marriage and begun to grapple with the theological implications of
same-sex marriage. This reveals that religious beliefs regarding same-sex mar-

88. There may be a third dimension to the teleological matrix: character (i.e., intimate
relationship between the parties). However, an intimate relationship is no longer required for a
marriage to legally exist, and parties to a marriage are not required to love one another before they
get married. See supra notes 54–55 (discussing the general consensus that the legal aspects of
marriage no longer turn on the parties’ ability to procreate or their willingness to be intimate). As a
result, the character of marriage seems significantly less relevant to the teleological debate than the
quality and quantity of marriage. But see infra Part V.A.2.d (discussing the civilizing qualities
inherent in marital relationships).
89. See, e.g., MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, WORLD RELIGIONS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 1 (2002) (“In
the United States, of 163,916,650 adherents of the five major religions [Christianity, Judaism, Islam,
Hinduism, and Buddhism], 160,049,690 are in religious bodies that affirm the classical definition of
marriage (97.6 percent), while 3,030,930 are in religious bodies which support same-sex ‘marriage’
(2.4 percent).” (alteration added)), available at http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/publications/wrr.pdf.
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TABLE 1. RELIGIOUS VIEWS ON MARRIAGE.
“Traditional Marriage”:
Opposite-Sex Marriage

“Traditional Marriage”Plus:
Opposite-Sex Marriage;
Some Congregations Bless
Same-Sex Unions;

Two-Party Marriage:
Opposite-Sex and Same-Sex
Marriage

Polygamy/Polyamory

No Unified Theological
Viewpoint
Christian Traditions
American Baptist
Association

90

Anabaptists (Amish,
Mennonites)

91

Christian Traditions

American Baptist Churches
in the USA (Northern
Baptist Convention,
American Baptist

Alliance of Baptists
(Southern Baptist

Convention)

Assemblies of God
(Pentecostal)

Christian Traditions

92

Children of God (The
93

Family)

Christian Church (Disciples
115
of Christ)
Church of Christ, Scientist

National Gay Pentecostal

116

Community of Christ
(Reorganized Latter117

95

Day Saints)

Church of Christ
(Mormons)

96

Coptic Orthodox

Episcopal Church, USA

Evangelical Christian Church
98

(Christian Disciples)
Watchtower)

Evangelical Lutheran Church
120

of America

99

134

Alliance

135

United Church of Canada

136

United Church of Christ

Other Traditions
Islam: opposite-sex
marriage and
polygamy—man may
have two or more
141

wives

Presbyterian Church in
100
America (PCA)

Quakers (Society of

Reformed Church in

United Methodist Church

137

138

Reform

Other Traditions
Unitarian-Universalist
Association

Presbyterian Church
121
(USA)

Jehovah’s Witnesses (The

133

Reconstructionist
119

97

Church

Judaic Traditions

Cooperative Baptist
118
Fellowship

Latter-Day Saints

132

Metropolitan Community

(Christian Science)

Christian Reformed
94
(Calvinist)

131

Alliance)

Evangelicals Concerned

114

Christian Traditions
Fundamentalist Latter-Day
Saints: opposite-sex
marriage and
polygamy—man may
have two or more
140
wives

139

122

Friends)

123

101

America

124

Unity Church
102

Roman Catholic Church

Russian Orthodox Church

Judaic Traditions

103

104

Conservative

125

Seventh-Day Adventist

Other Traditions

Southern Baptist

Buddhism

Convention

126

105

Native American
127

Traditions

Unification Church
(“Moonies”)

106

Neopaganism (Asatru,
Druid, Wicca,
128
Witchcraft)

United Pentecostal Church
International

107
108

Scientology

The Way, International

109

Worldwide Church of God

Theosophy

129

130

Judaic Traditions
Orthodox (and Ultra110
Orthodox)
Other Traditions
111

Baha’i

112

Hinduism

Zoroastrianism

113

90. Religious Tolerance.org, American Baptist Association and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_aba.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
91. Religious Tolerance.org, The Mennonite Churches and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_men.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); Religious Tolerance.org, The Amish:
Practices of Various Groups, http://www.religioustolerance.org/amish4.htm (describing marriage
practices of several Amish communities in America) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
92. Religious Tolerance.org, The Assemblies of God and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_aog.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
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93. Religious Tolerance.org, The Family a.k.a. The Children of God: Its beliefs about homosexuality, http://www.religioustolerance.org/homthefam.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
94. Religious Tolerance.org, Christian Reformed Church and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_crc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
95. Religious Tolerance.org, The Church of Christ, and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_coc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
96. Religious Tolerance.org, The LDS Church & Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_lds.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
97. Religious Tolerance.org, The Coptic Orthodox Church and homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_copt.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
98. Religious Tolerance.org, The Evangelical Christian Church and Homosexuality, http://
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_eccdc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
99. Religious Tolerance.org, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_jeh.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
100. Religious Tolerance.org, The Presbyterian Church in American (PCA) and Homosexuality:
Statements on homosexuality: 2000 to now, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_pcia3.htm (last
visited Jan. 4, 2007).
101. Religious Tolerance.org, Reformed Church in America and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_rca.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
102. Religious Tolerance.org, Roman Catholic Church and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_rom4.htm#ssm (last visited Jan. 4. 2007).
103. Religious Tolerance.org, Russian Orthodox Church and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_russi.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
104. Religious Tolerance.org, The Seventh-Day Adventist Church and Homosexuality, http://
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_sda.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
105. Religious Tolerance.org, Southern Baptist Convention and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_sbc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
106. Religious Tolerance.org, The Unification Church and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_uni.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
107. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and the Pentecostal movement, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_upci.htm (last visited Jan. 4. 2007). Several offshoots of the Pentecostal
movement—e.g., the National Gay Pentecostal Alliance—would fall in the “Two-Party Marriage”
category as fully affirming the right of same-sex couples to be religiously married. Id.
108. Religious Tolerance.org, The Way, International and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_way.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
109. Religious Tolerance.org, The Worldwide Church of God and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_wcg.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
110. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Orthodox Judaism, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_jortho.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
111. Religious Tolerance.org, The Baha’i Faith and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_bah.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
112. MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, supra note 89, at 3 (“Within the history of Hinduism, one finds a
variety of views on homosexual feelings and behaviors, ranging from indifference to disapproval to
strong opposition.” (citing Arvind Sharma, Homosexuality and Hinduism, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND
WORLD RELIGIONS 68 (Arlene Swidler ed., 1993) (observing that as “a religion Hinduism is perhaps
more tolerant of homosexuality than it is as a culture”))).
113. Religious Tolerance.org, The Zoroastrian Faith and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_zor.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Zoroastrians have taken no public
stance on same-sex marriage, and they are divided regarding the morality of homosexuality. Id.
114. Religious Tolerance.org, American Baptist Churches in the USA, and Homosexuality,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_abc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
115. Religious Tolerance.org, The Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) and Homosexuality,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_disc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
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116. Religious Tolerance.org, The Church of Christ, Scientist (Christian Scientist) & Homosexuality, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_chsc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
117. Religious Tolerance.org, The Community of Christ and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_reo.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
118. Religious Tolerance.org, The Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, and Homosexuality, http://
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_cbf.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
119. Religious Tolerance.org, The Episcopal Church, USA and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_epis.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
120. Religious Tolerance.org, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and Homosexuality,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_ecla4.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
121. Religious Tolerance.org, The Presbyterian Church (USA) and Same-Sex Unions, http://
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_pru5.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); Religious Tolerance.org, The
Presbyterian Church (USA) and Homosexuality, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_pru.htm
(last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
122. Religious Tolerance.org, The Society of Friends (Quakers) and Homosexuality, http://
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_quak.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
123. Religious Tolerance.org, The United Methodist Church and Homosexuality: An Overview,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_umc4.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
124. Religious Tolerance.org, Unity Church and Homosexuality, http://www.religioustolerance.
org/hom_unit.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
125. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Conservative Judaism, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_jcons.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). See also Laurie Goodstein,
Conservative Jews Allow Gay Rabbis and Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A26 (reporting on the
December 6, 2006 vote that permitted “individual synagogues to decide whether to accept or reject
gay rabbis and commitment ceremonies”).
126. Religious Tolerance.org, The Buddhist Religion and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_budd.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Buddhists have taken no public
stance regarding same-sex marriage, but they are generally against anti-gay discrimination. Id.
However, the Dalai Lama has described homosexual sex as against Buddhist teachings because it is a
misuse of the sex organs. Id.
127. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and Religion: Policies of Non-Judeo-Christian
Religions, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_chur3.htm#nativ (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
Many Native American traditions have celebrated homosexuals as healers and shamans, referring to
them as berdache or “two-spirited.” Id. To date, no Native American tribes permit same-sex
marriage, but several tribes—including the Cherokee and Navajo—have taken up the issue in recent
years. See Lois Romano, Battle Over Gay Marriage Plays Out in Indian Country, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
2005, at A2 (noting that one Cherokee lesbian couple was permitted to marry before the Cherokee
Nation banned same-sex civil marriage).
128. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and Religion: Policies of Non-Judeo-Christian
Religions, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_chur3.htm#neopa (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). It is
likelier than not that, given the general openness of Neopaganism to homosexuality, most
Neopaganists would publicly support same-sex marriage within their faith traditions. However,
given the decentralized nature of the coven system, there is no one public stance on same-sex
marriage that is attributable to Neopaganism. See id.
129. Religious Tolerance.org, The Church of Scientology® & homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_scie.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Scientologists have taken no public
stance regarding same-sex marriage, but they are generally against anti-gay discrimination. Id.
130. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and Theosophy, http://www.religioustolerance.
org/hom_theo.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Theosophists have taken no public stance regarding
same-sex marriage, but they are generally against anti-gay discrimination. Id.
131. Religious Tolerance.org, The Alliance of Baptists and homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/homalbapt.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
132. Evangelicals Concerned, About Evangelicals Concerned, http://www.ecwr.org/aboutus/
aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Evangelicals Concerned is “a nationwide ministry which
encourages and affirms lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered Christians in their faith.” Id. See also
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-riage are neither static nor universally-held within a single faith system—in
fact, a heated debate is currently taking place within major religious groups
142
around the nation.
Finally, it is critical to understand that, just because a particular religious
group rejects same-sex religious marriage, it does not necessarily follow that the
Neela Banerjee, Gay and Evangelical, Seeking Paths of Acceptance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at A1
(reporting on Evangelicals Concerned and other gay-affirming Evangelical Christian groups).
133. Religious Tolerance.org, The Metropolitan Community Church and Homosexuality,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_met.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
134. Religious Tolerance.org, Homosexuality and the Pentecostal movement, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_upci.htm (last visited Jan. 4. 2007).
135. Religious Tolerance.org, United Church of Canada and Homosexuality, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_ucc.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
136. Religious Tolerance.org, United Church of Christ and Homosexuality: General Synod 25 in
2005: Endorsement of same-sex marriage, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_ucca4.htm (last
visited Jan. 4, 2007).
137. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Other Groups, http://www.religious
tolerance.org/hom_jother.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
138. Religious
Tolerance.org,
Judaism
and
Homosexuality:
Reform
Judaism,
http://www.religious tolerance.org/hom_jref.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
139. Religious Tolerance.org, The Unitarian-Universalist Association and Homosexuality,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_uua.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
140. See Bill Hanna, Sect’s Texas Outpost Looking Permanent, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 1,
2007, at B1 (cataloguing polygamous history of the Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints from
1890–2006).
141. See OFFENHAUER, supra note 40, at 40–41 (cataloguing Islamic nations in which polygamy is
legal). See also Religious Tolerance.org, Islam and Homosexuality: All Viewpoints, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_isla.htm (noting that Islamic traditions oppose homosexuality and
same-sex relationships and that homosexual behavior is punishable by death in several Islamic
nations) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
142. The seriousness of this theological dispute is not debatable. For example, the seventy-seven
million-member world-wide Anglican Communion, known in the United States as the Episcopalian
Church, has begun to schism over the ordination of openly homosexual bishops. See, e.g.,
Episcopalians approve gay bishop: Opposition vows to seek intervention from Anglican leaders, CNN.COM,
Aug. 6, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/08/05/bishop/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Alex Kirby,
Analysis: Anglican schism nears reality, BBC NEWS UK, Feb. 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/
4296373.stm.
In an attempt to stave off schism, key Anglican leaders have begun a dialogue about how to keep
the church from fracturing over the issues of homosexuality, gay-ordination, and same-sex marriage.
E.g., Peter Lee & Jack Spong, A Catechesis on Homosexuality (2006), http://www.dioceseofnewark.
org/jsspong/catech.html (identifying the roots of the theological debate over homosexuality and
encouraging Anglicans to remain committed to continued unification) (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
Bishops Lee and Spong are from the Dioceses of Christ the King (Southern Africa) and Newark
(USA), respectively. Id.
Despite these best efforts, American Episcopalians are finding that the issue of schism is far from
resolved. On December 17, 2006, eight Episcopal parishes in Virginia voted to break with the
American Episcopal Church over the ordination of gays and women. Wars of Religion, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 23, 2006, at 65.
Finally, intra-sect divisions over social issues are not limited to same-sex marriage. For example, in
the abortion context, most of the religious groups in the “Traditional Marriage” column oppose
abortion, but polls show that the majority of Americans support preserving a woman’s right to
choose as a fundamental constitutional right. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ABORTION AND RIGHTS OF
TERROR SUSPECTS TOP COURT ISSUES 1 (2005), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/
253.pdf.
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group also rejects same-sex civil marriage. As mentioned above, some religious
groups regard the legal right to marry as a civil or human right, regardless of
143
their own beliefs about the morality or immorality of homosexuality. Likewise,
individuals within faith traditions are not of one mind—and as voters, they may
vote against same-sex marriage bans as a matter of civic conscience, while
simultaneously believing that homosexuality is sinful or theologically
problematic.
And what of non-theists? Secularists are found throughout America. By its
nature, secularism rejects religion and mysticism, instead drawing upon
philosophy and science as sources of personal morality. As a whole, Secularists
144
favor same-sex civil marriage. For comparison purposes, the beliefs of
Secularists are laid out in Table 2.
TABLE 2. SECULAR VIEWS ON MARRIAGE.
“Traditional Marriage”:
Opposite-Sex Marriage

“Traditional Marriage”Plus:
Opposite-Sex Marriage;
Some Members Support
Same-Sex Unions;

Two-Party Marriage:

Polygamy/Polyamory

Opposite-Sex and Same-Sex
Marriage

No Unified Viewpoint
Atheist Traditions
145

American Atheists

Humanist Traditions
American Humanist
Association (Humanist
Society)

146

Council for Secular
147
Humanism
Institute for Humanist
148

Studies

Secular Traditions
Secular Coalition for
149

America

150

Secular Judaism

143. E.g., Religious Tolerance.org, Reformed Church in America and Homosexuality, http://
www.religioustolerance.org/hom_rca.htm (noting that, while “[h]omosexuality is not God’s
intended expression of sexuality,” the church also believes that “[h]omosexual persons should be
accorded their full measure of human and civil rights” (alterations added)) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007);
see also Religious Tolerance.org, The United Methodist Church and Homosexuality: An Overview,
http://www. religioustolerance.org/hom_umc4.htm (reporting that liberals within the UMC
“generally look upon gay/lesbian ordination and same-sex marriage as civil rights issues—
fundamental human rights . . . that should be available to persons of all sexual orientations”) (last
visited Jan. 4, 2007).
144. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
145. American Atheists, Inc., Vote on Federal Marriage Amendment Slated for Tuesday, June 6,
http://www.atheists.org/action/alert-03-jun-2006.html (urging atheists to “oppose religion-based
discrimination” in the form of a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex civil marriage)
(last visited Dec. 19, 2006); see also American Atheists, Inc., Bush Push for Federal Marriage
“Protection” Amendment—Senate May Vote Tues [sic] on S.J.1, “The Battle of Our Times,” http://
www.atheists.org/flash.line/gaym1.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2007).
146. Press Release, American Humanist Association, Considerations Regarding Proposals to
Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons, http://www.americanhumanist.
org/press/VaticanMarriage.html (noting that the AHA has advocated for legal recognition of samesex marriage for decades; stating that “[t]he AHA will continue to advocate for equal justice under
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These tables are not an exercise in mere exhaustiveness—establishing the
diversity of religious and Secularist opinion in America is central to the point.
America’s ongoing failure to distinguish religious from civil marriage has led to
two constitutionally-impermissible results: (1) the government is allowing a
majority of religious believers to impose a theological definition of “marriage”
upon a significantly-sized minority of non-believers and different-believers,
without offering a rationally secular justification for the mandated definition;
and (2) by allowing this to occur, the government is endorsing the majority’s
definition of religious marriage, and as a result, has created a sizeable class of
political outsiders who are being told that their religious beliefs are, at best, lessworthy than the majority’s or, at worst, simply wrong. The Establishment Clause
151
expressly forbids such explicit sectarianism.
II. A PRIMER ON THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AND ITS KIN
A. What Are Same-Sex Marriage Bans and What Do They Do?
Before we undertake our constitutional analysis, it is important to
understand what same-sex marriage bans are and what they are intended to
accomplish. Typically, same-sex marriage bans arise as either constitutional
amendments or statutory revisions to pre-existing Marriage Acts, and they come
in two general flavors: those that ban legal recognition of same-sex marriages
152
performed in other jurisdictions—also known as Defense of Marriage Acts —

the law, and won’t rest until there are equal marriage laws in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia” (alteration added)) (last visited Dec. 19, 2006). See also Charlene Gomes, The Need for Full
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 63 HUMANIST 15 (Sept.–Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.thehumanist.org/ humanist/articles/GomesSO03.pdf.
147. Massimo Pigliucci, Rationally Speaking: Bush, the Pope, and Gay Rights (2003), http://
www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=columns&page=03-10-pope-vs-gays (last visited
Jan. 4, 2007).
148. Institute for Humanist Studies, Testimony in Support of Legally Recognizing Same-Sex
Marriage in New York State, http://humaniststudies.org/media/same_sex_marriage.html (transcript of testimony of Matt Cherry, Executive Director of the IHS) (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
149. Secular Coalition for America, Constitutional amendments on marriage, http://secular.org/
issues/marriage/?view=summary (opposing bans on same-sex civil marriage because they enact
“theological definitions for civil contracts”) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
150. Religious Tolerance.org, Judaism and Homosexuality: Other Groups, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/hom_jother.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
151. But see George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 593 (1999)
(“Basing the legal definition of marriage on religion would not breach the Constitution’s
Establishment Clause because it does not endorse or compel obedience to any faith.”). Dent elides
the fact that basing the civil definition of “marriage” upon a religious one requires the government
to choose among several available definitions of marriage. While such a definition would certainly
not compel religious observance, the very act of choosing one religious definition over another clearly
endorses the religion that supplied the preferred definition. Moreover, the government must have a
rational secular basis for adopting the chosen definition—as discussed below, none of the proffered
justifications for same-sex marriage bans is rationally secular. See discussion infra Part V (raising and
dismissing the “secular” arguments against same-sex marriage; applying the Lemon-endorsement
test to same-sex marriage bans).
152. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020(1)(c), (3) (West Supp. 2006).
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and those that permit only opposite-sex marriage to the exclusion of all others.
Many states that have adopted same-sex marriage bans have adopted both
154
types.
Whether stated positively (e.g., “To be valid or recognized in this State
155
[Alaska], a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.” ) or
negatively (e.g., “Marriages, whether created by common law, contracted, or
performed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of the same gender
156
are not valid in North Carolina.” ), the legal effect is the same: Same-sex civil
marriage bans prohibit the legal recognition of any civil or religious marriage
between persons of the same sex.
Some bans go even further, prohibiting the creation of marriage-like legal
arrangements or the conferral of marriage-like benefits (commonly referred to as
157
“the legal incidents” of marriage). These broad-based “legal-incidents” bans
are even more sweeping than simple same-sex marriage bans: Whether by
accident or by design, they bar same-sex couples from obtaining even marginal
legal protections for their relationships.
Proponents of “legal-incidents” bans claim that they are only intended to
prevent legislatures and municipal governments from allowing same-sex
158
couples to enter civil unions and domestic partnerships. Despite this assertion,

(1) Marriages in the following cases are prohibited: . . . (c) When the parties are persons
other than a male and a female.
....
(3) A marriage between two persons that is recognized as valid in another jurisdiction is
valid in this state only if the marriage is not prohibited or made unlawful under
subsection . . . (1)(c) . . . of this section.
Id.
153. E.g., id. § 26.04.010(1) (West Supp. 2006) (“Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a
female . . . .”).
154. See supra notes 26–28 (cataloguing state-level bans on same-sex marriage).
155. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted 1998) (alteration added).
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (West Supp. 2006).
157. E.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one man and one
woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any
state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any
member of a union other than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status
identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be
valid or recognized. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any
marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one
woman.
Id. (emphasis added).
158. See, e.g., Chris L. Jenkins, Voters to Decide on Gay Unions, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2006, at VA23
(reporting that the purported goal of the Virginia constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage and civil unions was to “protect against judges who might rule that the current statut[ory
ban] is unconstitutional” (alteration added)). Virginia’s constitutional amendment reads:
[O]nly a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
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it is an outstanding question whether these bans potentially reach private
159
relationship contracts, wills, and powers of attorney. For example, Michigan’s
state attorney general recently determined that Michigan’s constitutional
amendment bars state and local governments from offering employment
160
benefits to same-sex couples as domestic partners.
Similarly, Ohio’s
amendment has been read to bar unmarried heterosexual domestic-violence
victims from bringing certain suits against their batterers in Domestic Violence
Court, because standing to bring these claims is limited to persons in a legal
161
familial relationship, which is only created through blood or marriage.
At the federal level, there is already a statutory ban on same-sex marriages:
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Enacted in 1996, DOMA was
codified in two separate titles of the United States Code. First, DOMA enacted a
garden-variety ban on same-sex marriage by establishing a “one-man, one162
woman” definition of marriage for the purposes of federal law. Until DOMA,
there had never been a federal definition of marriage; moreover, the Supreme
Court has long recognized that the regulation of family law—including
determining what constitutes “marriage”—lies beyond the reach of federal

qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political
subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to which
is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (adopted 2006) (alteration added).
159. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 158, at VA23 (reporting that opponents of the Virginia
constitutional amendment thought it could potentially hamper “the ability of unwed heterosexual
couples to engage in contracts covering such things as property ownership and allowing partners to
determine health care”; noting that opponents thought it might also “threaten protective orders and
additional safeguards for unmarried victims of domestic violence by barring legal recognition of
unmarried family or household members”).
160. See 7171 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 9 (Mich. 2005) (determining that the City of Kalamazoo’s “policy
of offering benefits to same-sex domestic partners violates the [Michigan constitutional]
amendment’s prohibition against recognizing any ‘similar union’ other than the union of one man
and woman in marriage” (alteration added)), available at 2005 WL 639112; see also MICH. CONST. art. I,
§ 25 (adopted 2004) (“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future
generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”).
Such determinations are devastating for the same-sex couples and their families. For example, as
of January 2007, 13 state governments, 139 city and county governments, 299 colleges and
universities, 264 Fortune-500 companies, and 9,378 other private-sector companies offered domesticpartner health benefits. For a continually-updated count provided by the Human Rights Campaign,
see http://www.hrc.org/worknet (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
161. See Phelps v. Johnson, No. DV05 305642, 2005 WL 4651081, at *1 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 28,
2005) (holding that Ohio’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex civil marriage had the
unintended effect of invaliding Ohio’s Domestic Violence Act, insofar as it conferred standing to
bring claims in Domestic Relations Court upon unmarried heterosexual individuals). Ohio’s
constitutional amendment reads:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized
by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (adopted 2004).
162. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
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authority, instead falling squarely within the states’ regulatory powers.
DOMA’s second part purported to fashion an exception to the Full Faith and
164
Credit Clause by allowing states to refuse to recognize any same-sex marriage
165
performed in another jurisdiction. The constitutionality of DOMA has been the
166
subject of much speculation and analysis.
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) is designed to preempt
167
any constitutional challenges to DOMA. The FMA is a “legal-incidents” ban
that first appeared in 2002, when Rep. Ronnie Shows, D-Miss., introduced it to
168
the Second Session of the 107th Congress as H.J. Res. 93. In 2003, the 108th
169
170
Congress saw H.J. Res. 56 and S.J. Res. 26 introduced in the First Session, by

163. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (holding that “domestic relations [is] an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States” (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States
upon the subject of divorce . . . .”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1878) (“The State . . . has
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”) (alteration added)).
Therefore, the only limitation on the states’ right to regulate in this area is the federal Constitution
itself. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation
statute unconstitutionally violated equal protection and due process); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 388–91 (1978) (holding that Wisconsin’s statute requiring child-support payors to seek judicial
permission before remarrying unconstitutionally burdened the payors’ fundamental right to marry);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a prisoner’s right to marry could not be burdened
by a requirement that the prisoner first receive permission from the prison warden before being
permitted to marry another inmate or a citizen).
164. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
165. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
166. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997) (arguing that the full faith and credit aspects of DOMA do
not pass constitutional muster); Emily J. Sack, The Retreat from DOMA: The Public Policy of Same-Sex
Marriage and a Theory of Congressional Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 38 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 507 (2005) (exploring the constitutionality of DOMA as a federal definition of marriage and as a
full faith and credit question). The constitutionality of DOMA has been addressed at length in the
literature, so it will not be addressed here.
167. 151 CONG. REC. S364 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2005) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[T]he Marriage
Protection Amendment . . . define[s] marriage as a union between a man and a woman. . . . What we
are trying to do is protect the voice of the American people. The right place for this to be determined
is in the legislative bodies of this country, in the Congress of the United States and each and every
legislature in every state, and not in the Federal courts.” (emphasis and alterations added)); see also
infra Part V.A.6.
168. 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (May 15, 2002).
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups.
Id. H.J. Res. 93 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on May 15, 2002, which in turn
referred it to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on July 18, 2002. No subsequent action
was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HJ00093:.
169. 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 21, 2003).
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups.
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Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, R-Colo. and Sen. Wayne Allard, R.-Colo., respectively.
Neither of these amendments got off the ground in a meaningful way.
Since 2003, Rep. Musgrave and Sen. Allard have introduced five versions of
the FMA, four of which have come up for a vote in their respective chambers.
171
First among the subsequent versions was S.J. Res. 30, introduced in the 108th
Congress’s Second Session. S.J. Res. 30 was replaced later on in the Session with
172
S.J. Res. 40 (“Allard Amendment I”) and its companion bill in the House, H.J.
173
Res. 106 (“Musgrave Amendment I”), which were the first two versions of the
FMA to come to the floor of either chamber. Neither S.J. Res. 40 nor H.J. Res. 106
passed its respective chamber with the requisite two-thirds majority. In the
Second Session of the 109th Congress, renewed efforts to revive the FMA

Id. H.J. Res. 56 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on May 21, 2003, which in turn
referred it to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on June 25, 2003. The Subcommittee held
hearings on May 13, 2004. No subsequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:HJ00056:.
170. 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Nov. 25, 2003).
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the Constitution of any State, nor State or Federal law, shall
be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups.
Id. S.J. Res. 26 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on November 25, 2003. No
subsequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SJ00026:.
171. 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Mar. 22, 2004).
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.
Id. S.J. Res. 30 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 22, 2004. See
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SJ00030:.
172. 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 7, 2004).
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.
Id. The Allard Amendment I was brought to the Senate floor on July 8, 2004, and after a motion to
proceed to consideration of measure was made on July 9, 2004, it was the subject of intense debate
for several days—several motions to invoke cloture and end debate were made during this time.
Under Senate rules, a motion to invoke cloture must pass by a three-fifths majority. On July 14, 2004,
the Senate voted 48 to 50 not to invoke cloture and thus did not consider the measure. While the
cloture vote did not technically address the substance of the Allard Amendment I, it was largely
understood to represent the Senate’s receptiveness to the measure. On July 15, 2004, the motion to
proceed to consideration of measure was withdrawn, and no subsequent action was taken on the
Allard Amendment I. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SJ00040:.
173. 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Sept. 23, 2004).
Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.
Id. The Musgrave Amendment I was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on
September 23, 2004. On September 30, 2004, after some debate, the measure failed 227 to 186. No
subsequent action was taken on the Musgrave Amendment I. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d108:HJ00106:.
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spawned S.J. Res. 1 (“Allard Amendment II”) and H.J. Res. 88 (“Musgrave
175
Amendment II”). Both S.J. Res. 1 and H.J. Res. 88 came up for a vote in their
176
respective chambers and failed for a second time.

174. 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 24, 2005), renewed without amendment, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (May
18, 2006).
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.
Id. The Allard Amendment II was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on January 24,
2005, which in turn referred it to the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and
Property Rights, where hearings were held on November 9, 2005. On May 26, 2006, the Allard
Amendment II was brought to the Senate floor with a motion to proceed to consideration of
measure. Like the Allard Amendment I, the Allard Amendment II sparked intense debate for several
days, and several motions to invoke cloture were made. On June 7, 2006, the Senate voted 49 to 48
not to invoke cloture and thus did not consider the measure. As with the Allard Amendment I, no
vote was taken on the Allard Amendment II itself; however, it was generally understood that the
cloture vote was at root a vote on the substantive merits of the measure. No subsequent action was
taken on the Allard Amendment II. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SJ00001:.
175. 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 6, 2006).
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.
Id. The Musgrave Amendment II was referred to the House Committee on June 6, 2006. It was
brought to the House floor on July 18, 2006, where it failed 236 to 187. No subsequent action was
taken on the Musgrave Amendment II. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:
HJ00088:.
176. Several other versions of the FMA were proposed in the 109th Congress, none of which
gained any meaningful momentum. Rep. Daniel Lungren, R-Cal., introduced H.J. Res. 39, 109th
Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 17, 2005).
§ 1. Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a legal union of one man and one
woman.
§ 2. No court of the United States or of any State shall have jurisdiction to determine
whether this Constitution or the constitution of any State requires that the legal incidents
of marriage be conferred upon any union other than a legal union between one man and
one woman.
§ 3. No State shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State concerning a union between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage, or as having the legal incidents of marriage, under the laws of such
other State.
Id. H.J. Res. 39 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on March 17, 2005, which in
turn referred it to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution on April 4, 2005. No subsequent
action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HJ00039:.
Sen. Sam Brownback, R-Kan., introduced S.J. Res. 13, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 14, 2005).
§ 1. Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
§ 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Id. S.J. Res. 13 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 14, 2005. No
subsequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SJ00013:. On
May 18, 2005, Sen. Brownback withdrew S.J. Res. 13. See 151 CONG. REC. S5434 (daily ed. May 18,
2005) (statement of Sen. Brownback).
Rep. Louie Gomert, R-Tex., introduced H.J. Res. 91, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 11, 2006).
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The versions of the FMA that concern us here are the four that came up for
a vote on the floor of Congress. The Musgrave and Allard Amendments were
virtually identical each time they were considered; Rep. Musgrave and Sen.
Allard were joint co-sponsors of one another’s proposed amendments. As a
matter of interpretation, then, the legislative histories of these four versions of
the FMA should and will be considered as a whole. To that end, when I refer to
the FMA, I am referring collectively to these four proposals.
B. Who Supports the FMA?
Many individuals have testified in hearings before Congress in favor of the
177
178
FMA. With only two possible exceptions and one notable one, every single
one of these witnesses was a fundamentalist Christian, Mormon, or Catholic,
each vested with strong religious credentials earned from years of working on
behalf of fundamentalist religious causes. As discussed above in Table 1, all of
the religious traditions to which these witnesses belong vehemently oppose
homosexuality and same-sex marriage—and for explicitly religious reasons.
Table 3 lists all of the witnesses who testified in favor of the FMA in
congressional hearings.
Interestingly, despite these witnesses’ obviously religious viewpoints, each
one employed a carefully-crafted non-religious vocabulary to advance the
179
secular-sounding arguments dismissed below. Couched in safe, secular-ish
terms, each witness’s arguments were cleverly—albeit transparently, to the keen
observer—designed to mask the FMA’s invidious purpose of imposing religious
marriage onto an unsuspecting nation.
It is impossible to rationally conclude that these witnesses had a genuinely
secular purpose in mind or actually believed the secular implications of their

Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a legal union of one man and one
woman.
Id. H.J. Res. 91 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on July 11, 2006. No subsequent action was taken on it. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HJ00091:.
177. Gregory Coleman, Former Texas Solicitor General, and Jon Bruning, Nebraska Attorney
General, both gave statements in their representative official capacities. See What Is Needed to Defend
the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civ. Rights and Property Rights,108th Cong. 1st Sess. (Aug. 28, 2003)
[hereinafter Senate, What Is Needed] (statement of Gregory Coleman); Judicial Activism vs. Democracy:
What are the National Implications of the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of
Traditional Marriage Laws?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civ. Rights and Property Rights, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Mar. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Senate,
Judicial Activism] (statement of Jon Bruning). While no information is available on Coleman’s
religious affiliation, Bruning calls himself a Christian and attends a Christian-Congregationalist
church, see Biography, http://www.jonbruning.com/index.php?PAGE_ID=3 (last visited Jan. 8,
2007).
178. Stanley Kurtz is a conservative commentator and legal theorist who does not ground his
arguments in religion. Stanley Kurtz, Point of No Return, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 3, 2001 (“I
personally do not see homosexuality as sinful . . . .”), available at http://www.hudson.org/index.
cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=935. He instead argues in favor of the FMA on consequentialist grounds, claiming that same-sex marriage would result in ancillary harms to other legitimate
governmental interests. See infra Part V.A.3.a.
179. See infra Part V.A.
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testimony. How do we know this? Because of the strong religious pedigree of
each of the witnesses. The idea that these individual witnesses—decidedlyreligious, almost to a person—somehow prefer secular-ish conceptions of
180
“traditional marriage”—a minority position among Secularists —to their
181
deeply-held religious beliefs again defies common sense.
TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA.
Name/Affiliation
Judge Robert Bork, U.S. Cir. Ct. App. for

Religious Tradition

Hearing(s) Attended

Catholic (Natural Law)

Federal Marriage Amendment (The
183
Musgrave Amendment)

Gerard V. Bradley, Prof. of Law, Univ. of
Notre Dame Law Sch.

Catholic (Natural Law)

Less Faith in Judicial Credit: Are Federal
and State Defense of Marriage
Initiatives Vulnerable to Judicial
184
Activism?

Jon Bruning, Neb. Att’y Gen.

Christian-Congregational

Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What
are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge
Decision and the Judicial
Invalidation of Traditional
185
Marriage Laws?

Gregory Coleman, Former Tex. Solicitor
Gen.

Unknown

What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan
Defense of Marriage Act of
186
1996?

Teresa S. Collett, Prof. of Law, St. Thomas
Univ. Sch. of Law

Catholic (Natural Law)

A Proposed Constitutional Amendment

182

the 4th Cir.

to Preserve Traditional Marriage

187

180. See supra notes 6–10 (discussing the significant majority of secularists who support same-sex
civil marriage).
181. See H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916 (House
Committee on the Judiciary report on the 1996 “Defense of Marriage Act”) (describing same-sex civil
marriage bans as the result of a “moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality”). But see supra notes 11, 143 (noting that many
religious believers choose to privatize their religious views, instead relying on secularism to supply
justifications for social policy).
182. Some may challenge my characterization of Judge Bork as a religious believer. It is true that,
for the better part of his career, Bork was not a highly-religious person, despite authoring such
religiously-overtoned works as SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE (1996) (cataloguing perceived excesses in American society, including loosening
strictures on sexual mores). Bork converted to Catholicism in 2003. Tim Drake, Judge Bork Converts to
the Catholic Faith, NAT’L CATH. REG. (online ed.), July 20–26, 2003. He subsequently authored A
COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES (2005), in which he
heavily criticizes the Supreme Court’s recent religion cases, claiming that they have inappropriately
accelerated the secularization of America. From his writings, it seems reasonable to characterize
Bork as a religion-driven preservationist.
183. Hearing on H.J. Res. 56 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Const., 108th
Cong. 2d Sess., at 16–18 (May 13, 2004) [hereinafter House, Musgrave Amendment I] (statement of
Judge Bork).
184. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R. and Property
R., 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Senate, Less Faith] (statement of Prof. Bradley).
185. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Att’y Gen. Bruning).
186. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Gregory Coleman).
187. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (Mar. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Senate, Proposed Amendment] (statement of Prof. Collett).
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TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA.
Name/Affiliation
John Cornyn, U.S. Sen., R-Tex.

Religious Tradition
Church of Christ (Pentecostal)

Hearing(s) Attended
A Proposed Constitutional Amendment
to Preserve Traditional Marriage

188

Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What
are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge
Decision and the Judicial
Invalidation of Traditional
Marriage Laws?

189

What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan
Defense of Marriage Act of
190

1996?
Pastor Daniel de Leon, Sr., Gen. Presbyter,
Alianza de Ministerios Evangélicos
Nacionales (AMEN)

Assemblies of God (Pentecostal)

Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What
are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge
Decision and the Judicial
Invalidation of Traditional

Dwight Duncan, Assoc. Prof. of Const. Law,
S. New Eng. Sch. of Law

Catholic (Natural Law)

Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage:
192
Implications for Public Policy

John C. Eastman, Prof. of Law, Chapman
Univ. Sch. of Law

Christian (Natural Law, affiliation
unknown)

The National Consensus to Protect
Marriage: Why a Constitutional

Marriage Laws?

191

193

Amendment Is Needed
Michael Farris, President, Patrick Henry
Coll.

Fundamentalist Non-Denominational
Evangelical

What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan
Defense of Marriage Act of

Scott Fitzgibbon, Prof. of Law, Boston Coll.

Catholic (Natural Law)

An Examination of the Constitutional
195
Amendment on Marriage

Maggie Gallagher, President, Inst. for
Marriage & Pub. Pol’y

Catholic (Natural Law)

Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What
are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge
Decision and the Judicial
Invalidation of Traditional
196
Marriage Laws?

194

1996?

What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan
Defense of Marriage Act of
197

1996?
Rev. Dr. Ray Hammond II, Pastor, Bethel
African Methodist Episcopal (AME)
Church

Methodist-Holiness (Pentecostal)

What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan
Defense of Marriage Act of
198

1996?

188. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
189. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
190. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
191. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Pastor de Leon).
192. Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Const., 108th Cong. 2d Sess.,
at 5–14 (Apr. 22, 2004) [hereinafter House, Legal Threats] (statement of Prof. Duncan).
193. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R. and Property
R., 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (May 18, 2005) (statement of Prof. Eastman). This hearing was cancelled,
and Prof. Eastman’s testimony was never made publicly available.
194. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Michael Farris).
195. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R and Property
R., 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Senate, Examination] (statement of Prof.
Fitzgibbon).
196. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Maggie Gallagher).
197. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Maggie Gallagher).
198. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Rev. Dr. Hammond).
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TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA.
Name/Affiliation
Orrin Hatch, U.S. Sen., R-Utah

Religious Tradition
Mormon (LDS)

Hearing(s) Attended
Preserving Traditional Marriage: A
199

View from the States

A Proposed Constitutional Amendment
200
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What
are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge
Decision and the Judicial
Invalidation of Traditional
201
Marriage Laws?
What Is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan
Defense of Marriage Act of
202

1996?
Stanley Kurtz, Hoover Inst.

Natural Law/Consequentialism (no
affiliation)

Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage:
203
Implications for Public Policy

Marilyn Musgrave, U.S. Rep., R-Colo.

Assemblies of God (Pentecostal)

Federal Marriage Amendment (The
204
Musgrave Amendment)
Preserving Traditional Marriage: A
205

View from the States

A Proposed Constitutional Amendment
206
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
Lincoln C. Oliphant, Res. Fellow, Marriage
Law Project

Catholic (Natural Law)

Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage:
207
Implications for Public Policy

Rev. Richard Richardson, Asst. Pastor, St.
Paul African Methodist Episcopal
(AME) Church

Methodist-Holiness (Pentecostal)

A Proposed Constitutional Amendment
208
to Preserve Traditional Marriage
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What
are the National Implications of the
Massachusetts Goodridge
Decision and the Judicial
Invalidation of Traditional
Marriage Laws?

209

Mitt Romney, Gov. of Mass.

Mormon (LDS)

Preserving Traditional Marriage: A
210
View from the States

Jay Sekulow, Am. Ctr. for Law. & Justice

Fundamentalist Non-Denominational
Evangelical

Federal Marriage Amendment (The
211
Musgrave Amendment)

Katherine S. Spaht, Prof. of Law, La. State
Univ.

Christian (affiliation unknown); primary
drafter of covenant marriage
legislation in Louisiana212

A Proposed Constitutional Amendment
213
to Preserve Traditional Marriage

199. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Const., Civ. R. and Property
R., 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Senate, View from the States] (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
200. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
201. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
202. Senate, What Is Needed, supra note 177 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
203. House, Legal Threats, supra note 192, at 14–34 (statement of Stanley Kurtz).
204. House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 5–15 (statement of Rep. Musgrave).
205. Senate, View from the States, supra note 199 (statement of Rep. Musgrave).
206. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Rep. Musgrave).
207. House, Legal Threats, supra note 192, at 38–47 (statement of Lincoln Oliphant).
208. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Rev. Richardson).
209. Senate, Judicial Activism, supra note 177 (statement of Rev. Richardson).
210. Senate, View from the States, supra note 199 (statement of Gov. Romney).
211. House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 22–34 (statement of Jay Sekulow).
212. See Katherine S. Spaht, Covenant Marriage, http://faculty.law.lsu.edu/katherinespaht/
convenantinfo.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
213. Senate, Proposed Amendment, supra note 187 (statement of Prof. Spaht).
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TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE FMA.
Name/Affiliation

Religious Tradition

Hearing(s) Attended

Lynn Wardle, Prof. of Law, Brigham Young
Univ.

Mormon (LDS)

Less Faith in Judicial Credit: Are Federal
and State Defense of Marriage
Initiatives Vulnerable to Judicial

Richard Wilkins, Prof. of Law, Brigham
Young Univ.

Mormon (LDS)

An Examination of the Constitutional
215
Amendment on Marriage

Christopher Wolfe, Prof. of Pol. Sci.,
Marquette Univ.

Catholic (Natural Law)

An Examination of the Constitutional

Activism?

214

Amendment on Marriage

216

Why then, if the supporters of the FMA are as staunchly religious as their
credentials would lead us to believe, would they resort to arguing from a
Secularist viewpoint? Only one Secularist, Stanley Kurtz, was put forward to
lend credibility to the claim that the FMA is based on secular principles—and
his consequentialist legal theories are so irrational and have been so heavily
criticized (by writers on both ends of the political spectrum) that they are not
217
creditable. Instead, delineating the FMA’s secular purposes was left largely to
the say-so of numerous highly-religious witnesses.
This is not to say that the mere presence of a creditable Secularist would
cure the underlying constitutional infirmities of the FMA. Even if one were put
forward, if there is no rational secular relationship between the purposes given
for the FMA and the action that the law takes (banning same-sex civil
218
marriage), then no amount of secularist pontification would be able to justify
it: The purpose of the law would still be religious, even if not on its face. Thus, it
219
would be void under an endorsement analysis.
Still, why does this matter? Taking a page from the Establishment Clause’s
sister doctrine is instructive. When courts hear Free Exercise claims, they
frequently inquire as to the sincerity with which the claimed adherents hold
220
their beliefs. And so it should be in the search for a secular purpose: Divining a
secular purpose for a government action demands an inquiry into the sincerity
with which its proponents believe the action to be genuinely secular. Merely
claiming a secular purpose does not mean that one exists. If that were the rule,
then the Establishment Clause would be undermined from within: Without a
more searching inquiry, no court could ever discern an invidious religious
purpose, as the central question is whether the claimed secular purpose is
merely pretextual for a religious one.
This has nothing to do with evaluating the content of one’s beliefs and
everything to do with whether actually believes that the claimed secular
purpose is actually secular. If courts are competent to undertake inquiries into
purpose at all, then they must necessarily be competent to determine whether
the proponents of a law are subtextually motivated by religious beliefs.
214. Senate, Less Faith, supra note 184 (statement of Prof. Wardle).
215. Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (statement of Prof. Wilkins).
216. Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (statement of Prof. Wolfe).
217. See infra Part V.A.3.a.
218. See infra Parts IV.A.2, V.A.
219. See infra Parts IV.A.2, V.B.
220. E.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).

19_WILSON.DOC

2/8/2007 2:11 PM

PRESERVATIONISM

597

Finally, one might question my use of the FMA as exemplary of all samesex marriage bans or as even relevant at all. Indeed, it may seem silly to evaluate
the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment. However, because similar
constitutional concerns exist for DOMA and for individual state bans on samesex civil marriage (whether statutory or constitutional), the Establishment
Clause discussion remains highly relevant. At the time of this writing, no new
versions of the FMA have been introduced into the First Session of the 110th
Congress. Nevertheless, if the opponents of same-sex marriage are true to their
221
word, efforts to amend the federal Constitution are far from over. Future
Congresses will almost certainly face incarnations of the FMA that are
essentially replicas of those that—so far—have been voted down. These yetunwritten versions of the FMA will undoubtedly implicate the same
Establishment Clause concerns that are addressed here.
Barring a significant change in opponents’ rhetoric, the so-called “secular”
arguments used to justify prior bans will be recycled anew for the consideration
of future legislators. Therefore, it is important to debunk these pretexual
arguments now, to better equip same-sex marriage advocates for future debate
and litigation.
III. WHERE ARE WE GOING, AND WHY ARE WE IN THIS HANDBASKET?:
A SHIFT IN FUNDAMENTAL(IST) RHETORIC
“Overt bias, when prohibited, has oft-times been supplanted by more cunning
devices designed to impart the appearance of neutrality, but to operate
with the same invidious effect as before.”
222

–Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

Until recently, same-sex civil marriage advocates were entirely
disempowered in their attempts to obtain any legal recognition of same-sex
223
relationships. While successes have come in fits and starts, with several key
224
state court decisions being handed down recently and others on the way, the

221. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5518 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“We
are making progress in America on defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman, and we
will not stop until it is defined and protected at the union of a man and a woman.”).
222. 420 F.2d 1225, 1238 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
rev’d, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
223. Compare generally Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1971) (holding that a same-sex couple could not qualify for a marriage license, in part because,
as two men, they fell outside of the historical definition of religious marriage), with Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that, under the Vermont Constitution, same-sex couples could not
be denied the civil benefits and obligations of marriage, regardless of what the resulting legal
arrangement was called), and Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that, under the Massachusetts Constitution, same-sex couples could not be denied access to
civil marriage and its attendant legal benefits), and Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding
that New Jersey’s refusal to extend the rights and privileges of marriage to same-sex couples
violated equal protection but not due process under the New Jersey Constitution).
224. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that New York’s refusal to
extend the rights and privileges of marriage to same-sex couples violated neither due process nor
equal protection under the New York Constitution); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash.
2006) (holding the Washington’s state DOMA violated neither due process nor equal protection
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legal recognition of same-sex relationships is in a state of constant flux and
225
upheaval. Religion is playing a key role on both sides of the debate.
Historically, the Supreme Court has described marriage using explicitly
226
227
religious language, portraying it as a “holy estate” or “sacred precinct” that
could only be entered into by one man and one woman. Indeed, in early samesex civil marriage cases, courts invoked similar language in determining that
228
legal recognition of same-sex relationships was improper. As discussed above,
one trial court cited both the Bible and specific Judeo-Christian beliefs in
229
disposing of a claim seeking same-sex civil marriage rights.
Currently, the proponents of same-sex civil marriage are not raising claims
230
of any religious liberty interests. Opponents of same-sex marriage are
tiptoeing around the subject of religion, mostly claiming that allowing same-sex
civil marriage would limit the availability of religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws that protect homosexuals—said more plainly, opponents
claim that allowing same-sex civil marriage will hamper Christians’ ability to (1)
publicly speak out against homosexuality and (2) act on those beliefs in a
functionally-discriminatory way; therefore, their right to free exercise of religion
trumps the government’s interest in preventing invidious discrimination based
on sexual orientation. While the religious-freedom claim is addressed more fully
231
below, it is important to note that, for the bulk of opponents, Free Exercise is

under the Washington Constitution). See also In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006), review granted and opinion superseded, S147999 (Cal. Dec. 20, 2006). The California Supreme
Court has yet to hear the marriage cases.
225. See Matthew Hay Brown, Senate to revisit same-sex marriage: Hope for a ban unites many faiths,
BALT. SUN, June 5, 2006, at 1A (reporting on the high levels of religious fervor encountered on both
sides of the same-sex civil marriage question). For a functionalist argument in favor of expanding
religion’s role in supporting claims for same-sex civil marriage, see generally Larry Catá Backer,
Religion as the Language of Discourse of Same Sex Marriage, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 221 (2002).
226. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
227. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1964).
228. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (“The institution of marriage as a union of man
and woman . . . is as old as the book of Genesis.”); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973)
(“Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose. For a
time the records of marriage were kept by the church.”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash.
App. 1974) (quoting the “book of Genesis” language from Baker v. Nelson), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d
1008 (Wash. 1974); see also Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (regarding
same-sex marriage within the context of federal immigration law, holding that “there has been for
centuries a combination of scriptural and canonical teaching under which a ‘marriage’ between
persons of the same sex was unthinkable and, by definition, impossible”; regarding both federal and
Colorado law, holding that “[g]iven the scriptural, canonical, and civil law authorities[, and] the
prevailing mores and moral concepts of this age, one could not entertain a good faith belief that [the
plaintiff] could be married to a person of the same sex” (alterations added)), aff’d on other grounds,
673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
229. See Dean I, Civ. A. No. 90-13892, slip op. at *4–8 (D.C. Super. Dec. 30, 1991), available at 1992
WL 685364, aff’d on other grounds, 653 A.2d 307 [Dean II] (D.C. 1995).
230. For a strategy outlining how same-sex civil marriage advocates could be raising these claims
to their advantage, see generally Catá Backer, supra note 225.
231. See infra Part V.A.4.
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the only context in which they currently appear comfortable advancing
232
affirmatively religious arguments.
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Preservationism
Over time, as American society as a whole has grown more tolerant—albeit
233
not totally accepting—of homosexuality, opponents of same-sex civil marriage
have learned to couch their arguments in positive-sounding, seemingly unbigoted terms, and to decry any “hatred” or intent to “discriminate” against
234
anyone’s “lifestyle choices.”
As a result, once overtly-religious rhetoric has been largely supplanted
with what Prof. Edward Rubin terms “post hoc, secular-sounding argu235
ment[s].” As Prof. William Eskridge has pointed out, this shift in language and
tone does not show that the substance of the religious arguments has abated—
instead, it indicates that anti-gay rhetoric and discourse has “sedimented,” a
process by which the old religious arguments have evolved to become more
236
sophisticated and secular-sounding.
Describing the foundation of anti-gay rhetoric as “religious natural law
theory,” Eskridge notes that religion forms the bedrock for these newer,
237
secularized arguments used to “promote” opposite-sex civil marriage. This
“sedimentation” has layered three distinct levels of anti-gay rhetoric upon one
another, like a wedding cake: (1) the bedrock layer is “God’s law,” a religiouslyderived form of natural-law theory that emphasizes the moral depravity of
homosexuality, bolstering these claims with “objective” scientific data

232. But see 152 CONG. REC. S5450 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (quoting the
book of Genesis and the Gospel of Matthew as justifications for the Allard Amendment II; describing
these biblical texts as “the Law”).
233. See supra notes 6–10 (tracing liberalization of opinions regarding same-sex marriage and
civil unions).
234. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S8089 (2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I make it clear nobody
wants to discriminate against gays. Simply put, we want to preserve traditional marriage. Gays have
a right to live the way they want. But they should not have the right to change the definition of
traditional marriage.”); see also infra Part V.A (raising and dismissing key justifications for same-sex
civil marriage bans).
235. Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 43 (2005).
236. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse
and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) [hereinafter Eskridge, No
Promo Homo].
237. Id. at 1338, 1347, 1364. To be sure, there are both religious and secular natural-law theories.
Secular natural-law theory has been rent asunder in attempts to find within it theoretical and
philosophical justifications for banning same-sex marriage. However, the theory can be convincingly
read to both support and oppose same-sex marriage. See generally Mark Strasser, Natural Law and
Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (1998) (establishing that the legal theories of secular natural
law cannot be construed as either supporting or opposing same-sex marriage with any definiteness,
and that any attempts to do so result in outcome-determinative analytical methods).
Every argument raised against same-sex marriage on secular natural-law grounds has an equallycompelling counterargument, which leaves the theory in equipoise. Because of this irreconcilable
ambiguity within secular natural-law theory, it is not a useful method of analysis when attempting
to justify bans on same-sex marriage.
Moreover, the natural-law theory in play with the FMA is entirely religious. See infra note 245. As
such, it is the only form of natural-law analysis with which we must concern ourselves.
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purporting to show that homosexuality and same-sex relationships are bad for
238
239
society; (2) the constitutional tier protects “normal” (heterosexual) people’s
right to be free from exposure to homosexuals, because such exposure could
240
make heterosexuals uncomfortable or corrupt their children; and (3) the “no
promo homo” frosting seeks to prevent any suggestion that the government
“promotes” homosexuality as an “acceptable lifestyle choice”—particularly to
241
children.
Eskridge concludes that the discourse has layered itself in this way in order
to appeal to the broadest cross-section of anti-gay constituencies: (1) the
242
243
religious fundamentalists who believe that Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13, and
244
Romans 1:26–27
should govern modern legal treatment of homosexual
behavior and orientation; (2) the moral bigots who believe the various scientific
245
claims—derived from religious natural-law theory —that homosexuals and

238. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1338, 1351–52, 1363.
239. The word “normal” is used with due care regarding its implications. There is a general
scientific consensus that homosexuality is a benign variation of human sexuality and is therefore
“normal.” See infra notes 359–62. As such, the idea that heterosexuality is “normal” and
homosexuality is “abnormal” is not conceded here.
240. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1362–63.
The rights of people frightened of homosexuality to speak out against it, of parents to
control the education of their children, of children to be free from the trauma of a lesbian
or gay household, of spouses to enjoy the sanctity of their institution, and of churches,
landlords, employers, soldiers, and organizations like the Boy Scouts not to involve
themselves with openly gay persons are just as often heard in antigay churches and
political rallies as in the courtroom.
Id.
241. Id. at 1330–31, 1362–64.
242. “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination.” Leviticus 18:22 (New
Oxford ann., New Revised Standard Version).
243. “If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination;
they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them.” Leviticus 20:13 (New Oxford ann., New Rev.
Standard Version).
244. “For this reason God gave them up to degrading passions. Their women exchanged natural
intercourse for unnatural, and in the same way also the men, giving up natural intercourse with
women, were consumed with passion for one another. Men committed shameless acts with men and
received in their own persons the due penalty for their error.” Romans 1:26–27 (New Oxford ann.,
New Rev. Standard Version).
245. One doesn’t have to look very hard to discover that the majority of “religious natural law”
scholarship against same-sex marriage is written by religious authors and published by religious
institutions. For example, the University of Notre Dame Law School (a conservative Catholic
university) sponsors a law journal that was founded in 1947 as the “Natural Law Institute” (the
oldest legal journal devoted to the study of natural law) and is now known as the “American Journal
of Jurisprudence.” http://law.nd.edu/ajj/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). One of the faculty
editors of the journal, Prof. Gerard V. Bradley, was a primary drafter of the FMA. See 151 CONG. REC.
S5454 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (identifying Prof. Bradley as a drafter of
the FMA).
Moreover, several religious law schools appear to be fixated on same-sex marriage and
homosexuality. In 1995, the Notre Dame Journal of Ethics and Public Policy hosted a symposium
titled “Sexual Orientation,” and in 1996, a symposium titled “Law and the Family.” In 1997, the
American Journal of Jurisprudence hosted a forum titled “Sexual Morality and the Possibility of
‘Same-Sex Marriage.’” In 1998, the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law hosted a
symposium titled “Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty Years.” In 2002,

19_WILSON.DOC

2/8/2007 2:11 PM

PRESERVATIONISM

601

same-sex relationships are bad for society; and (3) the “normal people” who
assert their collective “constitutional right”—typically claiming free exercise of
246
247
religion —to avoid exposure to homosexuals. At the heart of this layered
discourse lie two common elements: (1) religious belief and (2) the opinion that
such beliefs should guide the government’s treatment of homosexuals in the
public sector.
Prof. Reva Siegel takes a slightly different approach to conceiving the
modernization of disempowering anti-minority rhetoric. Characterizing the
248
phenomenon as “preservation through transformation,”
she notes that
“struggles over group inequality can transform the rules and reasons by which
249
social stratification is enforced and justified.”
Transformation occurs
antiphonally: first, members of a disfavored minority—e.g., same-sex couples, or
homosexuals generally—begin to successfully discredit the historical rhetoric
used to justify their continued disempowerment. In response, the majority
simply modernizes its justificatory rhetoric—often through the use of code

the Regent University Law Review hosted a symposium titled “Homosexuality: Truth Be Told.” In
2004, three symposia were sponsored by conservative religious schools: the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy hosted a symposium titled “Marriage and the Law”; the University of St.
Thomas (Minneapolis-St. Paul) Law Review hosted a symposium titled “Federal Marriage
Amendment: Yes or No?”; and the Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law hosted a
symposium titled “Same-Sex Marriage.” In 2005, Regent University Law Review hosted a
symposium titled “Moral Realism and the Renaissance of Traditional Marriage.” Also in 2005, the St.
Thomas University (Miami) Law Review hosted a symposium on “Lofton and the Future of Gay and
Lesbian Adoption.” In 2006, Ave Maria University Law Review hosted a symposium titled
“Perspectives on Natural Marriage.”
This is not an exhaustive list of the work that these religious schools have published; nor is it to
say that secular schools are not also publishing in this area. The point is that there is a predilection
on the part of conservative religious schools to solicit, develop, and publish anti-same-sex marriage
scholarship that is based heavily on religious natural-law principles—a predilection that appears to
be unique to these institutions.
246. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 20
(reporting that, when the Catholic Charities of Boston failed to receive a religious exemption from
Massachusetts’s anti-discrimination laws protecting sexual orientation, it was faced with the choice
of having to place children with homosexual and same-sex couple adoptive parents; instead of
complying with the law, Catholic Charities chose to forfeit its license and stopped providing
adoption placement services altogether) [hereinafter Gallagher, Banned in Boston]. Gallagher
characterized this situation as a “tragedy.” Id. See discussion infra Part V.A.4 (addressing the
religious-freedom argument against same-sex civil marriage).
247. Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1409.
Apparently, those advocating on behalf of the “normal people” have forgotten the lesson of Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), which held that a citizen wearing a jacket emblazoned with the
phrase “Fuck the Draft” could not be censored in public fora, because any observers who were
offended by the phrase had the option to avert their gaze. Id. at 21 (noting that persons who find
certain information or speech to be offensive “could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”). In a broader sense, Cohen recognized that pluralistic
societies with open marketplaces of speech and expression cannot tolerate the censorship of some
viewpoints for the sake of preserving the comfort of observers.
248. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 111 (2000).
249. Id. at 111.
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words, making only superficial adjustments to its excuses for discrimination.
This serves to perpetuate the power imbalance without addressing head-on the
substantive question of why the minority deserves to be disempowered—
instead, it brilliantly smoothes over the conflict, leaving the majority
comfortable with its newfangled explanation for why it should remain superior.
When the minority realizes that, despite the facial shift in rhetoric, nothing
of substance has changed, the cycle begins anew. This call and response
continues ad infinitum until one of the following occurs: (1) the majority’s
arguments to support continued disempowerment eventually become so
attenuated that they are no longer creditable; (2) the majority tires of the
masquerade and ceases to engage in modernization; or (3) the majority actually
liberalizes and decides that there are no longer adequate substantive
justifications for continued disempowerment. Only then does equalizing change
become possible.
B. Preservationism: An Application
A prime example of “preservation through transformation” and
“sedimentation” is the veritable evolution of “creation science” into “intelligent
design.” In Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, a school board passed a
resolution requiring teachers to read a statement offering “intelligent design” as
251
an alternative “scientific” theory to evolutionary biology. Several parents from
the area challenged the resolution as an unconstitutional establishment of
252
religion. At the head of its analysis, the court traced the refinement of
Fundamentalist rhetoric about evolutionary biology from the Scopes Monkey
253
Trial to the present day: During the Twentieth Century, as more and more
public-school teachers and public-school systems eschewed blatantly-religious
instruction in favor of teaching evolutionary biology in public-school
classrooms, it became harder for the Fundamentalists to justify their desire for
the teaching of facially-religious beliefs in public schools. In response, the
Fundamentalists changed their rhetoric, but only incrementally, and only as
much as was necessary to pass muster under ever-more-stringent constitutional
254
standards. Most importantly, the underlying religious purpose never changed.
In Scopes, it was considered constitutionally permissible to bring a criminal
255
prosecution for teaching evolutionary biology in lieu of biblical creationism.
Forty years later, in Epperson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court struck down
256
statutory prohibitions against teaching evolutionary biology in public schools.
In response, Fundamentalists began to advocate for laws requiring “balanced
treatment” of biblical creationism and evolutionary biology—teachers wishing
to teach evolutionary biology were forced to devote equal time to biblical

250. See generally id. (discussing the use of “semantic code” in “color-blindness” discourse to
signal—and perpetuate—white privilege).
251. 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708–09 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
252. Id. at 709–11.
253. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
254. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 711–12.
255. Scopes, 289 S.W. at 363.
256. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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creationism. This too, was struck down by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
257
Daniel v. Waters. In response, Fundamentalists began to reason that scientificsounding language would help their religious purpose to survive constitutional
scrutiny: hence “creation science.” When, in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Supreme
Court struck down a requirement that “creation science” be taught alongside
258
evolutionary biology, “intelligent design” was born.
In striking down the Dover School Board’s resolution as an
unconstitutional establishment of religion, the Kitzmiller court recognized the
evolution of the Fundamentalists’ discourse for what it was: preservation
through transformation. The Fundamentalists had simply layered new,
scientific-sounding language over their previously-religious rhetoric, but the
underlying message and purpose remained unchanged.
* * * *
As the evolution case reveals, Siegel’s “preservation through
transformation” formulation synthesizes with Eskridge’s “sedimentation”
theory rather nicely: When the disfavored minority empowers itself, the
language used to perpetuate the minority’s disempowerment transforms—or
sediments—itself into a more politically-palatable rhetoric, while maintaining a
broad-based appeal to a majority whose bigotry remains palpable.
Both “preservation through transformation” and “sedimentation” have
occurred throughout the debate over same-sex civil marriage. As it has become
less fashionable to use expressly religious rhetoric to justify holding an anti-gay
position, it has become more important for religiously-motivated opponents of
259
same-sex marriage to couch their arguments in secular-sounding terms.
Currently, opponents rely mostly on social-science evidence and broader
appeals to “morality”; express citations of religious doctrines are rare. Still, it is
necessary for these religious believers to communicate with one another, so they
have developed code words that signal a belief in the unstated—but everpresent—religious objective, which is to impose a specific religious definition of
marriage on the entire nation.
Catchphrases such as “traditional marriage,” “ideal environment,” “gender
complementarity,” and “values-transmission” abound. They are derived from
the larger “family-values”-talk that permeates many religious spheres.
However, because phrases like these straddle the line between sounding
comfortably secular and signaling a religious objective, it is not always obvious
when modernized anti-gay discourse is afoot. With experience, however, samesex civil marriage advocates will learn to decode this rhetoric and expose the
underlying religious objectives to all who would see them. The same-sex
marriage debate is drenched with this “family-values” newspeak. I will refer to
the tactical use of such modernized discourse as “preservationism.”

257. 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
258. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
259. According to the Pew Research Center, there really isn’t another kind. See supra notes 6–10
(reporting that advanced age and religiosity—which frequently go hand-in-hand—are the two best
predictors of opposition to same-sex civil marriage).
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IV. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: “HOPELESS DISARRAY”
“[W]e do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.”
261
–Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in McCreary County v. ACLU

Before same-sex civil marriage bans can be properly analyzed under the
Establishment Clause, it is important to ascertain the current constitutional
landscape that applies to such bans. Identifying background principles that are
universally agreed-upon has proven to be a Sisyphean task for the Supreme
262
Court. For example, consider Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, the first
modern-day case to discern a durable theory of the Establishment Clause.
Everson presented a deceptively simple question: Is it an impermissible
establishment of religion for a state to subsidize transportation for students
attending certain private religious schools, but not all private schools, whether
secular or religious? The Court voted 9–0 in favor of the now-famous “wall of
263
separation between church and state” principle handed down by Justice Black.
All Justices concurred in Black’s articulation of what might be described as basic
neutrality rules:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called or whatever form they adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
264
by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between Church and State.

Even so, the Court divided 5–4 over whether the transportation program
constituted an establishment of religion—the majority concluded that it did not,
while the dissent concluded that it did. Why? Because the dissenting Justices
had actually sought a more stringent set of neutrality rules than the ones adopted
by the majority:
The Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment
of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had
prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all
such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state
in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of

260. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
261. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2747 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
262. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
263. Id. at 16. See also id. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (opining that “complete separation
between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion”).
264. Id. at 15–16 (Black, J., majority opinion).
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the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively
265
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.

Regardless of which of these conceptions one prefers, it seems that the Court
took a unified, aggressive stance in favor of the government remaining neutral
in its treatment of religious affairs, both among religions and between religion
and irreligion.
Fast-forward to 2005. Heard, decided, and announced together, the twin
266
267
cases of McCreary County v. ACLU and Van Orden v. Perry are the bellwether
of present-day Establishment Clause jurisprudence. But simply put, the opinions
are a mess. Like Everson, McCreary County and Van Orden also presented a
deceptively simple question: In what context, if ever, is a government-sponsored
display of the Ten Commandments on government-owned property
constitutional? Said more broadly, where do we draw the line between displays
that acknowledge America’s religious heritage and those that actually
“establish” religion?
The Court answered the question two ways: The McCreary County displays
268
were struck down while the Van Orden display was allowed. The McCreary
269
County displays were in two Kentucky county courthouses, and the Van Orden
270
display was on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. Although the specific
context and background of each display varied, and the outcome of each case
differed, the Justices generally wrote as if they were addressing a single case,
rendering a total of ten opinions across the two cases: three in McCreary County
271
and seven in Van Orden.
Of all that might be said about these cases, they begged for the Court to
articulate a unifying principle and stick to it. In rendering their ten opinions, the
Justices struggled to delineate an analytical method that was not susceptible of
272
substantive criticism from the other side. Still, with Justice Breyer and Justice

265. Id. at 31–32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
266. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
267. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
268. In each case, the Court split 5–4, with the “swing” vote being Justice Breyer, who joined the
McCreary County majority opinion and concurred in judgment only in Van Orden.
269. 125 S. Ct. at 2727.
270. 125 S. Ct. at 2858.
271. When the Court announced its ten opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist joked, “I didn’t know
we had that many people on our Court.” Evan Thomas et al., Transition: Hail to the Chief, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 12, 2005, at 60, 60.
272. Justice Breyer employed a “divisiveness” test that asked whether striking down the
challenged government action would “tend to promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment
Clause seeks to avoid.” Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Reasoning
from the principle that government and religion are separate but not “mutually hostil[e],” Breyer
concluded that (1) the display conveyed a sufficiently secular message of morality as to not
constitute an outright imposition of religion and (2) given the display’s context among numerous
other monuments and historical markers, the degree to which the display is divisive because it
potentially offends passersby is outweighed by the degree to which the removal of the display
would be divisive. The length of time for which the display had stood unchallenged was a relevant,
but not dispositive, factor—this display had stood for forty years. All told, the point is to
circumnavigate outcomes that could “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.” See id. at 2869–71 (alteration added).
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Thomas providing two notable exceptions, the Justices fell neatly across two
interpretive schools: the Lemon-endorsement test and the historicalacknowledgement test. (The liberal wing of the Court applied the former, and
the conservative wing of the Court applied the latter.) The tests are comprised of
starkly contrasting analytical methods, which the Justices have drawn from their
various schools of constitutional interpretation.
Save for Justice Breyer’s defection in Van Orden, a five-Justice majority
emerged in McCreary County in favor of applying the Lemon-endorsement test.
As discussed below, the Lemon-endorsement test was derived from the
longstanding neutrality principles articulated in Everson. However, given the
recent turnover of Justices, and most notably the replacement of Justice
O’Connor with the decidedly more conservative Justice Alito, it is unclear
whether the liberal wing of the Court will have the last word on resolving this
doctrinal fracture. As such, it is important to at least identify the competing
principles that caused the Court to fracture so badly in these cases. Thus, a
portion of the following discussion will address the historical-acknowledgment
test, despite the fact that for now, the Lemon-endorsement test is the controlling
framework applicable to Establishment Clause claims.
A. The Lemon-Endorsement Test: Context-Specificity and the Requirement of
Government Neutrality Toward and Among Religions
Over the last thirty years, various majorities of the Court have employed
two tests in analyzing Establishment Clause questions: the “Lemon test” and the
“endorsement test.” Both of these tests are the direct offspring of the Court’s
longstanding recognition that the Establishment Clause calls for government
274
neutrality both among religions and between religion and irreligion. Over
time, the two tests have merged into a single endorsement analysis steeped in
neutrality ideals.
1. The Lemon Test
275

The famous “Lemon test,” announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, held that
government actions are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause (1) if
they have no valid secular purpose, (2) if they have the effect of establishing
religion, or (3) if they result in unnecessary government “entanglement” with

For an explanation of how all applications of the Establishment Clause are inherently divisive,
thus rendering any analysis that focuses primarily on divisiveness to be essentially meaningless, see
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1 (2005).
273. Justice Thomas employed an “actual coercion” test in determining that the display in Van
Orden did not compel any religious observance or profession of belief through threat of coercion,
punishment, or force of law. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865.
Even if Thomas’s “coercion” test was the controlling one, it is possible that the banning of samesex marriage constitutes impermissible legal coercion, because it has the purpose of “prevent[ing]
individuals from engaging in a desired course of action.” See Rubin, supra note 235, at 40 (alteration
added).
274. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
275. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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276

religion. Soon after the test was announced, the Court quickly qualified it,
277
noting that the three factors are “no more than helpful signposts.” Over time,
several members of the Court have criticized Lemon as unhelpful in analyzing
certain Establishment Clause questions, and at times, the Court has simply not
278
applied it.
2. The Endorsement Test
As Lemon proved dissatisfying to more and more Justices, the
“endorsement test”—in reality, a gloss on Lemon—became a more palatable
alternative to some. Justice O’Connor originally postulated the test in her
279
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, in part because the Lynch majority used the
280
word “endorsement.” O’Connor subsequently codified the test in County of
281
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, with five Justices signing on to
282
its basic principles.
Essentially, the endorsement test asks whether a government action
appears, to the reasonably informed observer, (1) to have the purpose or effect
283
of (2) specifically endorsing or rejecting (3) a religion or a religious belief.
Under this articulation, the first prong of Lemon—valid secular purpose—is
refashioned into a threshold question, and the third prong of Lemon—
entanglement—is essentially discarded. The test also mandates that the
government’s action cannot render “adherence to a religion relevant in any way
284
to a person’s standing in the political community.” In County of Allegheny,
O’Connor laid out the key values underlying the test:
If government is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than showing either
favoritism or disapproval towards citizens based on their personal religious
choices, government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens
without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full
members of the political community.
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive” practices or
overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take account of the
numerous more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or
convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately

276. Id.
277. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
278. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2860–61 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (declining to apply
Lemon and cataloguing recent cases in which the Court has alternately applied and not applied
Lemon); McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cataloguing instances in which
individual Justices have expressly disapproved of Lemon as an analytical device).
279. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 683 (Souter, J., majority opinion).
281. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
282. See id. at 623–37 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 620 (Blackmun, J., plurality); id. at
642–43 (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
283. Id. at 625 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
284. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members of
285
our pluralistic political community.

Another way to lay out the test is to ask the following four questions: (1) As
a threshold matter, is there a valid secular purpose for the government’s action?
286
If no, then the action establishes religion and is unconstitutional. If yes, then
we apply the following endorsement analysis. (2) To the reasonable observer,
does the government’s action have the purpose of endorsing a religion or
religious belief? If yes, then the action endorses religion and is unconstitutional.
If no, then (3) to the reasonable observer, does the government’s action show
favoritism to particular beliefs or convey disapproval to others, such that it has
the effect of endorsing religion? If yes, then the action endorses religion and is
unconstitutional. If no, then (4) to the reasonable observer, does the
government’s action either create a class of outsiders or render a person’s
religious beliefs relevant to her standing in the political community? If yes, then
the action endorses religion and is unconstitutional. If no, then the action is
constitutional.
This series of questions synthesizes the basic elements underlying
O’Connor’s original endorsement test. The test was not immediately popular,
287
and the conservative Justices never really signed on to it. Additionally, the
Court initially struggled to determine what specific knowledge is imputed to the
288
“reasonably informed observer.”
However, all Justices supporting the
endorsement test agree that government actions “may not prefer one religion
289
over another or promote religion over nonbelief,” which seems to be a
290
reasonable position, considering the Court’s longstanding precedent.

285. Id. at 627–28 (internal cross-references omitted) (emphases added).
286. Although O’Connor’s endorsement analysis does not undertake an express “secular
purpose” analysis, Souter’s majority opinion in McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2732–33,
2735–36 (2005), affirmed that the key threshold step is whether the government has articulated a
sufficiently secular interest in undertaking the challenged action. Therefore, it is appropriate to
include it here as the first question a reviewing court would ask.
287. Cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (adopting a form of the endorsement test and attempting to create a public-forum exception
to it; this articulation failed to garner a majority of votes). Scalia’s articulation of the test would have
undermined it from within—his proposed public-forum exception would have permitted
governments to erect religious displays of any type in any public forum; provided each display
occurred in a public forum, the exception would supply no meaningful outer limit regarding what
constitutes an impermissible religious display in that forum. This giant loophole was probably
among the reasons that Scalia failed to gain a majority in favor of his proposed exception.
288. Compare id. 778–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the reasonable observer as
someone “deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the
religious display appears,” understanding the “‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice,” and not
“limited to the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged display,” id. at 780 (quoting
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring))), with id. at 800 n.5, 800–02 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing the reasonable observer as part of “the universe of reasonable persons[,]
ask[ing] whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely to perceive a government
endorsement” (alterations added)).
289. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of
Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)); accord id. at 2733 (Souter, J., majority opinion) (“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” (quoting Epperson v.
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In McCreary County and Van Orden, the Justices began to synthesize the
Lemon and endorsement tests within the broader framework of neutrality rules.
In his McCreary County majority opinion, Justice Souter emphasized the values
underpinning his dissent in Van Orden: (1) the impact of the display’s religious
291
content on the reasonable observer; (2) the presence or lack of a larger coherent
292
plan, of which the religious display constitutes but a part; and (3) the
significance or importance of the display’s location, particularly when it is
293
situated on civic or government property. Souter also affirmatively embraced
294
the neutrality principle in his own Van Orden dissent.
In McCreary County, Justice Souter placed additional weight on: (1) the
coherence of the plan, (2) its original development and justifications, and (3) its
295
subsequent evolution. Thus, a critical infirmity of the McCreary County
displays was that they were originally erected with an expressly religious
purpose that was covered up in subsequent iterations of the displays but never
296
repudiated. As a result, Souter found the post-hoc secular justifications offered
for the displays to be merely pretextual, reasoning that, if the government has
nothing to hide, it should not need to change its justifications for an action after
the action is challenged. When the government re-explains its purpose, it invites
297
inquiry into its original purpose, motivation, or objective.
Justice Souter noted that “the secular purpose required has to be genuine,
298
not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.” The McCreary
County majority took no position on whether this is a rational-basis standard or
some form of heightened scrutiny. Certainly, the Court’s language makes it
seem reasonable to conclude that this test constitutes heightened scrutiny—e.g.,
“genuine,” “sham,” “merely secondary.” However, the Court was unclear about
whether the secular purpose must be express and easily-identified, or whether
any conceivable secular purpose will suffice. It might assume too much to

Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2875 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The first and most fundamental of [First Amendment] principles, one that a majority of
this Court today affirms, is that the Establishment Clause demands religious neutrality—
government may not exercise a preference for one religious faith over another.” (citation omitted
and alteration added)).
290. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“Neither a state nor
the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.”).
291. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2893 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 2895–96.
293. Id. at 2897.
294. Id. at 2892 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 18).
295. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727–28 (2005). This emphasis probably arose
from the factual circumstances at hand: Each display had undergone three incarnations, but the
express purposes of the displays, manifested in official county documents, was to post the Ten
Commandments in the courthouses. At the time of the litigation, both displays had been integrated
into larger displays designed to showcase historical sources of American law. Id. at 2727–32.
296. Note how much this sounds like “preservation through transformation.” See supra Part III.A.
297. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2739.
298. Id. at 2735. See also supra note 286 (discussing the role of the secular-purpose inquiry within
the larger context of the endorsement-test framework).
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conclude that heightened scrutiny applies. Therefore, a rational-basis approach
299
will be used for the substantive analysis below.
Finally, Justice Souter provided the Court with a satisfying description of
the “reasonable observer,” obtaining a five-Justice majority in support of the
articulated definition. Accordingly, the reasonable observer: (1) is “presumed to
be familiar with the history of the government’s actions and competent to learn
300
what history has to show;” (2) is “familiar with implementation of government
301
action;” (3) inquires as to “‘the historical context of the statute . . . and the
302
specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage;’” and (4) is “‘deemed
aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the
303
religious display appears.’”
Concurring fully with Justice Souter’s analysis in McCreary County, Justice
O’Connor wrote separately to identify the greatest danger when governments
endorse religion—namely, that the endorsement will unduly influence, deter, or
restrict the free exercise of all religious adherents, even those who otherwise
304
agree with the substance of the government’s religious expression.
In his dissent in Van Orden, Justice Stevens’s endorsement analysis focused
305
primarily on the neutrality principle; he invoked it in criticizing the fact that
the actual text inscribed on the display placed “the State at the center of a
serious sectarian dispute,” because it made a definitive choice of language
306
among the many available versions of the Decalogue. Finally, Stevens
aggressively touted neutrality ideals when rejecting Justice Scalia’s “original
307
meaning” position, opining that Scalia’s position “is plainly not worthy of a
society whose enviable hallmark over the course of two centuries has been the
308
continuing expansion of religious pluralism and tolerance.”

299. See infra Part V.A.
300. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2737 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308
(2000)).
301. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 (internal quotation and citation
omitted)).
302. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987)) (alteration added).
303. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
304. See generally id. at 2746–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It is true that many Americans find
the Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs. But we do not count heads before
enforcing the First Amendment.”).
305. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2874 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2876
(“[T]he Establishment Clause requires the same respect for the atheist as it does for the adherent of a
Christian faith.”).
306. Id. at 2880 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.”)).
Also, Stevens noted that, due to its placement on the State Capitol grounds, reasonable observers
might potentially perceive the Decalogue as representing the official belief of all Texans, which
raises compelled speech issues under Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). See Van Orden, 125 S.
Ct. at 2881.
307. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
308. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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While Justice Stevens’s particular objection to the text of the Van Orden
display garnered only the votes of himself and Justice Ginsburg, it leads to two
instructive questions: (1) Does the government’s action reveal that the state has
taken one side in an ongoing sectarian dispute? (2) Does the government’s action
expressly or implicitly attempt to resolve the ongoing sectarian dispute? The
answers to these questions seem relevant to addressing the broader issue of
whether, even when the government did not have the express purpose of
endorsing religion, the government’s action has the effect of endorsing religion
or of segmenting society into insiders and outsiders: If the government has
taken a side in a sectarian dispute or attempted to resolve it, then necessarily,
the government has chosen to lend its imprimatur to one set of religious beliefs
over another. This effectively endorses the preferred belief system, which
violates neutrality ideals by preferring one religion to another.
B. The Historical-Acknowledgement Test: A Free Pass to Christian Majorities
Like the liberals, the conservatives on the Court have combined two
distinct modes of analysis in synthesizing what can only be characterized as an
extremely deferential test. Grossly stated, the historical-acknowledgment test
asks only whether the government action honors or acknowledges longstanding
religious beliefs that have been held since the dawn of the Union. The only limit
on this principle appears to be political will, which, in practice, supplies no
meaningful constraint on these “acknowledgments.” As a result, the test
provides religious majorities—who, in America, happen to be Christian—with a
free pass to concoct any “acknowledgement” they please, based primarily on the
fact that they comprise the greatest number of believers in American society and
309
always have.
Recognizing the infirmity inherent in this conception of the Clause, the
conservatives valiantly attempted to fashion a limiting principle, but the result
was much more lenient and religion-favoring than either the Lemonendorsement test or any of the Court’s previous rules. The historicalacknowledgment test limits the government’s authority in the following way:
The Establishment Clause is only offended when the government’s action (1) has
310
a religious purpose that extends beyond the scope of its secular purposes or (2)
requires or coerces nonbelievers into either professing adherence to a religious
311
doctrine or participating in a religious ceremony.
1. “Unbroken History”: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Test
Describing the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as
312
“Januslike,” Chief Justice Rehnquist cast the question before the Court as the
need to navigate two lines of cases, one acknowledging the “strong role played
309. See infra Part IV.B.2.
310. This is the outer limit that Justice Rehnquist describes in his articulation of the test. See
discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
311. Justice Scalia considers the outer limit to be compelled religious observation or
participation. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. Justice Thomas describes the outer limit as “actual
coercion.” See supra note 273.
312. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
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by religion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s history,” and one
recognizing that “governmental intervention in religious matters can itself
314
endanger religious freedom.” Rehnquist stated that the best reconciliation
between these competing values is one that “neither abdicate[s] our
responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince[s] a
hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing
315
our religious heritage.”
In a footnote, Rehnquist repudiated neutrality ideals, asserting that “we
have not, and do not, adhere to the principle that the Establishment Clause bars
any and all governmental preference for religion over irreligion. . . . Even the
dissenters do not claim that [we must] forbid all governmental
316
acknowledgements, preference, or accommodations of religion.” Technically,
Rehnquist is correct, but only because he used absolutist language. Rehnquist’s
criticism of the neutrality principle is an attack on a straw man, because there is
no genuine doctrinal dispute on this point: The Lemon-endorsement test neither
bars any and all governmental preference for religion nor forbids all
governmental acknowledgements of religion. No one questions that the
317
government can acknowledge religion (i.e., by erecting holiday displays), that
it can prefer religion (i.e., by giving tax-exempt status to all religious
318
organizations, regardless of their belief systems), and that it can accommodate
319
religion (i.e., by recognizing Christmas as a federal holiday). As such,

313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. (alteration added).
316. Id. at 2860 n.3 (alteration added). The first part of this statement overstates the scope of the
neutrality principle, while the second part constructs and attacks an argument that was never made
by either the McCreary County majority or the Van Orden dissenters. See also discussion supra Part
IV.A.
317. E.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
318. E.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (listing types of organizations eligible for tax-exempt status under
federal law; includes churches and religious social-service groups).
We must be careful not to overstate the nature or permissibility of this “preference.” The taxexemption of churches is commonly considered to serve a two-fold purpose: (1) encourage taxdeductible donations to social-service and religious organizations; and (2) relieve churches of tax
liabilities that would burden their delivery of social and religious services. The “preference” in
question would not seem to constitute a preference for religion over irreligion, because Secularist
societies are eligible for tax-exemption just like churches are. See id. Moreover, the general
availability of tax-exemption to religious organizations does not favor one religion over another. Id.
Finally, the secular purpose has commonly been understood as encouraging participation in
religious and social-service organizations because of their civilizing effects on society. Again, this
principle is inherently inclusive of all systems of both belief and non-belief.
Therefore, the word “preference” is being used in a subtly different way here than in everyday
English: Notions of favoritism (i.e., the government “prefers” for people to be religious, or it
“prefers” religion over irreligion) have been discarded in favor of recognizing the net-positive social
benefits of encouraging support for these organizations (i.e., the government “prefers” for these
organizations to enjoy public support and for them to be successful in their missions). This is not to
say that future claims may not arise about the permissibility of giving tax-exemption to religious
organizations generally. Instead, I merely note that the courts have thus far recognized several
secular reasons for permitting such exemptions.
319. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (2000) (listing federal holidays, including Christmas Day, December 25).
Christmas Day is the only federal holiday derived from the beliefs of a particular religion, viz.,
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acknowledgments, preferences, and accommodations appear to be entirely
permissible, provided they pass the basic neutrality test. Therefore, Rehnquist’s
characterization of the Court’s neutrality precedent is simply incorrect, and his
rhetorical sleight-of-hand fails: He is repudiating a position that no member of
the Court appears to hold. The neutrality rule is not an absolute bar—instead, it
is an inquiry as to whether the government’s action has the purpose or effect of
endorsing religion. This is a far cry from an outright ban on acknowledgment,
preference, or accommodation.
Nevertheless, to support his characterization of the Clause, Rehnquist
proceeded to recount the “‘unbroken history of official acknowledgement by all
three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at
320
least 1789.’” He also noted the role of functional acknowledgments or
321
“ceremonial deism” encountered in several places in American government. In
applying this “unbroken history” test, Rehnquist characterized the displays as a
322
“passive use” of the Decalogue, noting that the government’s interest in
acknowledging the Commandments was coextensive—and therefore
323
coterminous—with their religious significance.
Because of the potential that net-positive secular effects flow from the
admonishments found in the Decalogue, Rehnquist ultimately concluded that
the secular purpose behind posting it on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol
grounds was at least as great as the religious purpose, and that the display was
therefore constitutional.
2. The Framers and Original Meaning: Justice Scalia’s Test
Essentially, Justice Scalia sought to identify precisely what the Framers and
Ratifiers intended the Establishment Clause to mean, paying specific attention
324
both to their expressions of monotheistic beliefs at the time of the founding
325
and to the role of ceremonial deism throughout America’s history. Scalia
angled to refute the neutrality principle by establishing that “the history and
traditions” of the nation “reflect our society’s constant understanding of” the
Christianity. No other religious holidays are codified in federal law as days on which the federal
government is closed.
320. Id. at 2861 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (upholding a crèche and
Christmas display installed on government property)).
321. See id. at 2861–62 (citing cases upholding government acknowledgement of religion and
“official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance” (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675)).
The Court expressly permitted “ceremonial deism” in County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 n.46
(Blackmun, J., plurality, in dicta) (noting that invocations and prayer have a “solemnizing” effect on
public events and proceedings).
Currently, acceptable forms of “ceremonial deism” definitely include the national pledge (“one
nation under God”) and motto (“in God we trust”), see id., formalistic or traditional prayers, see
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (permitting non-denominational legislative prayer), and
probably include historic installations of religious figures and symbolism on federal government
buildings in Washington, D.C., see Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2862–63; id. at 2894 (Souter, J., dissenting).
It is unclear exactly where the outer limit lies, as it may be different for each Justice.
322. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864.
323. Id.
324. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748–50 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
325. See id.
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Establishment Clause not as generally requiring neutrality among religions, and
326
certainly not as requiring neutrality between religion and irreligion. Paralleling
Rehnquist’s view, Scalia’s conclusion seems to conflict with Everson and the
327
Court’s long-standing neutrality jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, Scalia sought to cast doubt upon the line of cases that
announced and reaffirmed the neutrality principle, criticizing Lemon as “brainspun,” incapable of consistent application, and a “mistaken interpretation of the
328
Constitution.”
He subsequently offered up the proposition that an
acknowledgement of religion is permissible when it either is constituted of
329
“‘beliefs widely held among the people of this country,’” or is “recognized
330
across . . . a broad and diverse range” of religious groups. He then argued that,
when balancing “the interest of [a religious] minority in not feeling ‘excluded’”
with “the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious believers in being
able to give God thanks and supplication as a people, and with respect to our
national endeavors,” courts should recognize that “[o]ur national tradition has
331
resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.”
Conceding that the foregoing analysis had failed to win over a sufficient
number of Justices, Scalia argued that, if Lemon’s secular-purpose prong is to be
332
preserved at all, the focus should remain on “the search for a genuine, secular
333
motivation” and not turn into a “hunt for a predominantly religious purpose.”
It is not clear whether Scalia conceives of this test as a form of rational basis or
heightened scrutiny, but it is probably safe to assume that, given his willingness
to let majorities erect almost any acknowledgement they please, Scalia conceives
of it as a form of rational basis—and a highly-deferential one, at that.
Furthermore, he proposed that any contextual inquiry should be
presumptively satisfied if the religious portion of the display does not have
334
“greater prominence” than the other portions, and the reasonable observer
could discern from the context that the entire display has a “purely secular
335
purpose.” Scalia would not consider evidence of a prior improper purpose as
336
“taint[ing]” a legitimate present purpose.
In conclusion, Scalia announced that he would affirm a display’s
constitutionality when (1) “[n]o one [is] compelled to observe or participate in
337
any religious ceremony or activity,” (2) the government does not “contribut[e]

326. Id. at 2750.
327. See supra Part IV.A.
328. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750–52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 2753 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). Ostensibly, Scalia means
only monotheistic beliefs in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. Id. at 2753, 2756.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 2756 (alterations added, quotation marks and emphasis in original).
332. See id. at 2758 (“I have urged that Lemon’s purpose prong be abandoned . . . .”).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 2759.
336. Id. at 2763 (alteration added).
337. Id. at 2762 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)) (alterations added).
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338

significant amounts of tax money to serve the cause of one religious faith,” and
(3) “[p]assersby who disagree with the message conveyed by th[e] displays are
free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when
339
they disagree with any other form of government speech.”
The conservative wing of the Court has struggled mightily to insinuate its
deferential, religion-preferring historical analysis as the primary method of
conceiving of the Establishment Clause. While the Lemon-endorsement test
generally prevailed in McCreary County and Van Orden, the recent turnover on
the Court probably means that neither side has been given the last word on the
matter. Nevertheless, as the law stands today, the Lemon-endorsement test is the
lens through which we must critically evaluate same-sex marriage bans.
V. DO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS PASS MUSTER?:
APPLYING THE LEMON-ENDORSEMENT TEST
The analysis of same-sex civil marriage bans occurs in two major steps.
First, a secular purpose must be identified. Without one, the bans cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny. As we will see, even under a rational-basis
conception of the secular purpose requirement, some of the so-called secular
purposes given for same-sex civil marriage bans are decidedly religious, while
others lie on such unstable logical foundations that, while the proffered
justifications may be secular purposes in and of themselves, none of them is
rationally related to banning same-sex civil marriage.
Even conceding for the sake of argument that some yet-unidentified secular
purpose is out there, the analysis is incomplete. The second step is to apply the
endorsement test’s three remaining questions: To the reasonable observer, does
the government action have (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of endorsing
religion, and (3) does the action render a person’s religious beliefs relevant to
her standing in the political community? As we will see, even assuming a
secular purpose, the preservationists’ preferred definition of marriage cannot
pass the endorsement analysis.
A. The Search for a Secular Purpose: Evaluating the Arguments Against SameSex Civil Marriage
“[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be
a secular legislative purpose.”
340
–Justice Tom C. Clark, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp

We must first determine whether the proponents of banning same-sex civil
marriage have articulated a non-pretextual, genuinely secular interest for doing
so. Without one, such bans are unconstitutional establishments of religion,
rendering the inquiry complete. This inquiry is far-ranging and relatively

338. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part)) (alteration added).
339. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part)) (alterations added).
340. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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extensive, because it requires us to undertake a critical evaluation of the logical
and secular foundations of the justifications offered for bans on same-sex civil
marriage. Our search is for a purpose that is “genuine, not a sham, and not
341
merely secondary to a religious objective.” As such, we are permitted to pierce
the veil of pretextual obfuscations designed to mask an invidious religious
342
purpose—genuine-ness cannot be determined otherwise.
The following analysis relies primarily on the arguments advanced in favor
of the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), which are found in its legislative
history and hearing transcripts. I have supplemented a handful of these
arguments with statements written by several individuals who testified in favor
of the FMA, as they are helpful in unpacking their claims. I assume for the ease
of argumentation that the arguments raised and dismissed here are the same
ones used to justify statutory and constitutional bans that have been enacted at
the state level, and that therefore, those bans would suffer the same
constitutional infirmities that exist within the FMA.
1. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Social Science, and a Bit of
History
In 1996, DOMA was passed with great religious fanfare, and supporters of
343
the law did not hesitate to trumpet its explicitly religious underpinnings. The
proponents of DOMA used religious beliefs about the immorality of
homosexuality as a justification for blatant gay-bashing. In light of DOMA’s
undeniably religious background, some commentators have argued that DOMA
344
is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Fast-forward to the present
day. While explicitly religious arguments against homosexuality were used to
345
support DOMA, there is a near-complete absence of such anti-gay religious
346
rhetoric used to justify the FMA. The preservationists only mention religion in
347
348
two contexts: (1) religious freedom and (2) the definition of marriage.

341. McCreary County, 125 U.S. at 2735. See also id. at 2727–28.
342. As a literal matter, if a proposition is pretextual, it is not genuine. The adjectives
“pretextual” and “genuine” are mutually exclusive, as they are contradictory—a proposition cannot
be both false and true at the same time.
343. E.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,100–02, S10,109–11 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (during the
DOMA floor debates, citing the Bible to condemn homosexuality and homosexual behavior). See also
James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 335, 349–53 (1997) (cataloguing the range of explicitly religious anti-gay rhetoric used
during the DOMA debates, including congresspersons’ direct citations to the Bible).
344. E.g., Donovan, supra note 343.
345. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary
Subcomm. on the Const., 104th Cong. 1, 247 (1996) (statement of Rep. Canady) (declaring the
homosexual “lifestyle” to be an “inherently destructive” one from which homosexuals need to be
“rescued”). Rep. Canady’s statements mimic the fundamentalist Christian groups who try to
convince homosexuals that they can “convert” from homosexual to heterosexual through prayer and
religious belief. See infra notes 363–65, 407–12 and accompanying text.
346. E.g., House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 1–53 (containing almost no
religiously-based anti-gay justifications for the FMA).
347. See discussion infra Part V.A.4; see also supra note 246 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 16; infra note 568; see also discussion infra Part V.A.2.b; supra Part I.A.
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While the FMA has the consequential effect of legitimizing discrimination
349
against same-sex couples, it does not have the express purpose of doing so.
The lack of a facially-discriminatory purpose lends an air of credibility to the
arguments favoring the FMA, despite their subtextual religiosity. This is a
remarkable modernization of discourse: The lessons of history have truly
“channeled” the preservationists’ once-religious anti-gay arguments into more
350
tolerable, secular-sounding ones. What happened? The preservationists have
not abandoned their religious principles. Instead, they have turned to using
pseudo-secular justifications and obfuscating free-exercise claims as cover for
insinuating their religious beliefs into the law.
Secularization of religious preservationism is not costless. For example, a
truly “fundamental” tenet of fundamentalist religious beliefs is proselytization
351
and conversion. As such, it is consistent with preservationist values to
conclude that imposition of their religious beliefs on American society is a
352
paramount goal.
Preservationists ardently decry the secularization of

349. See discussion infra Parts V.B.2–3.
350. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1332. Even more remarkable about this
tactical change is that fifty-eight of the congresspersons who co-sponsored DOMA in 1996 have cosponsored various versions of the FMA between 2002 and 2006.
351. E.g., Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), On Evangelism (June 2005), available at
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=1150 (“Since salvation is a free gift of God
and lost people matter to God, He has commissioned believers to share the gospel . . . ; we urge
individual Southern Baptists to recognize their responsibility to reach lost people with the gospel of
Christ . . . .”); see also Coral Ridge Ministries (CRM), About Coral Ridge Ministries, http://www.
coralridge. org/about_crm.htm (“CRM’s three-fold mission is to evangelize, nurture Christian
growth through biblical instruction, and act in obedience to the Cultural Mandate by applying the
truth of Scripture to all of life, including civic affairs.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); National
Association of Evangelicals (NAE), Our Values, http://www.nae.net/index/cfm?FUSEACTION=
nae.values (“The Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies, an NAE affiliate, serves thousands of
missionaries around the world by providing an integral liaison with the State Department of the
United States of America and other governments around the world.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). The
SBC, CRM, and NAE respectively claim sixteen million, three million, and thirty million members.
352. See, e.g., Traditional Values Coalition (TVC), Empowering People of Faith Through Knowledge, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/about.php (“Traditional Values Coalition is the largest
non-denominational, grassroots church lobby in America. Founded in 1980, by Rev. Louis P.
Sheldon, Chairman, TVC has sought to empower people of faith through knowledge. TVC speaks on
behalf of over 43,000 churches . . . .”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
In the interest of full disclosure, TVC opposes the FMA, but only because it does not go far
enough. See Andrea Lafferty, Constitution should ban gay marriage, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (online ed.),
June 24, 2006, http://www.columbusdispatch.com/editorials-story.php?story=dispatch/2006/06/
24/20060624-A12-00.html (criticizing the FMA because it leaves open the possibility that a
legislature might enact same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). It is
beyond dispute that TVC opposes same-sex civil marriage, and that, given the choice between the
FMA or no ban at all, TVC would support the FMA. Lafferty is the Executive Director of TVC.
Traditional Values Coalition, About TVC, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/about.php (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007). See also WallBuilders, About Us, http://www.wallbuilders.com/aboutus/index.htm
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
WallBuilders’ goal is to exert a direct and positive influence in government, education,
and the family by (1) educating the nation concerning the Godly foundation of our
country; (2) providing information to federal, state, and local officials as they develop
public policies which reflect Biblical values; and (3) encouraging Christians to be involved
in the civic arena.
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America, vigorously claiming that America is a Christian nation founded on
354
Christian beliefs. As such, a number of well-funded and highly-influential
preservationist organizations have begun to vigorously advocate for explicitly
355
356
Christian social and legal policies. The FMA is one of those policies.

Id.; Center for Reclaiming America for Christ (CRAC), Our Mission, http://www.reclaimamerica.
org/pages/aboutus.aspx (“To inform, equip, motivate, and support Christians; enabling them to
defend and implement the Biblical principles on which our country was founded.”) (last visited Jan.
8, 2007). CRAC is a ministry arm of CRM, supra note 351.
353. E.g., Southern Baptist Convention, On Secularization of our Culture (June 2004), available at
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution/asp?ID=1135 (“The cultural drift in our nation
toward secularism obscures moral absolutes under the guise of tolerance . . . .”); Southern Baptist
Convention, Resolution on Secular Humanism (June 1984), available at http://www.sbc.net/
resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=969.
Secular humanism has penetrated leadership in public life in our own land, especially in
the political, mass media, and educational arenas, so that religion (except for humanism) is
more and more regarded as irrelevant to national affairs and as of private significance
only . . . ; [we] encourage Christians to challenge the growing tendency of humanists to
dilute biblical principles in public life while they promote humanistic alternatives . . . ; we
[resolve to] pursue this reversal by Christian example and the penetration of secular
society, and by seeking appropriate legislative and/or judicial action . . . .
Id. (alterations added). See also, e.g., BILL O’REILLY, CULTURE WARRIOR 1–2 (2006).
I have chosen to jump into the fray and become a warrior in the vicious culture war that is
currently under way in the United States of America. And war is exactly the right term.
On one side of the battlefield are the armies of the traditionalists like me, people who
believe the United States was well founded and has done enormous good for the world.
On the other side are the committed forces of the secular-progressive movement that want
to change America dramatically: mold it in the image of Western Europe.
Id.
354.

E.g., WallBuilders, About Us, supra note 352.

WallBuilders is an organization dedicated to presenting America’s forgotten history and
heroes, with an emphasis on the moral, religious, and constitutional foundation on which
America was built—a foundation which, in recent years, has been seriously attacked and
undermined.
....
. . . [W]e develop materials to educate the public concerning the periods in our country’s
history when its laws and policies were firmly rooted in Biblical principles.
Id. (alteration added). See also supra note 16.
355. E.g., Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), Purpose, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/about/
purpose/default.aspx (“The Alliance Defense Fund is a legal alliance defending the right to hear and
speak the Truth through strategy, training, funding, and litigation.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007);
American Center for Law & Justice (ACLJ), About ACLJ, http://www.aclj.org/Content/?f=69 (“The
ACLJ is specifically dedicated to the ideal that religious freedom and freedom of speech are
inalienable, God-given rights. The Center’s purpose is to educate, promulgate, conciliate, and where
necessary, litigate, to ensure that those rights are protected under the law.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007);
Liberty Counsel, Restoring the Culture One Case at a Time by Advancing Religious Freedom, the
Sanctity of Human Life and the Traditional Family, http://www.lc.org/aboutus.html (“Liberty
Counsel provides pro bono legal assistance in the areas of religious liberty, the sanctity of human life
and the traditional family.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). See also The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
About Us, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/82.html (“The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, interfaith, legal and educational institute dedicated to protecting
the free expression of all religious traditions.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). The Becket Fund is not an
expressly Christian organization, but it is tirelessly pro-religion.
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Nevertheless, preservationists may not openly evangelize through facially
sectarian laws, as this would violate the Establishment Clause outright; as such,
they have had to make certain compromises of principle in obtaining their
religious objective. Now, instead of making blatantly religious arguments,
preservationists carefully couch their justifications in terms that are just secular
enough that their invidious religious purpose is not revealed. As a result,
357
preservationists have found some strange bedfellows in secularism.
Moreover, making secularized arguments has required preservationists to
stake out some intractable scientific and sociological positions against
358
homosexuality, same-sex relationships, and same-sex parenting. Over the last
several decades, scientific evidence has mounted that homosexual sexual
orientation is a benign variation of human sexuality, probably caused by
359
genetics, immunology, endocrinology, or a combination of these. Moreover,
356. Rubin, supra note 235, at 41–42 (noting that same-sex civil marriage bans “have no secular
justification at all; they are simply enactments of [religious belief]. The post hoc secular justifications
that have been offered for them are unconvincing as a general matter.” (alteration added)).
357. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1409. Eskridge writes,
Like gender-benders and sexual nonconformists, traditionalists have found themselves
making arguments that not only slight their core religious or natural law beliefs, but also
move them into analytical territory that is perilous for them. To medicalize or
constitutionalize their concerns—as lawyers do—risks losing their meaning in the
translation, and even altering their own self-understanding over time. For example, the
fundamentalist who truly believes that same-sex marriage is contrary to the law of God
now finds himself allied with the bigot who says “homosexuals are child molesters,” with
the lawyer who says “spouses have a right to defend their marriages against homosexual
assault,” and with the politician who says “normal people have a right not to associate
with homosexuals and lesbians.” Not only do the latter statements ignore the deep
spiritual component of the fundamentalist’s belief system, but the devout person’s
association with those secularized arguments may change his or her belief system. My
reading of the Gospels suggests that unfactual accusations about gay people and
dependence on the state to bolster one’s faith are inconsistent with Jesus’s philosophy of
love—and that the importation of these views into Christianity certainly changes and
arguably corrupts the philosophy articulated by Jesus.
Id. Lest we forget, religion lies at the root of the beliefs held by each of the preservationists that
Eskridge describes in this excerpt. See supra Part III.A. See also supra note 245.
358. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997) (claiming that same-sex parenting is likelier than not to result in harm to
children) [hereinafter Wardle, Potential Impact]. Wardle’s conclusions have been thoroughly
discussed and rejected in the literature as scientifically suspect and logically unfounded. E.g., Carlos
A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents,
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (1998).
359. See Ryan S. Higgins, “Mr. Chief Justice, Tear Down This Wall”: The Science of Immutability
Is Eroding the Court’s Barrier to Heightened Scrutiny for Homosexuals 14 (May 8, 2006) (on file with
author).
The weight of the scientific evidence compels the conclusion that male sexual orientation
has a biological antecedent that is beyond conscious, contemporaneous control and is
fixed in utero or shortly thereafter: Neuroanatomical studies suggest that sexual
orientation has a biological substrate in the human brain that is not chosen and cannot be
changed; pheromone studies indicate that sexual orientation is not a conscious,
contemporaneous choice; and a plethora of studies suggest that genetics, endocrinology,
and immunology are somehow implicated in the underlying “story” of male
homosexuality. Indeed, the growing consensus among scientists, psychiatrists, and
physicians is that while there may be many reasons for a person’s sexual orientation,
homosexuals do not choose their sexual orientation and it cannot be changed. This is the
essence of immutability.
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many scientists have affirmed that, regardless of the origins of homosexuality,
sexual orientation is fixed by an early age and is not the product of an individual
360
choice. Attempts to change an individual’s sexual orientation from homo361
sexual to heterosexual are generally viewed as psychologically harmful. Samesex couples have also been shown to be effective, loving parents capable of
362
raising well-adjusted, productive children.
Faced with mounting scientific evidence against their anti-gay position,
preservationists can only prevail if they rely on scientific arguments and
research about homosexuality that rest on factual conclusions directly contrary
to those consistently found by mainstream scientists. This research usually
comes in two flavors: conversion therapy and homosexual parenting.
First, in the context of “conversion therapy”—a process by which (it is
363
claimed) that homosexuals can become heterosexual —preservationists have
created an entire lobby of researchers whose outcome-determinative socialscience evidence is manufactured to conclude that (1) homosexuality is a choice,
(2) homosexuals who refuse to attempt to convert to heterosexuality are doomed
to a life of misery, and (3) there is no need to give homosexuals any civil rights,

Id.
360. E.g., Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 SCI. 1034 (1991); Ivanka Savic et al., Brain Response to Putative Pheromones in
Homosexual Men, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7356 (2005); Brian S. Mustanski, A Genomewide Scan of
Male Sexual Orientation, 116 HUM. GENETICS 272 (2005); Dean H. Hamer, et al., A Linkage Between
DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCI. 321 (1993); Sven Bocklandt et
al., Extreme Skewing of X Chromosome Inactivation in Mothers of Homosexual Men, 118 HUM. GENETICS
691 (2006);
361. E.g., American Psychological Association, Answers to Your Questions About Sexual
Orientation and Homosexuality, http://www.apa.org/topics/orientation.html (“Some therapists
who undertake so-called conversion therapy report that they have been able to change their clients’
sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual. . . . The American Psychological Association is
concerned about such therapies and their potential harm to patients.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007);
American Psychiatric Association, COPP Position Statement on Therapies Focused on Attempts to
Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies) (May 2000), http://www.psych.
org/psych_pract/copptherapyaddendum83100.cfm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
Psychotherapeutic modalities to convert or “repair” homosexuality are based on
developmental theories whose scientific validity is questionable. Furthermore, anecdotal
reports of “cures” are counterbalanced by anecdotal claims of psychological harm. In the
last four decades, “reparative” therapists have not produced any rigorous scientific
research to substantiate their claims of cure. Until there is such research available, APA
recommends that ethical practitioners refrain from attempts to change individuals’ sexual
orientation, keeping in mind the medical dictum to first, do no harm.
Id. See also American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Psychiatric Treatment and
Sexual Orientation (Dec. 1998), http://www.psych.org/psych_pract/copptherapyaddendum83100.
cfm (“The potential risks of reparative therapy are great, including depression, anxiety and selfdestructive behavior, since therapist alignment with societal prejudices against homosexuality may
reinforce self-hatred already experienced by the patient.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
362. E.g., Pawelski et al., The Effects of Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership Laws on the
Health and Well-being of Children, 118 PEDIATRICS 349, 358–60 (July 2006) (summarizing recent
longitudinal studies of same-sex parents and their children; finding no difference in adjustment and
psychosocial development outcomes). This article summarizes the findings of a committee
commissioned by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) to study the effects that continued
exclusion from legalized family structures has on same-sex couples and their children. Id. at 349.
363. See also infra notes 407–12 and accompanying text.
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because with enough willpower (and religiosity), they can always repair their
364
brokenness. Scientists have continually debunked these studies, demonstrating
that they are based on unsound scientific principles and conducted using faulty
365
research methods.

364. Of these researchers, among the most famous is Joseph Nicolosi, of the National Association
for the Research & Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), http://www.narth.com. NARTH’s
primary claim is that “reparative therapy”—a process by which the sexual orientation of a willing
subject is “repaired” by changing it from homosexual to heterosexual—is a viable treatment option
for persons who desire to “grow out of homosexuality”; Nicolosi refers to these persons as “non-gay
homosexuals.” JOSEPH NICOLOSI, REPARATIVE THERAPY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A NEW CLINICAL
APPROACH 3–4 (softcover ed. 1997) (defining “non-gay homosexuals” as those men who experience
same-sex sexual attractions but who desire to live their lives as heterosexuals); see also NARTH,
What do clinical studies say?, http://www.narth.com/menus/cstudies.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2007).
One should not conclude that NARTH’s theories are secular merely because the organization is
not expressly religious: Buried deep within the NARTH website are links to several articles by
religious medical associations. NARTH, Homosexuality and Hope: Statement Of The Catholic
Medical Association November, 2000, http://www.narth.com/docs/hope.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2007); NARTH, “Michigan State Medical Society Caves in to Gay Activist Agenda,” Charges
Catholic Medical Association, December 2002, http://www.narth.com/docs/caves.html (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007); NARTH, Medical Association Offers Position Statement on Homosexuality, http://
www.narth.com/docs/offersposition.html (reporting on the September 2004 position statement of
the anti-gay Christian Medical and Dental Association) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
Moreover, Nicolosi himself is a conservative Catholic who believes in religious natural-law theory.
Sandra G. Boodman, Vowing to Set the World Straight, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2005, at HE1 (quoting
Nicolosi: “Your true self is heterosexual. Look at your body: It was designed to fit a woman, not a
man.”). As discussed, much of religious natural-law theory was developed by Catholics, who are
among its most ardent proponents today. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. See also infra
Parts V.A.2.f; V.A.3.a.
Finally, NARTH disclaims all homophobic intent, but it opposes same-sex marriage, subscribing
to the preservationist position that opposite-sex marriage is the “ideal environment” in which to
raise children. NARTH, NARTH Position Statements, http://www.narth.com/menus/position
statements.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
365. Perhaps calling these pieces “studies” gives them more credit than they merit—most of the
literature claiming that homosexuality is a chosen, mutable condition comes in the form of opinion
pieces. For example, Exodus International—one of the earliest and most famous of the Christianitybased conversion-therapy groups—has a series of articles posted on its website that constitute
nothing more than opinions written by various proponents of the “ex-gay” movement; many of
these authors have chosen to remain anonymous, and most of the articles are un-cited and have not
been peer-reviewed. Moreover, the religious content of these “studies” is beyond dispute. See
Exodus International, Library-Society, http://exodus.to/content/blogcategory/17/56/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007). See also infra notes 407–12 and accompanying text.
To be fair, the preservationists have not commissioned every study that they cite. In 2003, one
study claimed that a handful of individuals who had undergone “reparative therapy” had
succeeded in maintaining “good heterosexual function” lasting at least five years. See Robert L.
Spitzer, Can some gay men and lesbians change their sexual orientation? 200 participants reporting a change
from homosexual to heterosexual orientation, 32 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 399 (Oct. 2003).
Preservationists celebrated this study as a validation of their longstanding claims that homosexuality
is a choice and that homosexuals can rid themselves of same-sex attractions—NARTH has fallen all
over itself trying to defend Spitzer’s study from criticism. See, e.g., Roy Waller & Linda A. Nicolosi,
Spitzer Study Published: Evidence Found for Effectiveness of Reorientation Therapy,
http://www.narth.com/docs/evidencefound.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); A. Dean Byrd,
Fordham University Dissertation Furthers Spitzer’s Landmark Study on Sexual Re-orientation
Success, http://www.narth.com/docs/fordham.html (reviewing doctoral dissertation by Jay C.
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Second, we have briefly noted the scientific evidence in support of
366
homosexual parenting; nevertheless, preservationists persist in claiming that
367
homosexual parenting is dangerous for children. I do not wish to delve deeply
into the arguments for and against homosexual parenting; because the
documented, positive effects of homosexual parenting do not enjoy the same
longitudinal credibility as several thousand years of recorded heterosexual
parenting, it is unlikely that the debate over homosexual parenting could be
resolved within these pages. For our purposes here, it is enough to show that
science has not provided us with a conclusive answer either way.
As such, we seem to be mired in an intractable “war of the studies”:
Because science may never conclusively establish either the genesis of
homosexuality or the effectiveness of conversion, or the effects of homosexual
parenting on children, the preservationists get away with citing social-science
evidence that is anti-gay, outcome-oriented, and patently non-objective. As a
result, they have left no room for meaningful argumentation and dialogue based
on nonpartisan, unbiased scientific research. Instead, advocates on both sides
can only engage in a fruitless back-and-forth about whose evidence is more
368
credible or accurate.
Despite the universally-positive support for same-sex civil marriage
369
coming from the mainstream scientific and mental-health community,
opponents of same-sex marriage persist in manufacturing incredible, specious
research to justify their anti-gay position. Because neither side appears to have
370
gained the upper hand in this battle, I will, for the purposes of this analysis,

Wade) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Daniel E. Byrne, Yet Another Attempt to Discredit the Spitzer Study
Fails, http://www.narth.com/docs/yetanother.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
However, Spitzer himself noted that the only individuals who could reasonably be considered to
have actually changed their sexual orientation were “extraordinarily religious” and “highly
motivated” to change—indeed, the only reason for the change was religiosity itself. Boodman, supra,
at HE1 (reporting that Spitzer claims his study has been misrepresented by the preservationists: “It
bothers me to be their knight in shining armor because on every social issue I totally disagree with
the Christian right.”).
Moreover, Spitzer’s study has been heavily criticized for its research methods. E.g., Theo G.M.
Sandfort, Studying Sexual Orientation Change, 7 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 15 (2003) (noting
the methodological deficiencies in Spitzer’s study); Charles Silverstein, The Religious Conversion of
Homosexuals: Subject Selection is the Voir Dire of Psychological Research, 7 J. GAY & LESBIAN
PSYCHOTHERAPY 31 (2003) (noting that “[e]xtreme bias in subject selection is identified as the
primary motivation for the subjects to claim that they have religiously converted from homosexual
to heterosexual” (alteration added)).
366. See Pawelski et al., supra note 362, at 358–60.
367. E.g., Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 358.
368. See, e.g., Catá Backer, supra note 225, at 232–34 (listing studies arriving at polar-opposite
conclusions regarding the impact of same-sex parenting and the influence of non-heterosexuals on
children generally).
369. E.g., Pawelski et al., supra note 362, at 361 (representing the position of the American
Academy of Pediatrics); American Psychological Association, APA Supports Legalization of SameSex Civil Marriages and Opposes Discrimination Against Lesbian and Gay Parents, http://www.
apa.org/releases/gaymarriage.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); American Psychiatric Association,
Support of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Marriage, http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/
lib_archives/archives/200502.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
370. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (N.Y. 2006).
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disregard all social-science evidence about conversion-therapy and homosexualparenting as being non-authoritative. This certainly renders it more difficult to
dispose of the preservationists’ arguments, but it does not render the task
impossible. To paraphrase Justice Breyer in Van Orden, nothing can adequately
371
replace the exercise of sound legal judgment.
2. Why We Have Opposite-Sex Marriage: Circularity, Question-Begging, and a
Pound of Logic
Preservationists rehearse several arguments about the nature of marriage to
justify their position against same-sex civil marriage. As we will see, none of
these arguments possess either a genuine or a rational secular relationship to
banning same-sex civil marriage. This is not to say that there are no genuinely
secular reasons whatsoever for having opposite-sex marriage; indeed, most of
these arguments are outstanding justifications for having opposite-sex marriage.
These “pro-marriage” arguments actually constitute a sedimentation of discourse: Instead of arguing against same-sex marriage, preservationists are now
arguing for opposite-sex marriage.
This is a brilliant tactical move, because it serves as convenient cover for
their anti-gay purpose: Whenever someone says, “But you’re being
discriminatory!,” the preservationists can simply respond, “Ah, but no! We just
love marriage, that’s all!” While this obfuscation may be strategically useful,
such empty cheerleading serves only to distract—after all, who isn’t for
372
“marriage”? Isn’t “marriage,” indeed, the very thing that we are fighting
about? Both sides are for “marriage”—it is disingenuous for one side to attempt
to claim the moral high ground about the matter.
As we see, the question before us is not why we should have opposite-sex
marriage. Rather, the question is why we should have opposite-sex marriage but
not same-sex marriage. Therefore, the constitutional inquiry is whether there is a
rational relationship between the proffered secular purpose and the government
action in question, viz., a ban on same-sex civil marriage.
Several of the arguments are based on two instrumentalist assumptions
and a conclusion: (1) opposite-sex marriage serves purpose X; (2) same-sex
marriage does not serve purpose X (and in fact, might harm it); and therefore (3)
marriage should not be made available to same-sex couples. While these

[P]laintiffs . . . refer to social science literature reporting studies of same-sex parents and
their children. Some opponents of same-sex marriage criticize these studies, but we need
not consider the criticism, for the studies on their face do not establish beyond doubt that
children fare equally well in same-sex and opposite-sex households. What they show, at
most, is that rather limited observation has detected no marked differences. More
definitive results should hardly be expected, for until recently few children have been
raised in same-sex households, and there has not been enough time to study the long-term
results of such child-rearing.
Id. (alteration added).
371. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2869 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“[O]ne
will inevitably find difficult borderline cases. And in such cases, I see no test-related substitute for
the exercise of legal judgment.” (alteration added)).
372. Cf. JAMIE WHYTE, CRIMES AGAINST LOGIC: EXPOSING THE BOGUS ARGUMENTS OF POLITICIANS,
PRIESTS, JOURNALISTS, AND OTHER SERIAL OFFENDERS 75–77 (2005) (characterizing this style of
argumentation as the “empty words” fallacy).
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arguments appeal to many unquestioning lawmakers and voters, it is important
to explore exactly what is illogical about them. Exposing the irrationality of
these arguments will inform the rest of the discussion.
As an initial matter, all advocates for marriage make arguments that favor
having marriage in the first place. In responding to the question, “what kinds of
relationships should be included in legal marriage?,” advocates on both sides
generally proceed on the following syllogism:
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve purpose X.
First Minor Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A.
Second Major Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A.
Second Minor Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships.
Second Conclusion = Therefore, purpose X is served by Y-type relationships.
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should include Y-type relationships.

Note that the term Y-type relationships is broad enough to encompass both
same-sex and opposite-sex relationships; thus, both narrow and broad
373
fit within this syllogism. However, because
definitions of marriage
preservationists object to same-sex marriage on substantive grounds, they
change the syllogism slightly, basing their arguments on a narrower iteration:
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve purpose X.
First Minor Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A.
Second Major Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A.
Second Minor Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships.
Third Major Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships.
Third Minor Premise = Y-type relationships include only opposite-sex couples.
Third Conclusion = Therefore, attribute A only exists in opposite-sex couples.
Second Conclusion = Therefore, purpose X is only served by opposite-sex couples.
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should only include opposite-sex couples.

The fallacy with this syllogism is that one of the syllogism’s terms is selfdefining: The Third Minor Premise begs the question of why Y-type relationships
include only opposite-sex couples. This flaw in reasoning means that none of the
syllogism’s subsequent conclusions are informed by actual arguments—the
series of conclusions become mere restatements of the question.
For example, nothing within the syllogism explains why (1) non-oppositesex couples don’t possess attribute A (the Third Major Premise, leading to the
Third Conclusion), (2) purpose X cannot also be served by relationship attributes
other than attribute A (the Second Major Premise, leading to the Second
Conclusion), or (3) purpose X is the only reason to have marriage in the first place
(the First Major Premise, leading to the First Conclusion). These infirmities
constitute the very substance of the due-process and equal-protection claims
374
described above —they go to the heart of what marriage is, which, as a legal
matter, seems reducible to the purposes and attributes in play in the syllogism.
Same-sex marriage advocates face significant challenges in explaining why,
under this syllogism, it is irrational to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples
only. Indeed, under rational-basis review, opponents of same-sex marriage can
win this argument without expressly concluding that governments should ban

373.
374.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
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same-sex marriage. As revealed in Hernandez v. Robles, all a government must
do is to establish why it makes marriage available to opposite-sex couples; it
need not advance an affirmative argument against same-sex marriage—under
rational-basis review, the point is to advance the interest somewhat, even if
376
imperfectly. Given that opposite-sex marriage usually serves purpose X
somewhat, a restriction (due process) or classification (equal protection) based
on purpose X will probably pass muster.
So far, same-sex marriage advocates have prevailed only when the
reviewing court determined that legal marriages may serve purposes other than
purpose X or possess attributes other than attribute A. Said differently, advocates
have only won when the reviewing court broadened the nature of the right.
Such broadening truly constitutes the redefinition that preservationists so
desperately seek to foreclose.
Lest these arguments distract us: our challenge vis-à-vis the Establishment
Clause is to discern what secular reason exists for concluding that, because
same-sex marriage does not possess the attributes of opposite-sex marriage, a
government should be prohibited from granting such marriages. The syllogism
in play here is the following:
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve purpose X.
First Minor Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A.
Second Major Premise = Purpose X is served by attribute A.
Second Minor Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships.
Third Major Premise = Attribute A exists in Y-type relationships.
Third Minor Premise = Y-type relationships include only opposite-sex couples.
Third Conclusion = Therefore, attribute A only exists in opposite-sex couples.
Second Conclusion = Therefore, purpose X is only served by opposite-sex couples.
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should only include opposite-sex couples, and we
should also ban legal recognition of all other relationships.

Preservationists have extended the logical conclusion of the syllogism to
include something—i.e., we should ban same-sex marriage—that the syllogism’s
propositions do not rationally support. It is insufficient to simply say that
opposite-sex marriage and same-sex marriage are different. Saying that
opposite-sex marriage is better than same-sex marriage is a value judgment that
requires a rational—and, as we will see, permissible—basis. Saying that
“marriage is marriage” does not answer the question, “What is marriage?”; it
merely repeats it in the form of a conclusion.
As mentioned, it is one thing to say that opposite-sex marriage should exist
and to advance arguments in favor of having opposite-sex marriage. It is quite
another to say that opposite-sex marriage should exist to the exclusion of same-sex
marriage. This last shows that the claimed rational relationship between the First
Major Premise and the First Conclusion has broken down. I call this the
“Conclusion-Plus” fallacy: Preservationists are relying on something beyond the
syllogism to justify the second half of the First Conclusion—banning same-sex
marriage. The proposition that same-sex marriage should be banned merely

375.
376.

855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
See id. at 11. See also id. at 22 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
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because society benefits from having opposite-sex marriage cannot be logically
derived from anywhere within the syllogism.
Where, then, does the “Conclusion-Plus” proposition come from? It
primarily derives from religious beliefs about the immorality and spiritual
dangers of homosexuality. Logically, the fallacy undermines the necessary
rational relationship between the asserted government interest and the means
used to serve that end; constitutionally, the religious beliefs undermine the
necessary secular purpose. As we will see, then, the preservationists have failed
to rationally articulate secular justifications for banning same-sex marriage.
a. A Brief Summary of the Arguments
This section briefly identifies the primary arguments—state interests,
really—raised in favor of the FMA and same-sex marriage bans generally. Table
4 groups the preservationists’ propositions by topic—for comparative purposes,
377
I have provided a key logical rebuttal to each argument.
Rehearsing these arguments is not just a dry exercise in philosophizing.
Note that a same-sex marriage ban serves the stated interests extremely poorly,
if at all. As a result, we face the inescapable implication that the stated interest is
not the true interest. First, each one of these propositions—with the possible
378
exception of Proposition C —is a rational reason for having opposite-sex
marriage. Yet, without more information, we cannot establish a rational link
between the claimed interest and banning same-sex civil marriage. As such,
none of these interests constitute convincing reasons for adopting the FMA.
Second, each one of these propositions fills its purpose imperfectly;
ostensibly, then, the FMA would perfect the interest, or at least to bring us closer
to perfection—right? Well, no. As we will see, same-sex marriage has nothing to
do with perfecting the interest. Instead, we would have to change something
about the laws governing opposite-sex marriage. For example:
1.

If the purpose of opposite-sex marriage is to encourage opposite-sex
couples to procreate, then only opposite-sex couples who are willing and
able to procreate—or, if infertile, willing to adopt—should be allowed to
marry, and married couples should not be permitted to use contraception.

2.

If the purpose of opposite-sex marriage is to ensure that as many children
as possible grow up with a married mother and father, then married
couples with children should find it harder to obtain a divorce.

377. Our discussion and rebuttal of these arguments will be limited to the Establishment Clause
context. However, much can be said about these arguments from due-process and equal-protection
perspectives. See generally Linda C. McClain, “God’s Created Order,” Gender Complementarity, and the
Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 313 (2006).
378. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Transcript, The Ties that Divide: A Conversation on Gay
Marriage with Andrew Sullivan and Gerard Bradley, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter
Pew Forum, The Ties that Divide], available at http://pewforum.org/events/print.php?EventID=56
(“[W]hen you’re coming down to saying that it’s not about procreation, it’s about procreative
orientation, you’re coming very close to a complete tautology. You’re coming close to saying it’s not
about being procreative, it’s about being heterosexual, even if that doesn’t mean being
procreative . . . .” (emphasis and alteration added)) (statement of Andrew Sullivan).
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TABLE 4. PRESERVATIONIST ARGUMENTS BY TOPIC.
Proposition

Rebuttal

Civilization and Public Ordering

Civilization and Public Ordering
We allow married couples to divorce, despite the fact that it
works harm against all four interests.

1. We want to maintain long-standing social institutions.

379

2. We want to encourage the formation of unitary families and
facilitate intergenerational values-transmission.

380

3. We want to encourage gender-complementarity in parenting
381

and sex-role modeling.

4. We want to create the ideal environment for child-rearing,
which includes a giving each child a mother and father who are
382
married.

We allow single-parent childrearing and single-parent
adoption, which, as mono-gendered parenting environments,
work harm against interests #1, 2, and 3.
We allow same-sex-couple adoption and second-parent
adoption, which, as mono-gendered parenting environments,
work harm against interests #3 and 4.

Responsible Procreation
1. We want to encourage procreation within all marriages; for
procreation to be “responsible,” couples should wait to have
383
children until they are married.

Responsible Procreation
We allow extramarital and premarital sex, but they could
result in pregnancy at any time, thus working harm against
interest #1.

2. We want to encourage unmarried persons who already have

We allow fertile married couples to use contraception, but
contraception results in temporarily- or permanently-delayed
procreation, and thus works harm against interest #1.

384

children to marry.

385

We allow marriages between infertile and sterile couples, even
when they will never adopt or foster children, thus working
harm against interest #1.
386

We require certain marriages to be non-procreative;
the
couple will never have children, thus working harm against
interest #1.
We allow singles who will never marry and same-sex couples to
undergo artificial insemination and in-vitro fertilization,
resulting in procreation outside of marriage; this works harm
against interests #1 and 2.
We allow unmarried couples who will never marry to procreate
or adopt, thus working harm against interests #1 and 2.
Procreative Orientation
We want to encourage the “reproductive meaning” within a
marriage through its “procreative orientation”—even if the
387

couple is infertile or childless by choice.

Procreative Orientation
We allow marital partners to engage in non-procreative forms
388

of intercourse (e.g., oral sex, anal sex), but these forms of
intercourse cannot result in children and thus work harm
against the interest.

379. See infra Part V.A.2.b (discussing the definitional argument against same-sex civil marriage).
380. See infra Part V.A.2.c (discussing the intergenerational values-transfer argument against
same-sex civil marriage).
381. See infra Part V.A.2.f (discussing the gender-complementarity argument against same-sex
civil marriage).
382. See infra Part V.A.2.e (discussing the ideal-environment argument against same-sex civil
marriage).
383. See infra Part V.A.2.d (discussing the responsible-procreation argument against same-sex
civil marriage).
384. See infra Part V.A.2.d (discussing the incentivizing-marriage argument against same-sex civil
marriage).
385. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (holding a statutory ban on
contraception to be an unconstitutional violation of a married couple’s due process right to privacy
in procreative decisionmaking).
386. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West 1996) (allowing first cousins to marry if one of
them is sixty-five or older); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.03 (West 1979) (allowing first cousins to marry if
the woman is fifty-five or older). See also Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S
L.J. 337 (2004).
387. E.g., See Pew Forum, The Ties That Divide, supra note 378 (statement of Prof. Bradley).
388. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a ban on homosexual sodomy).
Note also that the sodomy ban struck down in Lawrence did not extend to non-procreative
heterosexual intercourse, which Lawrence also constitutionalized by implication. See generally id.
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If the purpose of opposite-sex marriage is to encourage “reproductive
meaning” through penile-vaginal intercourse—thereby maintaining a
“procreative orientation” within the marriage, then married couples should
not be permitted to engage in non-vaginal intercourse or vaginal
intercourse with contraception.

I will not run through the various permutations ad absurdum. These
examples are sufficient to show that, aside from banning same-sex marriage,
there is a rational way to advance all of the interests outlined in Table 4—a
rational way that no one wants to talk about!
But according to the strictures of rational-basis review, merely identifying
these alternative means of advancing the interest is not enough: We must also
show that, because banning same-sex marriage bears such a highly-attenuated
link to the interest itself, it is irrational to conclude that banning same-sex
marriage advances the interest at all. In undertaking this analysis, we will
discover that the preservationists are citing these interests to cover up an
invidious religious purpose. It is identifying and dissecting this purpose to
which we now turn.
b. Identity Politics and the Definition of “Marriage”
Preservationists frequently claim that the “one-man, one-woman” model of
389
marriage should be “protected” from “redefinition,” because the man-woman
390
paradigm has always been the only possible definition of marriage per se. The
391
definitional argument was briefly discussed above, but it is worth revisiting
here in greater detail. The argument is a clever attempt to fix the meaning of
marriage as an arrangement reserved exclusively for opposite-sex couples
392
before any subsequent discussion takes place. However useful such an
argument might be rhetorically, the statement “marriage is marriage” fails
logically because it is tautological: By claiming that a same-sex marriage, by
definition, could never exist, preservationists have sidestepped the question (“Is
marriage only between one man and one woman?”) by repeating it as a
conclusion (“Marriage is only between one man and one woman.”). No attempt
is made to explain why “marriage is marriage.” Thus, the definitional argument,
while tactically useful, is an unsatisfying response to the question, “what is
marriage?”
To take on one of the more colorful iterations of the definitional argument,
Jeffrey Ventrella of the Alliance Defense Fund once wrote that, “without onions,
[onion rings] cease to be onion rings. In the same way, marriage . . . consists of

389. This rhetoric is simply code for Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 981 (Mass.
2003). It bears noting here that the Massachusetts Court was applying state constitutional protections
to that state’s definition of marriage. So much for federalism!
390. E.g., 150 CONG. REC. H7898, H7901 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Hayworth)
(“Whether a couple is a man and a woman has everything to do with the meaning of marriage.”).
391. See supra Part I.A.
392. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Ventrella, Square Circles?!! Restoring Rationality to the Same-Sex “Marriage”
Debate, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 681, 685 (2005) (“[I]f words lack fixed meaning, then debate itself
becomes meaningless.” (alteration added)). See also id. at 688 (“Marriage law cannot be decontextualized merely to support someone’s trendy preferences.”).
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two—and only two—persons [in] the union of a male and a female. Absent these
393
essential components, the social construct ceases to be a marriage.”
The argument, in essence, is that X = X. This is undoubtedly true. But it is
also mathematically possible that X = Y. It is this second equation that
represents the root of our definitional crisis. In response to the possibility that X
= Y, preservationists reply that, if the syllogism
X = marriage, and
marriage = one man + one woman, ergo
X = one man + one woman

is true, then the syllogism
X = marriage, and
marriage = one woman + one woman, ergo
X = one woman + one woman

could not also be true.
At first blush, one man + one woman „ one woman + one woman seems to be
logically correct. But is it? What, other than a bare dislike of one woman + one
woman, makes it logically—or, more precisely, legally—impossible for one man +
one woman = one woman + one woman? Is it really beyond dispute that, given the
existence of gender dysphoria, intersexuality, and transgenderism, the terms
“man” and “woman” are impervious to multiple interpretations? It seems quite
possible that the actors in our math-play are legally fungible: Since it is legal for
one man to marry, over the course of a lifetime, many women (albeit one at a
time), it is hard to imagine why, without more, he could not also marry many
men in the course of that same lifetime. (Remember, the syllogism does not say
“marriage = only one man + one woman.”)
If, as a matter of constitutional law, there are precious few areas in which
394
women and men can be adjudicated to be inherently unequal, then it is unclear
from the definitional argument exactly why or how one man + one woman is not
the legal equivalent of one woman + one woman. Arguing from essentialism gets
us nowhere, because we haven’t yet established that one man + one woman > one
woman + one woman, or why, even if that is true, such an imbalance justifies
banning one woman + one woman. I am not arguing that the definitional argument
is wrong. But to determine that it is right, we need more information than the
argument is willing to give.
Returning to the “onion rings” metaphor, we are thus left not with a
discussion of the necessary ingredients to create an onion ring, but instead with
the more basic question, “what is an onion?” Certainly, what an onion is cannot
395
be without limit. However, defining the outer limits of the onion necessarily
requires an inquiry beyond the onion itself. It seems that Ventrella’s argument is
unassailable, not because it is correct, but because it is premised on faulty logic:

393. Id. at 684 (alterations added).
394. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to defend genderbased government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that
action.”).
395. See infra Part V.A.3.c.
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Major Premise = The onion is what it is.
Minor Premise = The onion has always been what it is.
Conclusion = Therefore, what the onion is cannot be questioned.

A more impenetrable tautology there wasn’t yet.
Preservationists also find cold comfort in history: Governments have
396
continually redefined what constitutes a valid “marriage”; this means that
marriage has never been—and is not now—an institution with a static
definition. Claiming that one definition of marriage is the only possible definition,
despite evidence to the contrary, is a factually-unsupportable proposition.
For historical evidence that marriage in America has included arrangements
beyond “one-man, one-woman” marriage, one needs to look no farther than
397
Mormon polygamy in the late 1800s. Concededly, Mormon polygamy always
occurred within the confines of a man-woman paradigm. Some preservationists
seize upon this fact to claim that comparisons to polygamy are inapposite—
some preservationists even claim that, because polygamous marriages are bi398
gendered, they would support polygamy over same-sex marriage.
Logically, however, polygamous marriage cannot simultaneously support
and subvert the preservationists’ preferred definition of marriage. According to
the teleological argument against same-sex marriage, marriage is as necessarily
399
bi-nary as it is bi-gendered. Moreover, when preservationists invoke the
400
“slippery slope,” polygamy is cited as the very thing that they wish to avoid. It
is a logical contradiction to say both “I am against proposition X because it leads
to bad consequence Y” and “I prefer bad consequence Y to proposition X.” Bad
consequence Y is either worse than proposition X or it is not.
It is therefore logically inconsistent for preservationists to claim that
polygamy’s bi-gendered nature supports their definition of marriage while also
claiming that polygamy’s multi-nary nature opposes their definition of
marriage—polygamy either subverts the preservationist definition of marriage
or it does not. Said in the reverse, preservationists either oppose polygamy or
they do not. They cannot logically have it both ways.
Despite its faulty logical foundations, the definitional tautology undergirds
the preservationists’ frequent appeals to identity politics. Many preservationists
claim that gay and lesbian individuals have not actually been deprived of their
right to marry, because they can simply “choose” to marry an individual of the
401
opposite sex.

396. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (redefining marriage to permit persons of different
races to marry); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (same).
397. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
398. E.g., Maggie Gallagher, The Stakes: Why We Need Marriage, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, July 14, 2003,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-gallagher071403.asp (“Polygamy is not
worse than gay marriage, it is better. At least polygamy, for all its ugly defects, is an attempt to
secure stable mother-father families for children.”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
399. E.g., Ventrella, supra note 392, at 684 (opining that “marriage . . . consists of two—and only
two—persons [in] the union of a male and a female” (emphasis added)).
400. See infra Part V.A.3.c.
401. E.g., Card, supra note 65.
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This argument concedes that something has to change before the definitional
crisis can be resolved—the question is what or whom. It assumes that
homosexuals are merely being obstinate about who they wish to marry, and so
the definition of marriage need not be changed to accommodate their “trendy
402
preferences.”
Identity-politicking serves two useful purposes for
preservationists: (1) refuting claims of sex discrimination and (2) questioning the
notion that homosexuality is a sufficiently immutable characteristic as to merit
heightened constitutional protection.
First, there is a meaningful argument that same-sex marriage bans
constitute unconstitutional discrimination based on sex. Grossly stated, the
argument is this: (1) marriage is, after Loving, Zablocki, and Turner, an institution
that affirms individual autonomy and decisionmaking vis-à-vis choice of
partner; (2) bans on same-sex marriage are a restriction on individual autonomy,
because they do not permit individuals to marry their choice of partner; (3) the
restriction on individual autonomy is based on the sex of the individual who
seeks to enter marriage (this renders irrelevant questions of class-based harms—
i.e., harms to men or women as discrete groups); (4) because same-sex marriage
bans draw lines based on gender, they thus require an “exceedingly persuasive
403
justification”; and (5) same-sex marriage bans do not survive this heightened
404
scrutiny. This claim renders the claimant’s sexual orientation to be irrelevant,
because having a particular sexual orientation is not a prerequisite to marriage.
The claim succeeds or fails on whether the restriction is conceived of as
working an individually- or group-based harm. If the restriction is conceived of
as against the individual, the claim succeeds, because the individual’s autonomy
is diminished based on her sex. If the restriction is conceived of as against an
entire gender, the claim fails, because the legal handicap is the same for both
genders, and it is generally-applicable to everyone—the restriction diminishes
the autonomy of 100% of the population, so the persuasive force of any one
individual’s claim is undermined.
Preservationists, predictably, take the position that homosexuals remain
subject to the same gender-based line drawing that applies to heterosexuals, so
no sex-discrimination claim can be stated. Identity-politicking helps in this
regard, because it paints with a broad brush, delineating homosexuals as part of
the larger class of males and females, not as individuals who, although similarly
situated, are not permitted to marry the person of their choice solely on account
of their individual genders.
Second, and more invidiously, the assertion that homosexuals can always
choose to marry someone of the opposite sex is subtly intended to imply that
405
sexual orientation is not a “choice”—at least not in the classic sense —and
therefore it is not deserving of heightened protection or scrutiny. While not
directly related to the “definition” of marriage, this invocation of identity
politics is deliberate and definitional—it intentionally questions whether a
homosexual orientation results from nature or from choice.

402.
403.
404.
405.

See Ventrella, supra note 392, at 688.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
For a fuller explanation of the sex-discrimination claim, see generally Clark, supra note 67.
See supra notes 359–61 and accompanying text.
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It is important to remember that religions—preservationists included—are
not of one accord regarding the origins or moral consequences of homosexuality
406
or homosexual behavior. For preservationists, there are two general schools of
thought in this regard. One school believes that homosexuals (but curiously, not
heterosexuals) have affirmatively chosen their sexual orientation, and that they
407
have chosen incorrectly. This is the “reparative” school, and it is largely
Evangelical. This school believes that a homosexual orientation can—and
should—be changed to a heterosexual one through therapy and religious
408
indoctrination. This belief is derived largely from the Bible passages that
409
condemn homosexual behavior, and it drives the belief that homosexuals
suffer from a sinful, unrepentant failure to choose the proper sexual orientation:
heterosexuality.
The other school holds that the genesis of homosexuality is irrelevant—this
is the “behavioral” school, which believes that, although homosexual behavior is
sinful, homosexual desires are not. Accordingly, the story goes, even if an
individual does not choose a homosexual orientation, and even if that
orientation is immutable, individuals can choose whether to act on their
410
homosexuality. The Roman Catholic Church is the largest proponent of the
“behavioral” school; unlike the Evangelical ministries, it does not aim to
“change” an individual’s sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual—
the goal instead is to encourage homosexuals to live a life of chastity and
411
spiritual purity.
Regardless of which school one follows, it is the underlying religious belief
about the immorality of homosexuality that preservationists seek to insinuate
406. See supra Part I.B & Table 1.
407. As a logical matter, for this rationale to hold, it would mean that 100% of people choose
their sexual orientation, and that 100% of the population is therefore susceptible of conversion to a
different sexual orientation.
408. Representative religious organizations include: Homosexuals Anonymous, http://www.hafs.org/The_14_Steps (fashioned after the twelve-step program of Alcoholics Anonymous, but not
affiliated with AA or any other recovery groups fashioned upon the AA model) (last visited Jan. 8,
2007); Love in Action, www.loveinaction.org (claiming to “restor[e] those trapped in sexual and
relational sin through the power of Jesus Christ”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Exodus International,
www.exodus-international.org (“promoting freedom from homosexuality through the power of
Jesus Christ”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Pure Life Ministries, www.purelifeministries.org (“for men
with sexual addictions or homosexuality”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). See also Traditional Values
Coalition, Ministry and Counseling Resources For Those Struggling With Same-Sex Attractions And
Other Gender Identity Disorders, http://www.traditionalvalues.org/resources/index.php (last
visited Jan. 8, 2007).
409. See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
410. Catholic Answers, Homosexuality, http://www.catholic.com/library/Homosexuality.asp
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
Homosexual desires, however, are not in themselves sinful. People are subject to a wide
variety of sinful desires over which they have little direct control, but these do not become
sinful until a person acts upon them, either by acting out the desire or by encouraging the
desire and deliberately engaging in fantasies about acting it out. People tempted by
homosexual desires, like people tempted by improper heterosexual desires, are not
sinning until they act upon those desires in some manner.
Id. (emphases in original).
411. Courage, Our Five Goals, http://couragerc.net/TheFiveGoals.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2007).
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into the law through same-sex marriage bans. One theory is that banning samesex marriage can actually incentivize heterosexuality: Because a ban on same-sex
marriage will perpetuate heterosexual privilege in both law and culture, it might
have the derivative effect of turning some homosexuals into heterosexuals, or at
412
least of encouraging them to remain sexually chaste.
It is tempting to dismiss this claim as hogwash, but there is something to it:
If a government can rationally determine that opposite-sex marriage is, on
413
balance, better than same-sex marriage, then there is little to stop it from
rationally determining that heterosexuality is, on balance, better than
homosexuality—right?
Well, not exactly. While rational-basis review may theoretically permit a
government to incentivize heterosexuality, there still must be a legitimate basis
414
for doing so at all. In the Establishment Clause context, one would have to
identify the government’s interest in incentivizing heterosexuality and then
determine whether that purpose is sufficiently secular. As shown here, the
reasons for wanting to incentivize heterosexuality derive from religious belief.
We might also question whether a government ever has a legitimate reason to
incentivize or encourage a change in something so fundamental as an
415
individual’s sexual orientation.
At root, then, identity politics and the definitional argument both prove to
be unsatisfying as secular justifications for bans on same-sex marriage. Identity
politics is the cynical notion that homosexuality is so aberrant that the only
reasonable response to it is to change homosexuals into heterosexuals, and
failing that, to punish them for their aberrance by withholding civil rights.
Because identity politics derives entirely from religious belief, it is an
insufficiently-secular justification for banning same-sex marriage. The
definitional argument fails because it does not make an argument; it merely

412. The idea that same-sex marriage bans would encourage chastity among homosexuals is
somewhat absurd: Regardless of whether same-sex couples can legally marry, homosexuals will
continue to form pair-bonds and to engage in sexual relationships. The question is whether they
should be permitted to do so within the confines of a legal construct. The incentivizing-heterosexuality argument obfuscates, failing to address this question head-on.
413. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E. 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (“The Legislature could rationally believe
that it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father.”).
414. Cf. generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional
amendment prohibiting the state or local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to
protect homosexuals as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (invalidating a state statute criminalizing homosexual—but not
heterosexual—sodomy as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group).
415. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1032 n.5 (2006) (Bridge, J., concurring in
dissent).
Rather than being merely an unchanging characteristic, “immutability” may describe
those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for
government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that
change might be physically. Courts and legislators therefore should not conclude that
homosexuality is mutable because reasonable minds disagree about the causes of
homosexuality or because some religious tenets forbid gays and lesbians from “acting on”
homosexual behavior. Instead, courts should ask whether the characteristic is one
governments have any business requiring a person to change.”
Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).
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states a definition. Asserting that religious marriage is the only possible
definition of marriage defies both fact and reason—moreover, the proffered
definition is insufficiently secular “because the tradition in question is a
416
religious one.”
c. Marriage as an Intergenerational Values-Transmission Device
Preservationists often make an instrumentalist claim that opposite-sex
marriage resulting in a household run by a mother and a father is the primary—
and as some claim, the only—way that values and beliefs are transmitted across
417
generations. I will leave alone the incredible insult that such a claim hurls
toward single-parent and same-sex parent families, focusing instead on the
claimed secular relationship between marriage-as-a-values-transmitting-device
and a ban on same-sex civil marriage. At the outset, it is worth asking why then,
if marriage is so good at serving this noble purpose, same-sex couples should be
barred from taking advantage of it? Why should same-sex couples not be
allowed to pass on their values in such an effective way?
Values-transmission is a really good reason to have marriage at all; for
civilizations to survive, they must necessarily have institutions that facilitate the
intergenerational transfer of accumulated cultural knowledge, values, and
beliefs. However, what the preservationists have failed to explain is why
marriage’s ability to serve this valuable function inherently justifies limiting
access to marriage to only opposite-sex couples.
So what else might be going on with this claim? What secular justification
is there to prevent same-sex couples from taking advantage of valuestransmission in the same way as opposite-sex couples? Under Prof. Siegel’s
theory of transformation, the word “values” is pretextual code for “religious
418
beliefs.” Rhetorically, it is no accident that “values-transmission” and “family
values” share the word “values.” It takes little digging to discover that what the
preservationists mean by “values” is meant to signal religious opposition to
419
homosexuality and same-sex relationships.
As a definitional matter, “values” encompasses both secular and sectarian
morality. Exploiting this definitional ambiguity, preservationists attempt to lend
an air of legitimacy to their arguments—and render them less susceptible to

416. Rubin, supra note 235, at 42; see infra Part V.B; see also supra note 37.
417. E.g., Senate, Less Faith, supra note 184 (statement of Prof. Wardle) (“Marriage is the great
prize. It is the primary mediating structure through which values are transmitted to society in
general and to the rising generation, in particular. . . . [T]he institution of marriage is . . . crucial to
the organization of society and the transmission of social values.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG.
REC. S5415 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“We know the values
transmission that occurs in a marriage, what the parents say to their children and what they live in
front of their children. We know the values transmission that takes place from grandparents, if they
are surviving, to children, passing on those traditions and thoughts.”); 152 CONG. REC. S5519 (daily
ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“My parents have been married for over 50 years.
You look at them and say: That is the way it should be, where two become one. Out of that union
comes more people, more children, raised with a solid set of foundational values that you hope can
be good citizens.”).
418. See Siegel, supra note 248, at 111.
419. See also supra Table 1.
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Establishment Clause challenges—by conflating secular and sectarian morality
420
and carefully couching their claims in secular-sounding terms.
Nevertheless, it is not enough to merely identify the code words. To show
that a irrational sectarian relationship between values-transmission and bans on
same-sex marriage, we must engage the claim directly. Preservationists want to
encourage opposite-sex marriage because it serves a valuable public purpose,
viz., intergenerational values-transmission. Returning briefly to our syllogism
from above, let us make “values-transmission” equal purpose X. The attributes
and relationships that the preservationists prefer include “a mother-father
household” (attribute A) and “opposite-sex relationships” (Y-type relationships).
All we have left to do now is to make the substitutions:
First Major Premise = Legal marriage should include relationships that serve valuestransmission.
First Minor Premise = Values-transmission is served by a mother-father household.
Second Major Premise = Values-transmission is served by a mother-father household.
Second Minor Premise = A mother-father household exists in opposite-sex relationships.
Third Major Premise = A mother-father household exists in opposite-sex
relationships.
Third Minor Premise = Opposite-sex relationships only include opposite-sex
couples.
Third Conclusion = Therefore, a mother-father household only exists in oppositesex couples.
Second Conclusion = Therefore, values-transmission is only served by opposite-sex
couples.
First Conclusion = Therefore, legal marriage should only include opposite-sex couples, and we
should also ban legal recognition of all other kinds of relationships.

Again, we find a basic circularity in the Third Minor Premise, which says
that opposite-sex relationships include only opposite-sex couples. It is beyond
dispute that opposite-sex relationships would be comprised of opposite-sex
421
couples—indeed the very nature of the thing makes the syllogism true. As
Goodridge noted, such argumentation “singles out the one unbridgeable
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that
422
difference into the essence of legal marriage.”
This argument is therefore unhelpful in answering the question why samesex couples should be excluded from marriage. The claim cannot logically rest
on the mere truism that same-sex couples are different from opposite-sex
couples because they are, well, same-sex couples and not opposite-sex couples.
Without more, all we can look to for justification is the underlying religious belief
that homosexuals and same-sex couples suffer from an incurable moral and

420. E.g., H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15–16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916 (House
Committee on the Judiciary report on the 1996 “Defense of Marriage Act”) (DOMA “advances the
government’s interest in defending traditional notions of morality” (emphasis added)).
Note how carefully this language walks the line between religious belief and secularism. It is
crafted to signal religious belief to the “insiders” who know how to decode it, but the statement is
just vague enough about its underlying religious precepts to render it safe from the challenge that it
is overtly and impermissibly religious.
421. Cf. WHYTE, supra note 372, at 107–16 (2005) (discussing the logical fallacy of questionbegging).
422. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003).
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spiritual bankruptcy, and that, in light of this degraded state, the only
reasonable thing to do is to deny them access to civil marriage.
Note what I am not saying: I am not claiming that intergenerational valuestransfer is an ignoble purpose for marriage, or that opposite-sex marriages are
incapable of fulfilling that purpose. Indeed, I am not even claiming that samesex marriages are capable of fulfilling that purpose. Instead, I am concluding—
based purely on logical reasoning and the argument’s face value—that there is
no rational secular relationship between the claimed purpose and the proposed
government action.
d. Encouraging Responsible Procreation: Marriage as a Civilizing Force in
Society
A recent iteration of the “Conclusion-Plus” fallacy is that the state should
ban same-sex marriage because it serves the state’s interest in encouraging
423
“responsible procreation.” Concomitant with this claim is that marriage is a
civilizing force in society, and that being married is good for everyone—married
people are described has happier, healthier, better-off financially, and better424
regarded in their communities. As noted above, these arguments present
compelling reasons to have opposite-sex marriage, but they fail to answer the
question, “Why ban same-sex marriage?”
Responsible procreation means that the state has an interest in
incentivizing procreation within marriage; the assumption is that children being
raised within a marriage are more likely than not better off than children being
raised by single or unmarried parents. Fair enough: Encouraging propagation of
the species is a noble state interest, and creating stable environments for childrearing is a logical aim. Nevertheless, the responsible procreation argument is
fallacious in its own right, for two reasons. First, the claimed interest is both
over- and under-inclusive. Responsible procreation proves too much about the
nature of opposite-sex marriage and opposite-sex couples’ interests in childrearing: first, opposite-sex couples are not universally capable or desirous of
having children; second, opposite-sex couples are not universally desirous of
being married; and third, opposite-sex couples are not universally desirous of
having children within a marriage. Additionally, responsible procreation does
not reach children being raised in single-parent families, whether by death,
divorce, or design. As such, the interest itself is significantly over- and underinclusive, even without considering same-sex marriage as part of the equation.
Even so, we may assume that the state’s interest is rational. This leads us to
the second fallacy in the argument: Banning same-sex marriage does not

423. The term “responsible procreation” comes from Lynn Wardle’s “Multiply and Replenish”:
Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 771 (2001). In essence, it is a reiteration of the procreation arguments made more obliquely in
the “ideal-environment” and “gender-complementarity” contexts, see infra Parts V.A.2.e, f.
Nevertheless, it is important to bring it up here in a separate analysis to show that reducing
marriage to only procreation results in logical breakdown of the argument.
424. See infra note 531 and accompanying text (discussing the public-health argument against
same-sex marriage).
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One might respond by saying that
incentivize opposite-sex marriage.
legislatures may rationally decide that opposite-sex couples need marriage more
than same-sex couples do—indeed, this is the very argument made in
426
Hernandez. Nevertheless, it does not really answer the question before us.
Hernandez was concerned with answering the question why the New York
Legislature has heretofore failed to offer marriage to same-sex couples;
Hernandez explicitly held that the New York Legislature has the discretion to
427
“extend marriage or some or all of its benefits to same-sex couples.” Our
question is a different one. Why should the New York Legislature—or any
legislature, for that matter—be foreclosed from exercising its discretion in this
regard? The responsible procreation argument offers nothing to explain why
this should be so.
Moreover, marriage undoubtedly provides tangible and intangible benefits
to the spouses. However, an inevitable question arises: Why should same-sex
couples be precluded from taking advantage of these benefits? Said differently,
why do same-sex couples not deserve these benefits? The preservationists have
offered no rational or secular response to this question. It seems then, that their
religious beliefs about the immorality of homosexuality are supplying the
necessary link between the claimed interest and the means used to serve that
interest. Such a justification is decidedly sectarian.
e. Child-Rearing and the “Ideal Environment”
Preservationists claim that the man-woman marriage paradigm is the
428
“ideal environment” in which to procreate and raise children. This “child429
centered” view is a relatively new development in family-values rhetoric. To
425. The only claim that same-sex marriage bans incentivize opposite-sex marriage is based
entirely in private religious bias. See infra Part V.A.3.b.
426. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (“The Legislature could find that unstable
relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born
into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus that promoting
stability in opposite-sex relationships will help children more.”).
427. Id.
428. E.g., Senate, supra note 177 (testimony of Pastor Daniel de Leon, Sr.) (“Marriage between a
man and a woman is the standard. A child is like a twig that is planted in the soil of our society that
requires two poles to have the best chance of growing strong and healthy. Those two poles, if you
will, are the parents, Dad and Mom.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5289 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Gingrey) (“The ideal for children is the love of both a mom and a dad. No same-sex couple can
provide that. The ideal for marriage is about bringing together moms and dads so children have a
mother and a father to learn from.”); id. at H5302 (statement of Rep. Pitts) (“[T]he statistics still show
that the best home for kids is still with a mom and dad who are married and love each other. That is
the ideal we are talking about here: the best home for kids. By protecting marriage, this amendment
promotes such an environment for our kids.” (alteration added)); id. at H5302 (statement of Rep.
Graves) (“[T]he House needs to stand up and send a positive message to the American people about
what is the best married environment to raise our children, and that is an environment that is a
marriage between a man and a woman.” (alteration added)).
429. Thirty-five years ago, when Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972), first brought the idea of same-sex marriage onto the national stage, society’s antigay rhetoric was frequently grounded in then-widely-held beliefs that homosexuals were
“disturbed” or “perverted” individuals who suffered from mental illness. Indeed, it was not until
1973 that the American Psychiatric Association removed “homosexuality” from its list of
pathologies. See American Psychiatric Association, Homosexuality and Civil Rights: Position Statement
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support the claim, they frequently invoke social science evidence purporting to
show that children who are products of “healthy” opposite-sex marriages are
430
fundamentally better-off than children who are not.
Without delving into the specific merits of the social science claim, it is easy
to dispose of the “ideal-environment” interest as logically unsound. The stated
interest is to ensure that as many children as possible are born into and raised in
man-woman marriage paradigms. This is certainly a valid interest—
governments frequently espouse such “aspirational” paradigms, and the “ideal
environment” claim appears to fall neatly in that category: The operating
assumption is that marriage acts as a stabilizing, civilizing force in adult
relationships, in turn creating a more nurturing environment for children.
Said differently, the claim is that opposite-sex marriage is simply better for
children than same-sex marriage. Well, so what? If the state’s interest is in
providing a mother-father home for every child, there is a panoply of other steps
that it could take to serve that interest directly, viz., (1) enacting strict limitations
on premarital and extramarital intercourse (minimizing the potential that an
out-of-wedlock birth would result), (2) offering more financial incentives to
unmarried opposite-sex couples if they marry, particularly if they already have
or plan to have children (such incentives currently include, inter alia, certain tax
breaks, pension rights, and Social Security benefits), or (3) more strictly
regulating divorce (lessening the possibility that children would be exposed to
parenting environments that are somehow less-than-”ideal”).
This is not to advocate for these measures in lieu of (or even more
frighteningly, in addition to) bans on same-sex marriage. The point is this: the
means used to serve the interest is a ban on same-sex marriage. There are many
other reasonable steps that the government could be taking to incentivize
opposite-sex marriage and encourage the formation of the “ideal
431
environment,” but the supporters of the FMA are choosing instead to ban
same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage bans are not of a kind with the
regulations and incentives suggested above. Same-sex marriage bans are
designed to prevent the formation of legal family units, as opposed to the
changes suggested above, which are intended to encourage the formation of legal
family units.
Moreover, as a matter of common sense, it seems irrational to conclude that
the banning of one form of marriage would lead to the flourishing of another.
Indeed, in Lewis, the State of New Jersey gave away this argument, noting that
marriage’s sole purpose could not be to incentivize opposite-sex couples to
432
procreate. The absence of a rational relationship here belies the invidious truth

(Dec. 1973), http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/197310.pdf (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007).
430. See Catá Backer, supra note 225, at 232–34.
431. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. 104-193, § 401(a)(2), 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2000)) (“The
purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to . . . end
the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and
marriage . . . .”).
432. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006).
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underlying this claim: Advancing the “ideal environment” cannot be the preser433
vationists’ true interest in banning same-sex marriage.
That said, courts have thought otherwise. One of Hernandez’s key logical
foundations was that “an important function of marriage is to create more
434
stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be born.”
This rationale implies sub silentio that, in advancing the interest of creating the
“ideal environment,” the New York Legislature could rationally single out the
children of same-sex couples for disparate treatment—children who, but for their
parents’ sexual orientation, fall squarely within the larger class of children
435
intended to be protected by marriage.
It is facetious to conclude that the government rationally advances its
interest in providing all children with the security that marriage provides by
denying an identifiable class of children that very security. It is perverse to
punish children for the sexual orientation of their parents. If the preservationists
care so much about children, why would they relegate a portion of them to a
permanent underclass?
Some might say that rational-basis review allows us to count heads—or to
436
not count heads—when making social policy. Under this reasoning, the
children of same-sex couples don’t matter because there aren’t as many of them
437
as there are children of opposite-sex couples. However we conceive of rational

The State does not argue that limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman is
needed to encourage procreation or to create the optimal living environment for children.
Other than sustaining the traditional definition of marriage, which is not implicated in this
discussion, the State has not articulated any legitimate public need for depriving same-sex
couples of the [rights of marriage].
Id. (alteration added).
433. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking
down on Free Exercise grounds a generally-applicable, facially-neutral ordinance that was enacted
with the facial purpose of protecting public morals and safety, but which was actually intended to
burden the religious practice of only Santerian practitioners). A key aspect of this rule is that the law
must be intended to discriminate; merely burdening one religious group over others is insufficient.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
434. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
435. Cf. 152 CONG. REC. S5527 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Akaka).
Given the Marriage Protection Amendment’s broad and ambiguous language, it would
have a potentially devastating effect on existing same-sex families. In particular, I am
concerned how this amendment would impact the children currently being raised by
same-sex parents. Not only would it curtail the States from granting equal marriage rights
to same-sex couples, it could also, through their parents, deprive children of access to
health insurance, life insurance benefits and inheritance rights.
Id. (emphasis added).
436. Cf. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2747 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e do not count heads before
enforcing the First Amendment.”).
437. Nevertheless, many same-sex couples are raising many children throughout the nation. 150
CONG. REC. H7901 (2004) (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (“There are over 1 million children being
raised in gay and lesbian families in the United States.”). Barring nationwide laws against
homosexual parenting, it is foreseeable that they will continue to do so in ever-increasing numbers,
particularly given the continuing development and wider availability of alternative reproductive
methods. See Rubin, supra note 235, at 42–43. Therefore, if the ability or willingness to have and raise
children is a predicate to receiving civil marriage benefits, same-sex couples have already fulfilled
this requirement in spades.
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basis, it is nevertheless unreasonable to conclude that a government rationally
advances its interest through an action that affirmatively harms its interest.
Additionally, if the point of marriage is to encourage procreation, it is
unclear how allowing infertile and sterile opposite-sex couples to marry—but
not wholly-fertile same-sex couples—advances the stated interest. The argument
is that same-sex couples need marriage less than opposite-sex couples do,
438
because same-sex couples are less likely to have children. How does this logic
not also apply to opposite-sex couples who are childless by chance or by choice?
If the legal objection is childlessness, then the logical response would be to deny
marriage to all couples who are highly likely to remain childless.
In response to this criticism, one might argue that the potential for these
opposite-sex couples to adopt children is a sufficient justification for allowing
them to marry, while still excluding fertile same-sex couples. Although this
conclusion appears facially reasonable, it is mere obfuscation: How will
preventing same-sex couples from marrying encourage infertile and sterile
opposite-sex couples to adopt children? Assuming the existence of a causal link
between the two is irrational.
At root, then, the words “ideal environment” suggest that other
relationships—e.g., single parenting, same-sex parenting—are bad for children.
The merits of this empirical claim lie beyond the scope of our inquiry. Instead,
our focus is on rationality: If, arguendo, gays are bad for children, what is the
logical remedy—banning same-sex marriage or banning homosexual parenting?
Since banning homosexual parenting does not seem to carry as much currency
439
as banning same-sex marriage, preservationists have chosen to fight the battle
they can win. The “ideal environment” argument helps them in this regard: It
signals the religious belief that, because homosexuals are immoral and

Rubin also raises the concern that the world may already by overpopulated as it is, rendering the
necessity of reproduction a dead letter. See id. at 42. This appears to be a valid concern: In October
2006, the United States’ population exceeded 300 million, giving American environmentalists
significant pause. See U.S. population now 300 million and growing, CNN.COM, Oct. 17, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/17/300.million.over/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
438. See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“[T]he Legislature could rationally decide that, for the
welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex
than in same-sex relationships. Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth
of children; homosexual intercourse does not.”).
439. But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (2004), cited in Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-041152-C, 2006 WL 1445354 (W.D. Okla. May 19, 2006) (holding Oklahoma’s ban on recognition of outof-state adoptions by homosexuals to be unconstitutional under the federal Full Faith and Credit,
Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses); WEST’S F.S.A. § 63.042(3) (1977), cited in Lofton v. Sec’y
of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida’s ban on
homosexual adoption against federal due-process and equal-protection challenges), reh’g en banc
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005). See also Human Rights
Campaign, State Legislation/Ballot Initiatives Affecting GLBT People: Parenting Record,
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Parenting&Template=/CustomSource/Law/LawLegis
lationSearch.cfm (continually updating a catalogue of state-level measures that impact homosexual
parenting and adoption rights) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Most recently, legislatures in Ohio,
Tennessee, and Utah have addressed suggested bans or restrictions on homosexual parenting. Id.
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depraved, they are incapable of being good parents. The religious purpose
underlying this preservationist claim—and same-sex marriage bans generally, is
to discourage same-sex couples from becoming parents by punishing their
children. This is decidedly sectarian.
f.

“Gender Complementarity,” the Modeling of Sex Roles, and the
“Procreative Orientation” of Marriage

On a related point, preservationists claim that “gender complementarity” is
the only type of relationship model that the state should endorse as an
441
appropriate example for children. Preservationists frequently claim that
children can only learn “proper” social and gender roles within a man-woman
442
parenting paradigm. Despite the overwhelming amount of scientific evidence
443
that rebuts this claim, the merits of this empirical claim lie beyond these pages.
The war-of-the-studies that inevitably results cleverly distracts us from the more
invidious aspects of the “gender complementarity” theory.
One subtext of the theory is that, because same-sex relationships are, by
their very nature, not bi-gendered, they are inferior to opposite-sex relationships
as role models for children and are therefore undeserving of legal recognition.
Moreover, the theory goes, giving legal recognition to same-sex relationships
would “promote” homosexuality to children as “an acceptable lifestyle
choice”—this would further harm the interest because children would be taught
that it is acceptable not to conform to gender norms.
440. An even more invidious interpretation of “ideal environment” is that “we need children to
be raised in heterosexual families because we have to keep them away from sexually predatory gays
who, as everyone knows, are child molesters.”
This may seem like an extreme reading of “ideal environment,” but a number of preservationist
interest groups take this stance as an official party line. E.g., Traditional Values Coalition, Exposed:
Homosexual Child Molesters, http://traditionalvalues.org/urban/one.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2007);
Traditional Values Coalition, The Homosexual Movement and Pedophilia, http://www.traditional
values.org/homosexual_movement_and_pedophilia/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Timothy J. Dailey,
Family Research Council, Homosexuality and Child Sexual Abuse, http://www.frc.org/get.
cfm?i=IS02E3 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); Tres Kerns, Concerned Women for America, ABC News
Special on Catholic Pedophile Crisis Misses Mark, http://www.cultureandfamily.org/article
display.asp?id=590&department=CFI&categoryid=cfreport (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
441. E.g., Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (testimony of Christopher Wolfe) (“[G]ender
complementarity is essential or integral to the meaning of the institution of marriage. Marriage is a
union of two people whose physical union makes them, literally, a single unit, in the sense that this
union of two complementary, engendered bodies is the ordinary way of bringing children into
existence.” (alteration added)).
442. E.g., 150 Cong. Rec. E1859 (2004) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt) (“While not everyone who enters
into marriage desires children or is able to have children, the context of their marriage is an example
of how a man and a woman should live together in a way where children could be raised and cared
for.”). See also Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts on Children and Society of “Lesbigay” Parenting,
23 QUINNIPAC L. REV. 541 (2004).
We know that children of parents who smoke are more likely to smoke than children
whose parents do not smoke; children of parents who are violent tend to be violent;
children of Republicans tend to vote Republican. Is it not reasonable to expect that
children raised by lesbigay parents will tend toward the same kinds of sexual behaviors
and gender identity issues as their parents?
Id.
443.

E.g., Pawelski et al., supra note 362, at 358–60.
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Citing these interests, the preservationists seek to prevent the “promotion”
of homosexuality, claiming concern for the well-being of children generally.
Nevertheless, as we will see, their impetus for making this argument is their
religious beliefs about the immorality of homosexuality. This concern for other
people’s children overreaches: If the end sought is to limit the exposure of their
own children to homosexuality, preservationists already possess the autonomy
444
to do that effectively, so no substantive legal changes appear to be necessary—
preservationists may, according to the dictates of their consciences, teach their
children whatever they wish about homosexuality, homosexuals, and same-sex
relationships. If the end sought is more invidious—to dictate what information
is available to every child or to limit other parents’ ability to educate their children
as they see fit (or both)—then the interest cannot withstand scrutiny for two
reasons: (1) such a restriction unconstitutionally infringes on others’ right to
bring up their children as they see fit; and (2) the preservationists’ negative
views of homosexuality are dictated solely by religious belief, which is a
constitutionally-impermissible basis for creating public policy. As a result, this
iteration of the “no promo homo” argument fails both because it overreaches
and because it is not secular.
Moreover, the ends-means problem encountered in the previous section
arises here as well. The stated interest of the “gender complementarity” claim is
that marriage exists to encourage the formation of opposite-sex relationship
models, premised on the assumption that these relationships are the ideal
method for teaching children about healthy adult relationships. The means to
that end is a ban on same-sex marriage. Again, the means fail to rationally serve
the ends: It is irrational to conclude that the formation of opposite-sex
relationships is the natural—or even logical—result of a ban on same-sex
marriage.
As a result, it would seem that the “gender complementarity” theory must
stand for something else—and so it does. Preservationists, and particularly
Catholics, believe that penile-vaginal intercourse is the only appropriate form of
445
intercourse, in part because of the “divinity” of the copulative sexual act, and
in part because they believe that male and female genitalia are physiologically
446
“complementary.” Therefore, “complementarity,” an otherwise innocuous
word, is used equivocally to telegraph a belief in the “proper” copulative form
of sexual intercourse—also referred to as the “procreative orientation” of

444. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the due process right to
“liberty” includes the right to “bring up children . . . according to the dictates of [one’s] own
conscience” (alteration added)); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (U.S. 1925) (holding that the due process right to “liberty” includes “the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”).
445. E.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/
catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm#2335 (“Each of the two sexes is an image of the power and tenderness of
God, with equal dignity though in a different way. The union of man and woman in marriage is a way
of imitating in the flesh the Creator’s generosity and fecundity . . . .”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
446. E.g., Senate, Examination, supra note 195 (testimony of Christopher Wolfe) (“Marriage is a
union of two people whose physical union makes them, literally, a single unit, in the sense that this
union of two complementary, engendered bodies is the ordinary way of bringing children into
existence.”).
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Preservationists believe that oral and anal sex—the primary
marriage.
methods by which many homosexuals engage in intercourse—are deviant and
448
sinful forms of sex. The basis for this belief is found in several Biblical passages
that explicitly condemn non-vaginal forms of intercourse as disfavored by God
449
and punishable by death.
This religious belief was originally manifested in criminal sodomy laws,
which have been used for centuries to punish non-procreative intercourse,
450
particularly between men.
Historical sodomy laws represented a
commandeering of civil social policy by the church, and American sodomy laws
perpetuated this conflation of sectarian and secular interests for hundreds of
years. Many preservationists continue to believe that homosexuals should
451
continue to be punished for engaging in these “deviant” forms of sex.
However, as a constitutional matter, the government may no longer punish
individuals who eschew penile-vaginal intercourse for other forms of sex. If
452
Lawrence means anything—and some argue it does not —it certainly means
that governments cannot punish individuals for consensually engaging in non453
vaginal sexual intercourse.
Therefore, if preservationists were to continue to punish homosexuals for
their sinful forms of sexual intercourse, they had to find alternative forms of
punishment. They discovered a gold mine in same-sex marriage bans, which
have become a modern-day proxy for sodomy laws: Sodomy laws are designed
to punish homosexual conduct, and same-sex marriage bans are designed to
punish homosexual relationships. Because preservationists may no longer punish
homosexual sex directly, they now seek to punish the relationships in which

447. E.g., Pew Forum, The Ties that Divide, supra note 378 (statement of Prof. Bradley).
448. E.g., New Advent, Catholic Encyclopedia: Lust, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
09438a.htm (characterizing sodomy as “a consummated external sin”) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007);
Southern Baptist Convention, On Same-Sex Marriage, http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/
amResolution.asp?ID=1128 (claiming that “the Bible calls [homosexuality] sinful and dangerous
both to the individuals involved and to society at large”; citing Leviticus 18:22 and Romans 1:26–27,
both of which condemn homosexual sexual intercourse (alteration added)) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
449. E.g., Leviticus 20:13 (New Oxford ann., New Rev. Standard Version) (“If a man lies with a
male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death,
their blood is upon them.”).
450. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1351. See also An Acte for the punysshement
of the vice of Buggerie, 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1534) (Eng.) (“the detestable and abhomynable vice of
buggery . . . [is] adjudged felnye” (alteration added)).
451. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), sixteen amicus briefs were filed in support of the
State of Texas. Of these, only two were not filed by a fundamentalist Judeo-Christian religious
group; even so, both of these non-religious briefs relied heavily on the preservationist arguments
evaluated here. See Brief for the States of Alabama, South Carolina, and Utah as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), available at 2003 WL
470172; Brief for Texas Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), available at 2003 WL 470181.
452. See Ventrella, supra note 392, at 706–07.
453. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“To say that the issue in Bowers[ v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986),] was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about
the right to have sexual intercourse.”).
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homosexual sex is likely to occur. Flouting Lawrence’s mandate, talk of
“complementarity” telegraphs this invidious religious purpose.
3. Of Slippery Slopes and Social Destruction: Consequentialism, Perversity, and
Chicken Little
One of the most popular tropes in favor of the FMA is that allowing samesex marriage would cause American society to slide down a slippery slope
toward total destruction—the theory is that same-sex marriage would set off a
chain reaction of negative effects that will ultimately lead to the end of
455
civilization as we know it. The legal conclusion, then, is to ban same-sex
marriage before any court, legislature, or popular vote has the opportunity to
456
begin such dangerous experimentation with the fabric of our society.
The slippery slope comes in two primary flavors—consequentialism and
perversity. The consequentialist argument is that same-sex civil marriage and
marriage-like arrangements will devalue marriage and traditional family
structures, resulting in a marriage-less society that is only steps from total social
breakdown. The perversity argument is that legalizing same-sex marriage will
lead to the legalization of other perverse relationship models that are even more
depraved than same-sex couplings: If same-sex relationships were legalized, the
argument goes, then proponents of these other relationships would be able to
457
argue that their relationships, too, should be legally recognized.
Of all the arguments made in favor of the FMA, the slippery slope is the
only one that is made against same-sex marriage directly. All other arguments
454. This seems like an irrational course of action in and of itself, if only because homosexuals
will continue to pair-bond and have sexual relationships even while marriage remains foreclosed to
them. This conclusion hardly requires evidence: Pair-bonding has occurred among homosexuals for
the duration of human history, yet marriage has also been foreclosed to them for almost the entirety
of that history. The question before us, which the “gender complementarity” argument does not
answer, is why marriage should continue to be foreclosed to homosexuals and same-sex couples.
455. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5441–42 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback)
(“[W]ith the weakening of the institution of marriage over the past 30 to 40 years, with this
redefining of marriage, which would define marriage out of existence, which is what we have seen
in other countries, you are going to harm your next generations and succeeding generations that you
raise.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG. REC. H5304 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Akin)
(“[A]nybody who knows something about the history of the human race knows that there is no
civilization which has condoned homosexual marriage widely and openly that has long survived.”
(alteration added)).
456. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5457 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[O]ur
marriage laws permeate our entire culture and we need to be wary about letting the judiciary foist
some untested and frankly, unwanted social experiment on an entire Nation.” (alteration added));
152 CONG. REC. H5289 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Foxx) (“The [Goodridge] decision
represents that beginning of what could be a dangerous erosion of this sacred tradition [marriage]
that we must protect.” (alterations added)).
457. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5522 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe).
[A]ll of those who are concerned about the very strong lobby, the homosexual marriage
lobby, as well as the polygamous lobby, that they share the same goal of essentially
breaking down all State-regulated marriage requirements to just one, and that one is
consent. In doing so, they are paving the way for legal protection of such practices as
homosexual marriage and unrestricted sexual conduct between adults and children, group
marriage, incest, and, you know: If it feels good, do it.
Id. (alteration added).
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are either arguments in favor of opposite-sex marriage or are arguments against
same-sex parenting, or both. As such, the analytical method for these claims is
somewhat different than before. First, these slippery slopes are secular, even
though the fears driving their invocation are decidedly religious. This secularity
does not end the inquiry, for the government’s interest in avoiding the slide
must still be rationally related to banning same-sex marriage. For each slippery
slope, we therefore must establish two propositions: (1) that allowing same-sex
civil marriage does not harm the state’s interest and (2) that banning same-sex
civil marriage does not advance the state’s interest. As we will see, this
analytical framework plays out slightly differently in each context.
a. Consequentialism: Stanley Kurtz and the Scandinavian Dilemma
In February 2004, conservative commentator and social theorist Stanley
Kurtz published an article purporting to link the legal recognition of same-sex
relationships in Scandinavia to both falling rates of opposite-sex marriage and
458
rising out-of-wedlock birth rates. Specifically, Kurtz claimed that legalizing
same-sex civil marriage or marriage-like relationships had more or less caused
opposite-sex couples to stop marrying. I say “more or less” because Kurtz
himself conceded that same-sex marriage had not actually undermined oppositesex marriage, but instead had “further undermined the institution [of oppositesex marriage]. The separation of marriage from parenthood was increasing; gay
marriage has widened the separation. Out-of-wedlock birthrates were rising;
459
gay marriage has added to the factors pushing those rates higher.”
Preservationists rejoiced at this news, greeting Kurtz as their new anti-gay
messiah. Kurtz’s work supposedly confirmed their worst fears about the
destructive path America will travel if same-sex relationships are ever legalized
here. However, the preservationists apparently did not read Kurtz’s work very
carefully—had they done so, they might not have begun to repeat his
460
conclusions ad nauseam in congressional debates and hearings. They would
have discovered that Kurtz’s work rests on some very shaky logical foundations,
and that his conclusions have been roundly criticized from both ends of the
461
political spectrum as unscientific and statistically suspect. Nevertheless,

458. Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia: The “conservative case” for same-sex marriage
collapses, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26 [hereinafter Kurtz, The End of Marriage].
459. Id. (alteration added).
460. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5419–20, 5423–24 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Brownback) (citing Kurtz’s research); 152 CONG. REC. S5442–43 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Brownback) (same); id. at S5450 (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (same); 152 CONG. REC. S5523 (daily
ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (same); 152 CONG. REC. H5315–16 (daily ed. July 18, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Musgrave) (same); 150 CONG. REC. H7919 (2004) (statement of Rep. Pence) (same);
150 CONG. REC. S7908 (2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (same); id. at S7827–28 (statement of Sen.
Brownback) (same); id. at S7954 (statement of Sen. Allard) (same); id. at S7967 (statement of Sen.
Inhofe) (same); id. at S7980–81 (statement of Sen. Santorum) (same); id. at S7997–98 (statement of Sen.
Brownback) (same); id. at S8003–07 (statement of Sen. Allard) (same); id. at S8088 (statement of Sen.
McConnell) (same); House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 16 (statement of Judge Bork)
(same); id. at 56–60, 84–102, 124–97 (reprinting several articles by Kurtz and related materials).
Nevertheless, merely repeating a falsehood over and over again does not make it true.
461. See 150 CONG. REC. H7913–15 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (written statement of Rep. Frank);
M.V. Lee Badgett, Prenuptial Jitters: Did gay marriage destroy marriage in Scandinavia?, SLATE, May 20,
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heartened by the preservationists’ uncritical response, Kurtz has continued to
write on the topic, amassing an extensive body of articles on the state of
462
marriage in Northern Europe.
According the Kurtz, the harm to state’s interest boils down to this: “Gay
marriage is one part of a new stage of marital decline that contains three basic
elements: parental cohabitation, legal equalization of marriage and cohabitation,
and gay marriage. My claim is that these three factors are mutually
463
reinforcing.” Kurtz’s conclusions were drawn from his own meta-analysis of
several studies that had traced marriage trends in Denmark, Norway, and
464
Sweden, over the last several decades. All of these nations legalized same-sex
465
relationships in some way during the late 1980s through the 1990s. Kurtz cited
decreases in opposite-sex marriages and increases in out-of-wedlock births
between 1990 and 2000 as evidence that legalizing same-sex relationships
466
significantly contributed to the decline of marriage in Scandinavia.
In regard to this last, Kurtz’s own argument undermines the conclusion
that he draws from the changes to marriage that occurred in the 1990s:
“Scandinavia’s out-of-wedlock birthrates may have risen more rapidly in the
467
seventies, when marriage began its slide.” This seems to be a tacit admission
that the decline of marriage in Scandinavia began long before same-sex
468
relationships were legalized there.
It appears then that Kurtz’s statistical conclusions suffer from the classic
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: The fallacy occurs when we assume that, if two
events occur sequentially and in close proximity to one another (in either space
or time), then the later-in-time event was caused by the first-in-time event.
However, without more, it is logically irrational to conclude that, since oppositesex marriage in Scandinavia declined after same-sex relationships were

2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2100884/; Nathaniel Frank, Quack gay marriage science, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 3, 2004, at 20; Andrew Sullivan, Kurtz Again, DAILY DISH, Jan. 27, 2004, http://timeblog.com/daily_dish/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_01_01_dish_archive.html&PHPSESSID=8
93a9fbfa49b42caea86fa0d0f640ae1 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). But see Stanley Kurtz, Unhealthy Half
Truths: Scandinavia marriage is dying, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, May 25, 2004, available at http://www.
nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz200405250927.asp [hereinafter Kurtz, Unhealthy Half Truths]
(responding to Badgett’s criticisms); Stanley Kurtz, Slipping Toward Scandinavia: Contra Andrew
Sullivan, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2004 (responding to Sullivan’s criticisms), available at http://
www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz200402020917.asp.
462. See National Review Online, Stanley Kurtz, http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtzarchive.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Not all of Kurtz’s work in this area is catalogued in this archive,
but this listing is sufficient to show that he has published extensively on this topic.
463. Kurtz, Unhealthy Half Truths, supra note 461.
464. The author of one of Kurtz’s primary sources has publicly denounced Kurtz’s conclusions as
willfully misinterpreting his research. Darren R. Spedale, Nordic Bliss, http://www.freedomto
marry.org/document.asp?doc_id=1443 (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
465. Kurtz, The End of Marriage, supra note 458.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. And indeed, this was the case. See William N. Eskridge, Darren R. Spedale & Hans
Ytterberg, Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2004
ISSUES L. SCHOLARSHIP No. 4, at 43–49 (2004) (tracing the change in marriage and out-of-wedlock
birth rates in Denmark and Sweden; establishing that ongoing trends began early in the Twentieth
Century), available at http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pdf/ScandinaviaBEPressArticle.pdf.
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legalized, therefore opposite-sex marriage necessarily declined because of the
legalization of same-sex relationships. This error in reasoning constitutes the
very definition of the post hoc fallacy.
But as a matter of theory, is Kurtz right or wrong about what same-sex
marriage might do to opposite-sex marriage? If he is, it might be considered
rational to believe him, regardless of the methodological flaws in his work.
Therefore, we must identify exactly what it is that Kurtz is claiming will happen.
His syllogism is something like this:
Major Premise = Legalizing same-sex relationships delinks marriage from procreation
and parenthood.
Minor Premise = Delinking marriage from procreation and parenthood leads to the end of
marriage.
Conclusion = Therefore, legal recognition of same-sex relationships leads to the end of
marriage.469

Kurtz’s syllogism suffers from question-begging in both the Major and
Minor Premises. First, nothing in Kurtz’s work explains why legalizing same-sex
relationships delinks marriage from procreation and parenthood—or more
precisely, why legalizing same-sex relationships delinks marriage from
procreation and parenthood more than current laws already have. Currently,
procreation and parenthood may occur outside of marriage, and likewise,
470
marriage may occur without procreation and parenthood. Second, nothing in
Kurtz’s work explains how delinking marriage from procreation and
parenthood leads to the end of marriage. It seems that low exit-costs and a
declining heterosexual interest in marriage have started America down that
471
slippery slope already —and to a large extent, same-sex relationships aren’t
even legal in America, so they certainly couldn’t be the cause.
Nevertheless, under rational-basis review, we must show that it is
irrational to believe either that allowing same-sex marriage would harm the
government’s interest or that banning same-sex marriage would advance it. The
first part—showing no harm to the interest if same-sex marriage is allowed—is
difficult to do here, if only because Kurtz’s argument has so unsuccessfully
delineated the government’s interest. If we assume, arguendo, that the
government’s interest is to incentivize marriage for procreation and parenting
purposes, then we immediately find ourselves in familiar territory: As before,
we find many alternative rational ways for the government to advance this
interest aside from banning same-sex marriage, and we find a dearth of
472
explanations for why same-sex marriage harms the interest.
Still, we should take the substance of Kurtz’s claim seriously, if only to
show that it is irrational to conclude that fewer opposite-sex marriages will
occur if same-sex marriage is permitted. If Massachusetts is any example,
opposite-sex couples have continued to do quite well for themselves despite the
existence of same-sex civil marriage: Although, in declining, its overall marriage

469. This articulation of Kurtz’s syllogism is derivative of the one used in Eskridge, Spedale &
Ytterberg, supra note 468, at 12–13.
470. Cf. id. at 16.
471. See id. at 19.
472. See supra part V.A.2.a.
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rate has followed a nationwide trend that began in the 1950s, Massachusetts
continues to enjoy the lowest divorce rate in the nation and it has for some
474
time. Moreover, if we understand out-of-wedlock birth rates to stand as a
proxy for the success of opposite-sex marriage, Massachusetts—like the rest of
the nation—has enjoyed an out-of-wedlock birth rate has remained “essentially
475
stable” over the last sixty years. Since same-sex marriage was legalized there
in 2004, we have not seen a precipitous drop-off in marriage rates or a
476
concomitant increase in out-of-wedlock birth or divorce rates. As a factual
matter, it is clear then that opposite-sex couples are having little trouble forming
and sustaining healthy adult relationships in Massachusetts. The sky has not
fallen.
The second part—showing no advancement of the interest if same-sex
marriage is banned—is also a familiar question. As mentioned, it is hard to
understand exactly how banning same-sex marriage will induce more oppositesex couples to enter marriage and procreate—and to stay in marriage for many
years. The chain of causation between the two is so attenuated that it is simply
irrational to conclude that the banning of one leads to the flourishing of the
other.
Finally, it is important to note one key difference between the United States
and Scandinavia—and it is a difference that Kurtz himself calls out as highly
relevant: The European nations with the lowest rates of family-dissolution and
out-of-wedlock births are those which are “strongly dominated by the Catholic
477
478
confession.” Scandinavia is a highly-secularized region of the world, but the
479
United States is still a very religious nation. And indeed, the very reason samesex relationships have caused such a furor in America is because of religious
480
beliefs. The fact that so many religious believers feel so strongly about
marriage itself militates against the rationality of concluding that legalized
same-sex relationships would lead to lower rates of opposite-sex marriage.

473. See National Center for Health Statistics, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the
United States, 23 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 2, 4, 11–12 (July 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf [hereinafter NCHS, Cohabitation]; see also National Vital
Statistics System, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2004, 53 NAT’L VITAL
STAT. REP. 6 (June 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_21.pdf
[hereinafter NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths]; National Center for Health Statistics,
Marriage and divorce rates by State: 1990, 1995, and 1999–2002, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/
mar&div.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
474. See NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths, supra note 473, at 6.
475. See National Vital Statistics System, Births: Final Data for 2002, 52 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 8
(Dec. 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_10.pdf [hereinafter
NVSS, Births: Final Data]; NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths, supra note 473, at 6.
476. See NVSS, Births: Final Data, supra note 475, at 8; NVSS, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and
Deaths, supra note 475, at 6.
477. Kurtz, The End of Marriage, supra note 458 (quotation omitted).
478. See id.
479. PEW CENTER, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, supra note 9, at 26 (reporting that, as of October 2003, sixtytwo percent of Americans rated religion as “very important” in their lives, with an additional
twenty-four percent rating religion as “fairly important”).
480. Id. at 1–3.
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All of this is not to say that a slide down the slope is impossible—we have
already begun that slide to some degree, but this slide cannot be rationally
attributed to same-sex couples, who are largely denied access to marriage and
481
will be for the foreseeable future. No, it is only to say that a slide is not
inevitable, and that, for the reasons discussed, it is illogical to conclude from
Kurtz’s work that the consequentialist slippery slope constitutes a rational
justification for banning same-sex marriage.
b. Private Bias and the Cheapening of Marriage
Before moving on to the slippery slope of perversity, it is worth pausing to
consider what many claim to be the potential psychological impact of same-sex
marriage on opposite-sex couples. Echoing the consequentialist argument
dismissed above, many preservationists claim that allowing same-sex couples to
civilly wed will result in fewer marriages overall, because opposite-sex couples
would no longer perceive marriage as a special institution worthy of a life-long
commitment. Some, like Jeffrey Ventrella, claim that evidence showing the
deleterious effects of same-sex marriage on opposite-sex marriage could not
482
reasonably be produced before those negative effects have already occurred.
Ventrella is correct about our inability to precisely measure speculative
harms ex ante: It is impossible to predict with any certainty what the long-term
effects of any policy change will be—indeed, if this were the limiting principle
on government action, nothing would ever change because of this very
uncertainty. In light of this logical flaw, Ventrella’s argument fails logical
scrutiny: By assuming its conclusion—that a decline in opposite-sex marriage
will directly result from same-sex marriage—the argument renders itself a
solution in search of a problem.
To be fair, this version of the consequentialist argument says, “These
potential harms are so bad that we don’t even want to chance it.” In a different
context, this argument may have persuasive legal force. However, this line of
reasoning was used to oppose interracial marriage with little success; it has
483
merely been recycled here.
Interestingly, as a result of bans on same-sex civil marriage, harm to
opposite-sex marriage has already begun: Some opposite-sex couples are now
484
refusing to wed until civil marriage is made available to same-sex couples.
Moreover, some members of the clergy are refusing to issue marriage licenses or
485
solemnize marriages until same-sex couples have full access to civil marriage,

481. Cf. Eskridge, Spedale & Ytterberg, supra note 468, at 20.
482. See Ventrella, supra note 392, at 717–21.
483. See Eskridge, Spedale & Ytterberg, supra note 468, at 20–21.
484. Kayleen Schaefer, The Sit-In at the Altar: No “I Do” Till Gays Can Do It, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 2006, at 91 (reporting on the larger trend; noting that celebrity couples Charlize Theron and Stuart
Townsend, and Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt, have vowed not to wed until same-sex couples are
allowed to marry); see also Erik Baard, Standing on Ceremony: A Rites Issue: Straight Couples Who Refuse
to Marry Because Gays Can’t, VILLAGE VOICE (online ed.), Dec. 10, 2003, available at http://
www.villagevoice.com/news/0350,baard2,49322,1.html.
485. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, A New Marriage Decision (for Heterosexuals), LESSIG BLOG, June 6, 2005,
http://lessig.org/blog/archives/002943.shtml (chronicling several Connecticut and Massachusetts
ministers who are refusing to solemnize any marriages until same-sex couples have nationwide
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and at least for a time, Benton County, Oregon, stopped issuing civil marriage
486
licenses to anyone. These examples show that, even if the preservationists’
stated interests were rational, quantifiable harm to those interests is occurring as
a direct result of continued marriage inequality. There is no reason to think that
this harm would abate if marriage were constitutionally foreclosed to same-sex
couples.
Nevertheless, this is not the key problem with this interest. It is that the
interest is based entirely on assumptions about the subjective opinions, feelings,
and perceptions of millions of individuals nationwide. Preservationists cannot
adequately represent the opinions of all Americans within a claim for “freedom
from” same-sex civil marriage—as we have seen, such a claim is factually
487
inaccurate, for many Americans support same-sex civil marriage. Therefore,
the preservationists must be understood only to represent their own interests,
which by definition includes the religious belief that same-sex marriages would
488
corrode the “holy state of matrimony.”
This claim lies in the “constitutional” layer of sedimentation, within which
489
preservationists assert a right to be free from exposure to homosexuality. This
claimed right apparently includes a concomitant right to be free from the very
knowledge that legal same-sex civil marriages might exist somewhere else.
Unfortunately, the preservationists have fundamentally misconceived the role of
the Constitution in this regard: The First Amendment is not designed to abate
“the offense that religious people feel about being compelled to witness the
490
behavior of people who disagree with their beliefs.” “[B]ruised feelings are a cost
491
of living in an open, free society, but it is an inevitable cost that we accept.”
Thus, the easiest way to understand the marriage-will-be-cheapened
argument is through the lens of private bias. Without this perspective, it would
be impossible to understand why an opposite-sex couple in Arizona would

access to civil marriage) (last visited May 8, 2006); Unitarian-Universalist Association, Freedom to
Marry: Ministers’ Coverage in the Media and Written Comments, http://www.uua.org/news/2003/
freedomtomarry/ministercoverage.html (providing the names, locations, and comments of
Unitarian-Universalist ministers who have refused to solemnize any marriage until same-sex
couples have access to civil marriage) (last visited May 8, 2006).
486. See Oregon county bans all marriages, B.B.C. NEWS AM., Mar. 24, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/3564893.stm (last visited May 8, 2006). On November 2, 2004, Oregon voters adopted
a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (adopted
2004). Even with the amendment in place, it is not entirely clear that Benton County has resumed
issuing marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples. See Benton County, Oregon, Marriage FAQ,
http://www.co.benton.or.us/MarriageFAQ.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); cf. Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91
(Or. 2005) (holding that the marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples by Multnomah County,
Oregon, in February and March 2004 were void under OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; recognizing that § 5a
(referred to as “Measure 36”) rendered same-sex marriage unconstitutional under the Oregon
Constitution).
487. See supra notes 6–10.
488. H.R. REP. 104-664, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916 (House Committee
on the Judiciary report on the 1996 “Defense of Marriage Act”).
489. See Eskridge, No Promo Homo, supra note 236, at 1362–63.
490. Id. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that an individual’s freedom to
engage in offensive speech generally overrides others’ right to be free from the offense caused by
such speech).
491. Rubin, supra note 235, at 43 (emphasis and alteration added).
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refuse to marry on account of a same-sex couple being permitted to marry in
Massachusetts. For preservationists, this private bias arises exclusively from
religious beliefs about the immorality of homosexuality—while this bias
motivates them to adopt secular-sounding arguments, their religious beliefs will
always be the essential factor motivating their opposition to same-sex marriage.
Same-sex marriage bans effectively relegate homosexuals to a second-class legal
status and prevent public recognition of their relationships. By preventing
homosexuals from gaining recognition—and ultimately acceptance—within the
public sector, preservationists serve their invidious religious purpose of
492
punishing homosexuals for their depravity. However, the Supreme Court has
explicitly stated that the idiosyncratic beliefs giving rise to these private biases
493
have no place in the American legal canon.
c. The Long Way Down: Perversity
Preservationists love to trot out a parade of horribles that goes something
like this: Unless the government draws the line before legal recognition of samesex relationships, as a matter of logic, if it extended legal recognition to same-sex
relationships, it would also have to give legal recognition to other relationship
494
models that, to put it lightly, flout convention. Preservationists frequently cite
bestiality, child marriage, polygamy/polyamory, and incest as exemplary of
495
these “perverse” relationship models. The preservationists’ battle cry derives
directly from religious beliefs about what makes these relationship models
496
perverse. Putting aside this religious belief, all we must do is determine
whether the government has a rationally secular purpose in wanting to prevent
legalization of these other horribles—we need not mount an affirmative attack
upon them.

492. Cf. discussion supra Part V.A.2.f.
493. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”); Cohen, 430 U.S. at 21 (“The ability
of government . . . to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon
a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents
simply as a matter of personal predilections.”).
494. E.g., House, Musgrave Amendment I, supra note 183, at 39–40 (colloquy between Rep. King
and Rep. Frank) (argument regarding where, why, and how to draw the line between two-party
unions and three-plus-party unions).
495. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J, dissenting).
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are . . . called into question by today’s
decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from
its holding.
Id.
496. E.g., Jill Martin Rische, The Pain of Polygamy, 18 WATCHMAN EXPOSITOR No. 1, 2001, http://
www.watchman.org/lds/painpolygamy.htm (making the Christian case against Mormon
polygamy) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). The Watchman Fellowship is a Christian anti-cult group that
considers Mormonism to be a cult. See Watchman Fellowship, About Us, http://www.watchman.
org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.about_us (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Nevertheless, the group’s views
on polygamous practices are generally representative of those held within the larger Christian
community.
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As noted, the government’s interest in avoiding a slide down this slope is
secular. Our task is to show why it is irrational to believe that banning same-sex
marriage is necessary to prevent the slide from occurring. Here, we must
establish three things for each horrible: (1) the government has a genuinely
secular justification for outlawing it; (2) same-sex marriage does nothing to
undermine that justification; and (3) same-sex marriage poses no comparable
concerns of its own.
Despite their other differences, advocates on both sides agree that marriage
497
requires valid legal consent of the parties. Within this consent-based marriage
model, same-sex civil marriage appears entirely permissible. Comparisons to
498
499
bestiality and child marriage are easy kills: While animals and minors are
incapable of giving legal consent (and will remain so for the foreseeable future),
two adults of the same sex can give legal consent, particularly if—as many
preservationists insist—they are capable of consenting to enter into a
500
heterosexual marriage.
Comparisons to polygamy also fail. At the outset, it is important to
distinguish historical polygamy (used here to identify polygamy derived from
historical—mostly Mormon—religious beliefs) from modern polygamy (used
501
here to identify polygamy derived from both religious beliefs and secular
relationship arrangements).
502
Historical polygamy, which is entirely religious in nature,
has a
checkered history in America, long having been associated with coercion, adultchild marriage, and child sexual abuse. Historical polygamy has persisted into
the modern era, particularly among splinter groups such as the Fundamentalist
503
Church of Latter-Day Saints. In refusing to legally recognize historical
polygamy, the government has long stated a genuine secular interest in
504
avoiding the coercive costs that historical polygamy poses, and modern courts
continue to apply this coerciveness analysis to individuals seeking legal
recognition of historical polygamous relationships, particularly when minors are

497. Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (holding that the government could not punish non-procreative
intercourse between individuals capable of giving meaningful legal consent).
498. See, e.g., Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496, 499 (Va. 1938) (holding that “the word ‘animal,’ in the
language of the law, is used in contra-distinction to a human being, and signifies an inferior living
creature”).
499. See Valencia v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that minors are “legally
incapable of consent”).
500. Cf. Card, supra note 65 and accompanying text (claiming that marriage is not foreclosed to
homosexuals at all, because they remain free to marry members of the opposite sex).
501. Modern-day religious belief in polygamy is not limited to insular Mormon sects. A new
polygamous movement has recently arisen among Evangelical Christians. See Christian Polygamy
INFO, Christian Polygamy, http://www.christianpolygamy.info/christian-polygamy/ (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007).
502. E.g., The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, Polygamy: Latter-Day Saints and
the Practice of Plural Marriage, http://lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1—36-2-539,
00.html (discussing the history of Mormon polygamy in America; describing the Church’s position
today) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
503. See supra note 42.
504. E.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (holding that “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and
which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism”).
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505

involved. Same-sex marriage does nothing to undermine this secular interest,
506
and it raises no similar concerns of coerciveness.
Insofar as they involve three or more consenting adults, neither modern
507
polygamy nor polyamory raise the same issues of consent and coercion.
Indeed, within a consent-based marriage model, the only real problem is that
there are three or more members of the relationship unit. So what stops these
individuals from claiming legal rights for their multiple-party relationships?
The government has historically been afforded the right to maintain “good
508
order,” and this interest in orderly administration is genuinely secular.
Moreover, the deference that federal courts afford states in regulating the family
unit confirms that orderly administration of marriage is a significant area of
509
state concern.
Nationwide, family law (and particularly marriage) is founded on a twoparty model. Legally recognizing modern polygamy and polyamory would
require a dramatic overhaul in our current system of public ordering, reaching
dozens of areas of law, including divorce, child custody, adoption, pension and
ERISA benefits, property ownership and tenancies, derivative tort claims (e.g.,
loss of consortium or wrongful death), taxation, intestacy and survivorship, and
probate administration. As such, the government’s secular interest in
perpetuating a two-party model of legal relationships is not insubstantial.
It thus seems rational to conclude that, as a matter of public policy, threeplus-party relationships work harm against the existing two-party model of
public ordering used throughout America. Moreover, until polygamy or
polyamory is identified as a suspect characteristic deserving of some kind of
heightened scrutiny—be it “rational-basis with bite” or otherwise—the

505. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 752 (Utah 2006) (“[Y]oung people should be protected
from sexual exploitation by older, more experienced persons until they reach the legal age of consent
and can more maturely comprehend and appreciate the consequences of their sexual acts.” (citation
and quotation omitted)).
506. For a detailed refutation of the claim that allowing same-sex civil marriage would require
legalization of polygamy, see Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy,
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1579–94 (1997) (outlining the fundamental
objections to polygamy based on legal theories of equality, liberty, and personhood).
507. Polyamory is an amorphous term, frequently used to encompass relationship arrangements
resembling simple polygamy to more complex arrangements, such as those in which three or more
individuals participate as equal partners in a single relationship. See The Polyamory Society,
Introduction to Polyamory: What Is Polyamory?, http://www.polyamorysociety.org/page6.html
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Here, “polyamory” is used to describe all adult, consensual, three-plusparty relationships that are arrangements other than simple polygamy.
508. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163 (affirming Congress’s definition of civil marriage on public policy
grounds, noting that Congress has the right to regulate “good order,” particularly as it relates to
public health, welfare, and a right to prescribe the conditions under which territories may join the
union).
509. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (holding that “domestic relations [is] an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States” (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States
upon the subject of divorce . . . .”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1878) (“The State . . . has
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”) (alteration added)).
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government’s secular interest in maintaining the two-party system is likely to
remain undisturbed.
Conversely, legally recognizing same-sex marriage poses no similar
administrative hardship, because the same-sex marriage model is by definition a
two-party institution. As a matter of law, resolving whatever de minimis
administrative difficulties same-sex marriage might impose is a very simple
task: A government must only pass a statute of general applicability to amend
all mentions of “husband and wife,” “man and woman,” or “spouses” within its
legal canon to include the parties to a same-sex civil marriage. This one-line
statute would single-handedly operate to overcome objections that same-sex
marriage would constitute an administrative inconvenience. As such, same-sex
marriage works no evil against the government’s interest in the orderly
administration of family law.
Moreover, teleologically, same-sex marriage does nothing out of the
ordinary, save for the biological sex of the individuals involved. Presumably,
heterosexuals will continue to want to marry heterosexuals, so allowing men to
marry men or women to marry women would not appear to work a decisive
harm against ensuring that a sufficient number of marriageable individuals
remain “in the market,” so to speak. It seems that same-sex marriage is costless
510
in this regard.
A polygamist, on the other hand, is really asking for “marriage-plus,”
because under a two-party consent model, she will always be able to marry one
individual of her choosing; the only thing she will not be able to do is to legally
marry another individual while she remains married to her first spouse.
Concededly, this seems unsatisfying as an emotional explanation, given the
potential that the legal spouse may begin to view the polygamist’s relationship
with the cohabiting “spouse” as inherently inferior, which possibly leads to
tension within the arrangement. Nevertheless, the government’s interest here
appears to be both rational and secular; for these reasons, polygamists have a
long road ahead of them before a three-plus-party marriage may be legally
possible.
As for comparisons to consensual adult incest, a causal link between
allowing same-sex marriage and a subsequent repeal of laws prohibiting incest
cannot logically exist. While conflating incest and same-sex marriage is an

510. Some preservationists claim that allowing same-sex couples to marry would be
prohibitively expensive for the government. However, the government is presently structured so
that, at least in theory, it could afford to provide marriage benefits to every last eligible adult,
regardless of any one individual’s sexual orientation. Therefore, if every last eligible adult woke up
legally married tomorrow morning, then every last eligible adult would have a cognizable claim to
receive the legal benefits of marriage. In theory, then, it seems that the gender of the individual to
whom one is married is irrelevant to the cost to the government, which must plan as though 100% of
the eligible population might legally marry at any time.
Therefore, the claim that allowing same-sex couples to marry would be prohibitively expensive is
a canard: If every homosexual adult married a person of the opposite sex tomorrow, the preservationists would raise no claim that the state’s assets were being dissipated by these new marriages.
Because—at least in this context—the preservationists’ objection is therefore being lodged against
same-sex couples as same-sex couples (and not as homosexuals), the argument that allowing same-sex
marriage would cost society money is undermined by clear animus against same-sex couples as a
class.
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effective rhetorical device, it fails to acknowledge that (1) consanguinity laws
511
already vary widely and (2) challenges to those laws began decades before
512
widespread efforts to obtain same-sex marriage. Therefore, the idea that incest
is a possible slippery-slope outcome is largely a red herring based on the post hoc
fallacy of causation.
Still, we would do well to take the claim seriously: To be charitable, then,
the preservationist position is probably closer to the claim that allowing samesex marriage would undermine the legal justifications underpinning the few
incest taboos that remain. This is a largely inaccurate perception of the law: The
remaining taboos universally prohibit incest between nuclear family members,
513
and many states still ban incest between first cousins.
Moreover, governments have consistently identified a genuinely secular
interest in denying legal recognition to incestuous adult relationships. Under a
consent-based model of marriage, the government wants to ensure that the
parties to a marriage have the capacity to give meaningful legal consent to enter
into marriage. The possibility of intra-family coercion casts a cloud over
incestuous relationships—said differently, the government could legitimately
514
question whether incest is ever truly consensual. Moreover, the government
wants to support relationship models that foster harmony within pre-existing
intimate family relationships—as a society, we want family members to remain
515
on good terms with one another for the sake of intra-family stability. Like all
relationships, incestuous relationships can end quite badly, and the government
has a cognizable, secular interest in preventing legal arrangements that result in
516
estrangement between close relatives.
Same-sex marriage does no harm to either of these interests: Generally,
adults are presumed to have the legal capacity to consent to enter into marriage,

511. See McDonnell, supra note 386, at 361 (cataloguing incest provisions by state).
512. The historical taboo on incest is a complex social phenomenon, and this Article does not
seek to respond to it in its entirety. For a detailed analysis, see Courtney M. Cahill, Same-Sex
Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1562–65 (2005). See also, e.g., Israel v.
Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764–65 (Colo. 1978) (challenge to incest law resulted in recognition of an equal
protection claim on state constitutional grounds).
513. See McDonnell, supra note 386, at 361.
514. See McDonnell, supra note 386, at 354 (noting that “consent becomes harder to determine or
even define given the authority relationships within the family”).
515. McDonnell is concerned that this breakdown may occur in part because the intra-family
relationship becomes overly sexualized. Id. at 353.
516. Some might argue that recognizing same-sex marriages would nevertheless result in
estrangement between close relatives. This is undoubtedly true, as many homosexuals and same-sex
couples suffer from rejection by their parents, siblings, and close relatives.
For our purposes, it is important to identify who is being estranged from one another. In the incest
context, the two parties to the relationship—who are both members of the same pre-existing,
intimate family—are being estranged from one another. In the same-sex marriage context, one party
to the relationship is being estranged from a family member who is not a party to the marriage.
Paternalistically attempting to preventing estrangement because of such private, third-party biases
against homosexuality or same-sex relationships may be a noble aim, but it cannot constitute the
basis of an informed government policy. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.”).
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and, as in opposite-sex marriage, allowing two unrelated individuals to form a
legally-recognized family relationship does not usually disrupt any pre-existing
intimate family bonds. Moreover, we may assume that, if same-sex marriage
were ever allowed, the same consanguinity restrictions currently applicable to
opposite-sex couples would be applicable to same-sex couples.
Other slippery-slope concerns undoubtedly exist. However, our
examination of these horribles has shown that same-sex marriage is not of a
kind with them. Bans on bestiality, child marriage, polygamy/polyamory, and
incest all implicate longstanding, rational secular government interests. Samesex marriage does nothing to undermine these interests and raises no similar
concerns of its own.
Preservationists’ invocation of this parade of horribles must be disregarded
as rhetorical scare tactics. Preservationists are attempting to tie the perceived
valuelessness of these relationship models with a presumed valuelessness of
same-sex relationships. As I have demonstrated, same-sex relationships inflict
none of the negative costs that these other relationship models can impose.
Thus, because its logical underpinnings crumble in the face of rational scrutiny,
the slippery slope of perversity fails to gain legally-persuasive force.
4. A New Slippery Slope: Religious Freedom and Sincerely-Held Beliefs
Preservationists have recently begun to sound shrill alarms about the
intolerably-high tariff that same-sex civil marriage will unconstitutionally exact
517
from the preservationists’ free exercise of religion. Doctrinally, this may be a
simple argument to rebut, but it is among the most emotionally-charged ones
we will face. Simply stated, the operative syllogism is this:
Major Premise = The Free Exercise Clause forbids restrictions on religious practice.
Minor Premise = Religious practice is restricted by same-sex marriage.
Conclusion = Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause forbids same-sex marriage.

While we know that the Free Exercise Clause does not actually forbid same-sex
marriage, it is not possible to respond to this substantive argument within our
pre-existing framework. The very objection derives from religion—and no less
but from that aspect of religion that is constitutionally-protected from state
interference: free exercise. By striking meaningful compromises, however, we
can identify ways in which same-sex civil marriage and freedom of religion can
peacefully co-exist, such that allowing same-sex civil marriage would not
burden religious practice.

517.

E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5422 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback).

It is becoming increasingly apparent that same-sex marriage poses a significant threat to
religious liberties. Scholars on both the left and the right agree that same-sex marriage has
raised the specter of the massive and protracted battle over religious freedom. Where
courts impose the same-sex marriage regime as a constitutionally guaranteed right, a
multitude of new religious liberty conflicts will inevitably arise at every point where the
law touches marriage and is applied to individuals, businesses, nonprofits, and even
churches and synagogues.
Id.

19_WILSON.DOC

2/8/2007 2:11 PM

PRESERVATIONISM

657

A live case will help to clarify the values at stake. Maggie Gallagher—
518
President of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy (iMAPP),
a
conservative Catholic, and author of a substantial body of preservationist
519
literature —has made much hay over Catholic Charities of Boston’s (CCB)
520
March 10, 2006 decision to stop providing adoption-placement services. The
reason? CCB found itself between a rock and a hard place: One the one hand, it
wanted to follow the Vatican’s teachings that homosexuals are unfit to be
parents and thus withhold adoption-placement services from them wholesale;
on the other hand, to receive a license to operate adoption services within
Massachusetts, it had to pledge to follow state anti-discrimination laws—which
prohibit, inter alia, discrimination against homosexuals in the provision of statelicensed social services.
What did CCB do? Initially, it sought a religious exemption from the antidiscrimination laws. When that failed, it took what it believed to be the most
sensible course of action: Instead of compromising its doctrinal position in order
to comply with the law, it chose to cease all adoption placements whatsoever
and refused to seek licensure.
The preservationists are falling over themselves trying to claim that this
521
“tragedy” was a direct result of Goodridge. It seems somewhat disingenuous to
claim that CCB was unexpectedly burdened with having to provide statelicensed services to same-sex couples seeking to adopt. For seven years before
Goodridge was decided, same-sex couples in Massachusetts enjoyed antidiscrimination protections in all aspects of state life, save marriage. After
Goodridge, same-sex couples now enjoy anti-discrimination protections in all
aspects of state life, including marriage. As such, it would seem that CCB was
subject to the same legal duty toward same-sex couples before Goodridge as it is
now; the fact that some of CCB’s same-sex couple clients are now legally
married doesn’t have any bearing on whether it is presently subject to the state
anti-discrimination laws—it always has been. Moreover, whatever CCB found to
be doctrinally intolerable about homosexual parenting on the day before
Goodridge was decided is the same as what they find to be intolerable about
homosexual parenting today. All that changed was the legal relationship
between those homosexuals who were seeking to parent.
To be certain, Gallagher correctly observed that this conflict was inevitable.
However, she incorrectly characterized its cause as deriving primarily from the
518. http://www.marriagedebate.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
519. See The Marriage Law Project at The Catholic University of America, Marriage Document
Database, http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/resources/Marriage%20Database/Complete/cfm (attributing twenty-six articles to Gallagher) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
520. See Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246, at 20. See also 152 CONG. REC. S5473 (daily ed.
Jun 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“If you do not define marriage as the union of a man and
a woman, but define it to require that you have to recognize same-sex unions, that is the basis—one
of the bases on which Catholic Charities was driven out of the adoption business in Boston. They
were required by law to do something against the tenets of their faith.”); id. at S5479 (statement of
Sen. Brownback) (“There is an argument that churches that do not perform same-sex unions will not
be allowed to perform any marriages.”).
521. See Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246 (“Massachusetts law prohibited ‘orientation
discrimination’ over a decade ago. Then in November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ordered gay marriage.”).
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Goodridge decision itself. Rather, the conflict was inevitable regardless of how
the case might have come down; Goodridge may have accelerated the timing of
the conflict, but a storm was brewing long before same-sex couples were given
the right to marry in Massachusetts.
The next steps in this debate are tricky indeed. It would beg the question to
simply shrug and tell CCB that it needs to learn to tolerate homosexual
522
parenting. Indeed, the very (in)tolerability of homosexual parenting is the
heart of the dispute. So what is the proper solution? At one end of the spectrum,
we can totally privatize religion, requiring those religions that choose to venture
out of their cages to operate in a world of enforced pluralism. At the other end
of the spectrum, we can give religion a carte blanche exemption from complying
with whichever social policies it dislikes, permitting religiously-motivated
discrimination to go unchecked in the public square. As a constitutional matter,
neither option is desirable or satisfying. As such, the proper answer is more
nuanced than either of these positions, and it lies somewhere in between them.
One of the battle cries of preservationists is that legalizing same-sex
523
relationships will, if not actually force churches to perform same-sex marriages,
then at least coerce them into remaining silent about their objections to same-sex
marriage, for fear that speaking out would threaten their tax-exempt status or
524
eligibility for faith-based funding. The obfuscating rhetoric that usually

522. Cf. WHYTE, supra note 372, at 109–10 (“Everyone favors tolerance—but only, of course, of
what should be tolerated. This qualification is the tricky bit; it is where disagreements tend to arise.
And when they do, extolling the virtues of tolerance is of no help, because it can’t tell us what
should be tolerated and what not.”).
523. See Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246 (“The problem is not that clergy will be
forced to perform gay marriages or prevented from preaching their beliefs.”); see also Letter from
Clergy for Fairness to Reps. Hastert and Pelosi (July 7, 2006), reprinted in 152 CONG. REC. H5309–10
(daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
Thoughtful people of faith can and do disagree on the issue of marriage. America’s many
religious traditions reflect this diversity of opinion, as do we who sign this letter.
But we respect the right of each religious group to decide, based on its own religious
teaching, whether or not to sanction marriage of same-sex couples. It is surely not the
federal government’s role to prefer one religious definition of marriage over another,
much less to codify such a preference in the Constitution. To the contrary: the great
contribution of our Constitution is to ensure religious liberty for all.
Some argue that a constitutional amendment is necessary to ensure that clergy and faith
groups will never be forced to recognize marriages of same-sex couples against their will.
This argument is unfounded. Such coercion is already expressly forbidden by the First
Amendment’s “establishment” clause, its guarantee of the right to “free exercise” of
religion, and the Supreme Court’s doctrine of religious autonomy that is rooted in both
religion clauses. These, and only these, are all the protection of religious autonomy—and
of religious marriage—our nation needs.
Id. Clergy for Fairness is comprised of hundreds of clergy from dozens of religious denominations
throughout the nation; the group has taken no unified stance for or against same-sex civil marriage,
but it has taken a strong stance against the FMA. See Clergy for Fairness, About Clergy for Fairness,
http://clergyforfairness.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
524. Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 246 (“Even a slight risk of anything so damaging as
the loss of tax-exempt status will persuade many [religious] groups to at least mute their marriage
theology in the interest of preserving the rest of their activities.” (alteration added)).
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accompanies this claim is that those churches who oppose same-sex marriage
525
will be pilloried in the public square as if they were racist.
And yet, it is actually within this battle cry that we begin to see our way
through to resolving the underlying dispute. If there is one thing that everyone
agrees about, it is that the government is unquestionably forbidden to dictate to
its citizens (or to a group of its citizens) what their religious beliefs should be—
such an action would clearly violate both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, for unduly burdening religious practice and imposing religion,
respectively. Therefore, the question turns on what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation for religious belief, such that churches are neither forced nor
coerced into compromising their doctrinal beliefs and practices.
One suggestion is to include, with every statute, judicial opinion, or ballot
referendum that legalizes same-sex relationships, an exception that expressly
exempts religious organizations from being compelled to participate in same-sex
nuptials. Moreover, as argued here, there should be an express separation of the
civil and religious aspects of marriage, so that churches can make a specific
choice regarding whether to solemnize same-sex marriages or not. A bright-line
separation would add certainty and stability to the law: (1) same-sex couples
would know which churches welcome their religious celebrations; (2) churches
would remain free to exercise according to the dictates of their beliefs; and (3)
would-be spouses of all stripes would remain free to avoid the religious aspects
of marriage altogether and simply obtain marriage licenses directly from the
state. All told, this seems to be a straightforward resolution to the first
substantive objection.
The second objection—coercion—is a thornier thicket. It is best dealt with
in two parts: ministry and social service. The churches themselves are seeking to
preserve their tax-exempt status while simultaneously reserving the right to
speak out on doctrinally-compelling issues. Separating out the ministry function
of churches helps us to see that, if same-sex civil marriage is allowed, nothing
will change regarding what churches may say about it—even under a publicaccommodations law outlawing discrimination based on sexual-orientation, it is
extremely unlikely that a church would have to squelch core religious speech
within its own four walls. The current framing of the freedoms of speech,
association, and free exercise operates to protect these messages, whatever their
content.
At last, then, we come to it: Because many churches operate social-service
branches—e.g., the Catholic Charities—they often provide services on behalf of
the state. Under the states’ police powers, private organizations need not be
classified as state actors to be subject to generally-applicable anti-discrimination
rules. The question here is whether a limited religious exemption should be
made available, if only for the issue of same-sex marriage.
On the one hand, it is tempting to take a hard line against the churches,
saying, “If you want the money (or license, or access to public buildings, etc.),
then just comply with the laws!” However, this begs the question before us

525. Id. (“Twenty years ago it would have been inconceivable that a Christian or Jewish
organization that opposed gay marriage might be treated as racist in the public square. Today? It’s
just not clear.”).
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while disrespecting faith-based organizations on two levels: one, it shows
indifference to their call to provide mission services at all; and two, it
communicates to them that their deeply-held beliefs don’t matter.
On the other hand, we have anti-discrimination laws for a reason—we
think that, all other things being equal, certain groups of people should live
secure in knowing that their minority characteristics will not render them
vulnerable to either overt or invidious discrimination. We make these nondiscrimination laws generally-applicable so that service-providers of all types
aren’t able to work harm against the interest based solely on idiosyncraticallyheld prejudices.
So how do we resolve this tension? One way is to create targeted, narrow
exemptions one-at-a-time, or on an as-needed basis. Gallagher thought that a bill
exempting religious adoption agencies from the strictures of Massachusetts’
anti-discrimination laws might have done the trick, had it not died in the state
526
Legislature. She was probably right.
Nevertheless, it seems rational to reserve the question. Legislatures and
courts may take it up and resolve it with directness, nuance, or both, at any time.
Foreclosing debate on the subject seems irrational—if the lines we draw today
prove dissatisfying, then we can draw them differently in the future. With the
FMA, those lines are drawn once, and we will see, once they are set, they are
527
extremely difficult to move.
As to this last it seems worth mentioning that the free-exercise claim may
be best characterized as a hybrid slippery-slope and invidious-purpose
argument. What would motivate someone to ossify the nuanced lines that courts
are constantly drawing in around free-exercise claims? Logically, if that person
had a religious belief that the line should be in one place forever, then it would
make sense to attempt to fix the line early-on to minimize the possibility that it
might be drawn differently in the future. Indeed, it seems that the
preservationists’ desire to harden ever-flexible constitutional boundaries has
bled over from their public policy arguments into the free-exercise claim.
Therefore, the religious purpose underlying the FMA seems to be twofold: (1)
impose/endorse religion, and (2) exploit the free-exercise doctrine to heavily
favor religion, while simultaneously making it as difficult as possible to change
the law once it is passed.
5. Warhorses: Public Health and Morals
Preservationists have long cited public health, safety, welfare, and morals
528
as reasons for banning same-sex civil marriage. Here, we divide the claim into
two parts: public health and morals. First, the public-health interest is ostensibly
that of slowing the spread of sexually-transmitted infections (STIs). This
argument is premised on two obvious assumptions and an invidious one. First,

526.
527.
528.

See id.
See infra note 641 and accompanying text.
E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of Constitutional Democracy, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 374 (2003) (noting that several key reasons for marriage “include (1) safe sexual
relations . . . , (4) healthy human development . . . , [and] (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy, and
social order” (alteration added)).
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the obvious assumptions: (1) limiting the spread of STIs furthers the public
health; and (2) homosexuals as a class are disproportionately more likely to
contract, carry, and transmit STIs than are other groups. Advocates both for and
against same-sex marriage can easily agree that the first assumption is a worthy
goal; it need not be discussed further.
The second assumption is, to be charitable, a debatable one, but we will
nevertheless assume for the sake of argument that the preservationists are
correct. We need not explore disease statistics before we can determine that the
argument is irrational and not secular. Saying “the public health” is a non
sequitur response to the posit, “Why ban same-sex civil marriage?” Here is the
syllogism:
Major Premise = The public health is served by reducing the number of STIs.
Minor Premise = The number of STIs is reduced within opposite-sex marriage.
Conclusion = Therefore, the public health is served by opposite-sex marriage, and we
should ban same-sex marriage.

Again, we find ourselves confronted with the “Conclusion-Plus” fallacy.
First, as usual, the Minor Premise begs its conclusion why the number of STIs is
reduced only within opposite-sex marriage. Moreover, the syllogism offers no
justification whatsoever to explain how banning same-sex marriage serves the
public health.
An individual’s capacity to marry is not premised on being free from
529
STIs. Indeed, women are permitted to pass diseases on to their newborn
children with impunity: A baby could be born with syphilis, gonorrhea, and
530
HIV, and her mother’s legal capacity to marry will remain intact. As such, it
would seem arbitrary and irrational to punish one class of persons—
homosexuals—for the mere potential that they may harm the public health in
manner X, while permitting another class of persons—heterosexuals—to harm
the public health in manner X with impunity, with the only justification being
that they are heterosexuals.
The third, more invidious premise underlying this argument is that
homosexuals are disproportionately more likely to (1) engage in extrarelationship intercourse and (2) expose themselves to STIs in the process—
ostensibly through unsafe sex. Again, this is a non sequitur. In terms of legal
capacity to marry, it matters not at all—and it has never mattered—whether the
would-be spouses are monogamous or whether they will, once married,
routinely engage in unsafe sex with extramarital partners. The state just doesn’t
get involved with asking people such questions before allowing them to marry.
As such, refraining from extramarital sexual activities is not a predicate to
getting married, and remaining free from STIs throughout a marriage is not a
predicate to staying married.

529. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 74 (noting that, while several states require blood tests
before a marriage license will be issued, that no state actually conditions the right to marry on the
outcome of that test; reporting also that Louisiana and Illinois briefly flirted with mandatory HIVtesting, and that Utah once attempted to void all marriages where either party was infected with
HIV).
530. Her constitutional right to procreate will also remain intact, despite the harm that the intergenerational spread of disease works against the state’s public-health interest.
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Granted, some states require the parties to a marriage to submit to
premarital blood-tests; however, regardless of what ancillary public-health
benefits might obtain, the tests are not primarily done for the state’s benefit. No
one’s capacity to marry is contingent on the results of a premarital blood-test.
Instead, the state is at most interested in ensuring full disclosure between the
parties regarding the presence of any diseases that each might transmit either
genetically or through intercourse. Stated differently, the interest is to
discourage disease-free individuals from marrying diseased individuals. This is
a worthy public-health goal. Even so, it is not a rational justification for banning
same-sex marriage.
Preservationists claim that, in regard to public health, the state’s interest in
encouraging marriage is that, because marriage is “the building block of
531
society,” it counsels stability, monogamy, and commitment between spouses.
This rationally leads to a reduction in STIs, because married couples are
presumed to have fewer sexual partners throughout the course of their
marriages, thus minimizing the risk that either spouse will contract an STI and
transmit it to the other. Fair enough.
Assuming this is true, it is irrational to exclude same-sex couples from
marriage on the ground of public health, as allowing same-sex marriages would
seem to directly serve the interest at stake: Marriage would, presumably, do all
the things for same-sex spouses that it does for opposite-sex spouses, viz.,
counsel stability, monogamy, and commitment within the marriage. As a result,
same-sex spouses would have fewer sexual partners during the marriage, thus
minimizing the risk that either spouse will contract an STI and transmit it to the
other.
Moreover, if homosexuals are as diseased as some preservationists would
like to think, then it is irrational to think that preventing same-sex couples from
marrying would slow the spread of STIs. Indeed, if the claimed public-health
purpose—minimizing the spread of STIs—were the true interest, then it would
seem that same-sex couples need marriage more than opposite-sex couples do.
According to the argument’s premise, same-sex couples are more prone to
contracting and transmitting STIs; as such, marriage would civilize them for the
betterment of all society: their relationships would stabilize, they would be less
likely to engage in extra-relationship sexual activities, and they would benefit
from increased commitment to one another.

531. Marriage also contributes to the overall health and well-being of the spouses themselves. See
NCHS, Cohabitation, supra note 473, at 3 (“Compared with unmarried people, married men and
women tend to have lower mortality, less risky behavior, more monitoring of health, more
compliance with medical regimens, higher sexual frequency, more satisfaction with their sexual
lives, more savings, and higher wages.” (citation omitted)); see also 152 CONG. REC. S5479 (daily ed.
June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (“[A]lmost every category of individual character and
wellness was better if you were married. That is the just the way it was. You had a longer lifespan,
you ended up with more wealth, you had better health, you were happier, and there was less drug
use, less criminality, and less suicide.” (alteration added)).
If being married leads to such positive outcomes for the spouses, why then would preservationists
want to prevent same-sex couples from becoming married? If we want these outcomes because they
are good, then shouldn’t we want them for everyone?
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If the government’s public-health interest is in slowing the spread of STIs, it
is irrational to prevent same-sex couples from marrying. Without marriage,
same-sex couples will presumably continue to engage in both safe and unsafe
sexual intercourse. Without marriage, it is reasonable to assume that STI rates
among homosexuals will remain the same or increase. Without marriage, it is
reasonable to assume that partners will continue to infect one another at about
the same rates, and that those individuals and couples who are predisposed to
engage in extra-relationship intercourse—both safe and unsafe—will continue to
do so at about the same rates.
Enter marriage. Assuming that marriage has the stabilizing, civilizing
effects that opponents of same-sex marriage claim it does, it is rational to
conclude that allowing same-sex marriage will actually cause infection rates to
fall. While partners may continue to infect one another with STIs contracted
prior to marriage, the overall rate of extra-relationship intercourse will
presumably drop, due to marriage’s wise counsel regarding monogamy and
commitment. Moreover, because marriage is as special as the preservationists
say it is (if it weren’t, then why all the fuss?), homosexuals would suddenly have
an incentive to wait until marriage to engage in sexual intercourse (which they
do not have now), thus reducing the likelihood of either partner bringing an STI
into the marriage.
This third aspect of the public-health claim—i.e., marriage is civilizing, but
we don’t want same-sex couples to have it—belies what is really going with this
argument. The preservationists are constructing a tidy double-bind for same-sex
couples. First, they condemn homosexuals for living lives of promiscuity and
vice, but they also refuse to make the civilizing arrangement of marriage
available to homosexuals. And then, when homosexuals say, “Okay, we want
some respect now,” the preservationists reply, “Well, no. Because you’re
promiscuous and live lives of vice, we don’t think you deserve it because you’re
not morally worthy. Sorry.”
So which is it? Do same-sex couples get to live lives of stability, monogamy,
and commitment, or are they to be continually shunted into the second-best
category, where the very relationship attributes they seek are the ones they are
faulted for not already possessing?
In one study, homosexuals were castigated for failing to live up to the
expectations of opposite-sexed, married society; this failure of outcomes was
held up as the primary reason for keeping same-sex couples from marrying. For
ease of use, Table 5 lists each argument opposite a key response.
532
This entire study deserves a resounding “Well, quite!” Looking solely at
the fact that same-sex couples are not allowed to marry, none of these outcomes
is surprising—indeed, in responding to them, as we have seen, one need resort
only to logic to show that they are inapposite and unfairly-characterized
criticisms designed merely to perpetuate bias.
Nevertheless, it is useful to raise this study for two additional reasons.
First, it is a sociological fact that any study dividing social groups along cultural
lines will find significant variables between similarly-situated parties from

532.

See WHYTE, supra note 372, at 111.
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within each group. For example if the study had compared outcomes between
Black and Hispanic couples (or rich and poor couples, or highly-educated and
Table 5. Comparative Study of Homosexual-Cohabiting and
Heterosexual-Married Couples.
Claim

Response

Same-sex couples have relationships of shorter duration than
married couples.

Marriage has higher exit costs than cohabitation; therefore, it
would make sense for a population restricted entirely to
cohabitation to have shorter relationships on average than
marriage couples.

Homosexuals have a greater number of lifetime sexual
partners than heterosexuals.

Marriage is available to heterosexuals for the entirety of their
adult lives; given the likelihood that seventy-six percent of
533

women will marry at least once by age thirty, thereby logically
reducing the number of the average heterosexual’s lifetime
sexual partners, it makes sense that homosexuals would have
more sexual partners over the course of a lifetime—there is no
concomitant life-long, stabilizing institution for homosexuals to
enter. As such, the comparison seems inapposite.
Same-sex couples have lower levels of sexual fidelity within a
relationship than married couples.

Without the disincentivizing social costs that infidelity imposes
on an intact marriage, same-sex couples have been given no
institutional incentive to remain monogamous for the duration of
their relationships. Again, the comparison seems inapposite.

Same-sex couples raise fewer children per capita than
married couples.

As preservationists love to point out when making their other

Same-sex couples and homosexuals generally have greater
“health risks” (the study only reviewed HIV and suicide
risks).

It is not surprising that the preservationists behind this study
chose to emphasize the two health risks that have historically
troubled the LGBT community. If the preservationists were antiBlack, they might have chosen to emphasize sickle-cell anemia; if
they were anti-Semitic, they might have chosen to emphasize
Tay-Sachs disease; if they were anti-poor, they might have
chosen to emphasize Type-II Diabetes (adult-onset) or obesity.
535
Once more, the comparison seems inapposite.

Same-sex couples have higher levels of intra-relationship
domestic violence.536

This last is the only relationship characterization that presents us
with even a modicum of difficulty. However, because of a
deliberate statistical fallacy, the study’s conclusions are not
trustworthy. Let us assume that marriage counsels stability
between the partners. It is reasonable, then, to assume that
married couples would have less intra-relationship domestic
violence. As such, the relevant comparison would only seem to
be between same-sex couples and cohabiting (unmarried)
opposite-sex couples. This analysis would render the finding
more trustworthy, because it compares outcomes between
similarly-situated groups—i.e., those who have not yet benefited
537
from marriage’s stabilizing counsel.
Nevertheless, the study
groups married and unmarried opposite-sex couples into a single
statistical group, which skews the relevant comparison, making
it far less meaningful. As such, it is irrational to conclude that
this statistic provides any insight into our comparison of
outcomes.

534

arguments, same-sex couples cannot procreate without outside
assistance; therefore, it seems completely reasonable that the
barrier to entry for becoming a parent—the necessity of
involving a third party—operates to disincentivize parenthood.

533. NCHS, Cohabitation, supra note 473, at 11.
534. See supra Part V.A.2.c.
535. One cannot make a logical argument by first identifying undesirable traits that are more
likely to exist in the disfavored community than in the favored one, and then faulting the disfavored
community for possessing those traits while congratulating the favored community for lacking
them.
536. Timothy J. Dailey, Family Research Council, Comparing the Lifestyles of Homosexual
Couples to Married Couples, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS04C02&v=PRINT (last visited Jan. 8,
2007).
537. On this point, the study is infirm for two additional reasons: first, it elides the meaning of
the word “violence” to include everything from verbal shouting to physical assault, rape, and
stalking; and second, it capitalizes on this equivocation by refusing to control for confounding
factors in data-collection, such as a particular group’s overall willingness or hesitancy to report. For
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undereducated couples, etc.), significant differences would have been
observed—perhaps not the same differences as those observed between samesex couples and married opposite-sex couples—but significant differences
nevertheless. As Goodridge noted, such argumentation therefore “singles out the
one unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and
538
transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage.”
Second, if the institution of marriage has all of the stabilizing and civilizing
effects that the preservationists claim, then it is irrational to fault same-sex
couples for failing to match the outcomes of opposite-sex married couples, when
same-sex couples have never been offered the opportunity to benefit from
marriage’s stabilizing, civilizing forces. And why have same-sex couples never
been offered the opportunity to benefit from marriage? Because of their failure
539
to match the outcomes of those who have. This is truly impenetrable logic.
Encountering this circular double-bind feels about as rational as walking
up to someone who’s obviously angry with you, asking them why they’re upset,
and hearing them reply, “If you don’t know, then I’m certainly not going to tell
you.” The preservationists have cleverly pieced together a closed-circuit
feedback loop: No matter what homosexuals do to live the lives that the
preservationists claim they should be living—i.e., lives of stability, monogamy,
and commitment—it’s never going to be good enough. Why? Because
preservationists believe that homosexuals are immoral, depraved, and
redeemable only when they admit of self-hatred and unworthiness, and convert
540
to heterosexuality.

example, heterosexual men in a cohabiting or marital relationship are widely considered to
constitute up to forty percent of domestic violence victims. There are two key confounding factor in
obtaining actual rates: first, a cultural unwillingness to report, and thereby, to appear weak or
vulnerable; and second, cultural notions of what constitutes “violence” varies significantly between
men and women. See Domestic Violence Against Men (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.oregon
counseling.org/Handouts/DomesticViolenceMen.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
538. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003).
539. From this line of reasoning, one could easily conclude that, if we found that same-sex
couples did match the outcomes of opposite-sex couples, then the preservationists would simply say,
“Oh, then you don’t need marriage like the opposite-sex couples need it—let’s make sure they have it
first.” Cf. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
540. See Pew Forum, The Ties That Divide, supra note 378 (statement of Andrew Sullivan).
[W]hat I would like to ask Mr. Bradley is, if you don’t agree with our right as citizens to
enjoy the very fundamental right that others do, what would you have us do? How would
you like gay people to live their lives? Are we supposed to not have relationships? Are we
supposed to have no social support for those relationships? The religious right, on the one
hand, wants to condemn gay people from [sic] being, “promiscuous;” but, on the other
hand, they want to condemn us for getting married. What are we supposed to do? Where
would you like us to go? The answer is, We’d like you to disappear off the face of the
earth.
....
You speak as if gay human beings don’t really exist or that you don’t need to have a
proposal for them when you are simultaneously proposing to strip them of any basic civil
rights for their relationships. That seems to me to speak volumes about where this
argument is coming from, whether it’s coming from a desire for the common good or the
common good only of people of whom you approve.
Id. (alterations added). See also supra notes 358–65, 401–15 and accompanying text (discussing the
preservationist theories of “reparative therapy” and sexual-orientation conversion).
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This last observation leads us to the final point in this section. A
preservationist might encounter our argumentation here, concede all of it, and
still throw up her hands, saying, “Well, so what? I just don’t like gay people. I
think they’re immoral. Isn’t that rational enough? Isn’t that secular enough?”
Indeed, this is a powerful claim. Norms of morality have guided American
social-policymaking for the entirety of our history, and they will—and should—
continue to inform our cultural discussion. The moral obligations we assume as
a society are complex—too complex, indeed, for these pages.
Instead of considering the deontological range of rights and duties that we
541
carry, let us instead briefly consider Mill’s On Liberty. Prof. Mark Strasser boils
down Mill’s “harm principle” to the following “taxonomy of conduct”:
a)
b)

c)

Those actions that are self-regarding are not appropriately subject to sanctions from
either the state or society;
Those actions which are hurtful to others without violating any of their legal rights
may be subject to public condemnation, but are not thereby subject to legal
sanction; and
Those actions which violate the legal rights of others are subject not only to public
542
condemnation, but also to legal sanction.

Strasser believes that this taxonomy of conduct was a significant linchpin
undergirding Lawrence’s reasoning—particularly the portion of Lawrence that
suggested the existence of “a certain sphere which should be free from
543
government interference.” However, Strasser does not stop his analysis there.
He concludes that Lawrence may have actually exceeded Millian values when it
“suggest[ed] that the relations are protected because they may be part of a more
enduring relationship, [thus] ascribing some degree of positive constitutional
544
value to same-sex relationships.”
What does this have to do with preservationism? Well, it would be an
overstatement of Lawrence to say that it applies some prospectively-helpful legal
standard to our question—after all, Lawrence did expressly reserve the question
545
of legally recognizing same-sex relationships. However, the Millian taxonomy, combined with Lawrence’s broader respect for same-sex relationships,
goes a long way toward lessening the legal force of the “I just don’t like gay
people” argument.
First, it is both rational and secular to conclude that same-sex couples are
self-regarding—that is, one can conclude that they work no harm against public
or private interests. Thus, in this first taxonomic world, it is rational and secular
to conclude that same-sex relationships are costless to the larger society, and

541. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1978)
(1859), cited in Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values, Valuing, and the
Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285 (2006) [hereinafter Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex
Relationships].
542. Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships, supra note 542, at 287–88.
543. Id. at 292.
544. Id. at 294 (alterations added). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (noting that
the sexual conduct at issue was “but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring”).
545. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (noting that the case “does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”).
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that any resulting harm is entirely internalized by the parties. It is from this
vantage point that one might begin an argument in favor of same-sex marriage.
Second, it is also rational and secular to conclude that same-sex couples
“are hurtful to others” but do not “violat[e] any of their legal rights.” If same-sex
marriage were allowed, same-sex couples would probably have to settle for
living in this second taxonomic world for the foreseeable future. The second
world acknowledges that there are a lot of people in the world who simply don’t
like gay people, but it also provides same-sex couples with enough protection to
546
ensure that their interests as a minority are not “insecure.” One could also
begin to make an argument for same-sex civil marriage from this vantage point,
making sure to highlight that same-sex civil marriage is no more harmful to
public and private interests than are the other so-called victimless behaviors that
we currently permit.
Third, it is an irrational and sectarian world that the preservationists are
trying to construct for us. It is in this third taxonomic world that same-sex
couples would find their interests to be the least secure yet—the claim would be
that same-sex couples pose an irreparable harm to public and private interests,
such that they should be punished, or—barring punishment—at least not given
any civil rights. After all this argumentation and dissection, we see that it is this
third world from which all preservationist arguments are being made.
At root, all that we have left is a bald dislike for homosexuals and same-sex
couples. It seems that both Romer and Lawrence thus answer the question before
us: Preservationism, stripped of its idiosyncrasies, is nothing but bare animus—
547
an illegitimate and irrational basis for public policy.
6. Federalism, the Conflict of Laws, and Institutional Legitimacy
Before leaving the secular purpose inquiry, there is one more question to
answer: Why a federal constitutional amendment? Much of the impetus behind
the FMA is due to the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, and
the FMA’s proponents do not mask their desire to overrule the Goodridge
548
decision by any means possible. By calling into question the institutional
legitimacy of judicial review, the preservationists may indeed have a broader
549
purpose in mind. In the context of same-sex marriage, preservationists are

546. “If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
547. Cf. generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional
amendment prohibiting the state or local governments from passing anti-discrimination laws to
protect homosexuals as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (invalidating a state statute criminalizing homosexual—but not
heterosexual—sodomy as illegitimate and based purely in animus against homosexuals as a group).
548. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[T]he most
widely covered success in the effort to destroy traditional marriage[] came more recently in the state
of Massachusetts where four judges ruled in the Goodridge case that marriage itself must be
redefined to include same-sex couples . . . .” (alteration added)).
549. See Traditional Values Coalition, Our Battle Plan to Take Back Our Courts: The Plan to Win
over Judicial Tyranny, http://www.ourbattleplan.com/plan.php (outlining a strategy for placing
“constitutionalists”—code for religious conservatives—into a majority of positions on the federal
bench) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
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only attacking the institutional legitimacy of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court because it ruled in favor of same-sex marriage.
This is not to say that preservationists have no other reasons to attack the
550
institutional legitimacy of the courts. It is merely to say that, in the context of
the FMA, the attack comes only when courts decide in favor of same-sex
relationships. Preservationists do not object to litigating same-sex civil marriage
551
rights —they only object to losing. This belies the truth that the preservationists’ problem is not with the courts, but with same-sex relationships.
Why the flip-flopping? As a matter of constitutional structure and inherent
powers, courts are either competent to decide same-sex civil marriage claims or
they are not. Therefore, one can only assume it is because of a substantive
objection to same-sex marriage—if the Massachusetts Court had ruled against
the plaintiffs in Goodridge, it is clear that preservationists would be praising them
552
for it. In terms of the FMA, then, the substantive attack seems to be more upon
same-sex marriage than upon the institutional legitimacy of courts to order it.
Procedurally speaking, then, proponents of the FMA claim that they merely
553
want to “protect” marriage from “redefinition” by “activist” courts. Ancillary
to this claim is the assertion that the definition of marriage should be left up to
554
the people, and that a court order in favor of same-sex civil marriage in one

550. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (legalizing abortion as a fundamental due-process
right under the federal Constitution).
551. E.g., Josh Richman, Same-sex marriage handed a setback, OAKLAND TRIB. (Cal.) (online ed.), Oct.
6, 2006 (reporting that Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel, who argued on behalf of the Campaign for
California Families in the California marriage cases, was “eager to make his case to the Supreme
Court”).
552. When the California Court of Appeal ruled in favor of that state’s marriage ban,
preservationists celebrated a “victory.” See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, California Court Upholds State’s Ban
on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A16 (reporting that Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel
had characterized the decision as “a crushing defeat to the same-sex marriage agenda”); Maura
Dolan & Lee Romney, Ban on Gays’ Ability to Wed Upheld, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at 1 (reporting that
“[c]onservative Christians involved in the litigation reacted with glee” (alteration added)); Lisa Leff,
Appeals court upholds California’s ban on same-sex marriage, BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 6, 2006, at A7
(reporting that Monte Stewart of the Marriage Law Foundation claimed that the decision is “a
victory for society’s most consequential social institution, and that is marriage”).
553. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“While recent
court decisions handed down by activist judges may not respect the traditional definition of
marriage, these decisions also highlight a lack of respect for the democratic process. . . . Any
redefinition of marriage has been driven entirely by the body of government that remains
unaccountable and unelected—the courts.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5299 (daily ed. July 18, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Musgrave).
[M]ost legal experts expect DOMA to fall once a challenge finally reaches the high Court,
which is why it would be the very height of foolishness to rely on the Supreme Court to
protect marriage. Sadly, that august tribunal is part of the problem. Justice Scalia has
already warned us that the Court’s 2003 Lawrence decision was only the beginning of a
road at the end of which is a radical redefinition of marriage at the hands of the Court.
Id. (alteration added).
554. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5440 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“Democracy
and representative government are at the core of this debate. . . . The will of the people should
prevail.”); 152 CONG. REC. H5299 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Musgrave) (“The
American people want to settle this issue now. They don’t want us to wait to see how much havoc
the courts will wreak on the definition of marriage before we act to protect it.”).
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jurisdiction would eventually result in a nationwide imposition of same-sex civil
555
marriage in all jurisdictions.
In response to the FMA, both opponents and advocates of same-sex civil
556
marriage are crying “federalism.” On the one hand, opponents presume that
the FMA will protect federalism for three reasons: (1) it forecloses the possibility
that the Supreme Court would mandate a nationwide definition of marriage by
court order, (2) it sends the question of defining marriage to the legislatures of
all fifty states, and (3) it ensures that no conflict of laws questions arise between
the states, as no state will be permitted to perform same-sex marriages that are
legally enforceable.
On the other hand, advocates claim that the FMA undermines federalism
for three reasons: (1) it forecloses the possibility that states might act as
laboratories for change—it prevents a state legislature or popular referendum
from, at some point in the future, legalizing same-sex marriage, (2) it federalizes
an area of law—family law—that has historically been regulated by the states,
thereby intruding on the scope of their Tenth Amendment authority by
expanding federal power, and (3) it intrudes on individual autonomy and
decisionmaking about where to live—the states will not be able to efficiently
respond to demands for same-sex marriage coming from a desirable market
constituency.
These arguments are based primarily on the constitutional structure and
economic theory, but this should not distract from the point: Preservationists
want to federalize marriage policy because it would overrule the Goodridge
decision and prevent future courts from rendering Goodridge-like decisions in
the future. Why is this? As discussed, it is because preservationists have a
substantive, religiously-derived objection to same-sex civil marriage, and they
are trying to honor that objection by imposing an ossified definition of religious
marriage upon the entire nation.
Yet despite this religious intent, preservationists instead claim that the
FMA merely prevents America from sliding down one of the slippery slopes.
However, this claim is disingenuous and intellectually dishonest. Even if samesex marriage advocates could prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that none of
these slides would occur—i.e., that allowing same-sex civil marriage would
have either a neutral or net-positive effect on social stability and culture—the
preservationists’ substantive objections to same-sex marriage would not

555. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[S]ame-sex
advocates have, through the courts, systematically and successfully trampled on laws democratically
enacted through the States. If marriage is redefined for anybody, it is redefined for everybody. . . . If
we fail to define marriage, the courts will not hesitate to do it for us.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG.
REC. H5299 (daily ed. July 18, 2006) (statement of Rep. Musgrave) (“While the Goodridge case
remains on the books, court dockets all over the country will continue to be ensnarled with same-sex
marriage litigation as opponents of traditional marriage continue to fight to expand their agenda to
the rest of the country.”).
556. Compare generally Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection, supra note 19, at 464–68 (arguing
that the FMA advances federalism), with Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment:
Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, and Anti-Democratic, 570 POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst.) 1 (2006) (arguing
that the FMA damages federalism).
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evaporate; their religiously-derived objections to homosexuality and same-sex
relationships would remain unaffected.
As a result, it is difficult to believe that supporters of the FMA have
absolutely no homophobic or discriminatory purpose in mind whatsoever—the
very substance of their objection appears to be that same-sex couples might
someday receive the rights and benefits of marriage, in addition to whatever
social approval the state’s legal imprimatur might confer.
For their part, opposite-sex couples derive no direct benefit from—and
suffer no hardships under—the FMA. However, the FMA directly impacts those
same-sex couples who are seeking legal recognition for their relationships. By
design, if not by language, the FMA singles out same-sex couples and imposes a
unique legal handicap upon them: Under it, for same-sex couples to receive the
legal recognition they seek, they must either (1) settle for “separate-but-equal”
arrangements that mimic marriage (but which may only be enacted
557
legislatively ) or (2) bring about such a substantial shift of opinion among
558
Congresspersons and state legislatures as to repeal the FMA.
559
Prof. Gerard Bradley, a drafter of the FMA, once suggested a third way
for same-sex couples to obtain legal protections for their relationships: Under
the FMA, same-sex couples would have to convince a legislature to declare that
560
a particular right is no longer an “incident of marriage.” Thus, the right would

557. 152 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“The amendment
does not seek to prohibit, in any way, the lawful, democratic creation of civil unions or domestic
partnerships. It does not prohibit private employers from offering benefits to same-sex couples. It
denies no existing rights.”); id. at S5455 (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[W]e are limited the powers of
the courts. We have not done anything to restrict the power of the legislature, except on the
definition of marriage which is between a man and a woman.” (alteration added)); 152 CONG. REC.
S5519 (daily ed. June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allard) (“[U]nder my amendment, States remain free
to address the issue of civil unions and domestic partnerships. Citizens acting through their state
legislatures can bestow whatever benefits to same-sex couples they choose.”). But see id. at 5521
(statement of Sen. Levin) (“[T]he very language of this constitutional amendment would make it
unconstitutional for the States to create civil unions or domestic partnerships in their constitutions
with any of the same legal benefits currently afforded to marriage.” (alteration added)).
558. At the time of this writing, there are 440 Representatives listed on the House’s website. See
http://www.house.gov/house/MemberWWW.shtml (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). There are 100
Senators in the Senate. See http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007). There are 50 states eligible to vote on federal constitutional amendments.
Constitutional amendments must pass both houses of Congress with a two-thirds majority vote, or
294 Representatives and 67 Senators, and they must be ratified by three-quarters of the states, or 38
states. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
Assuming, then, that the FMA passed with the absolute minimum required number of votes,
same-sex marriage advocates would have to convince at least one-third of each chamber of
Congress, or 147 Representatives and 33 Senators, and at least one-half of the states, or 26 states
(because of how the numbers work out), to reverse their votes on the FMA. This would require an
incredibly costly political campaign that could easily take decades to complete.
559. Pew Forum, The Ties that Divide, supra note 378 (“I indeed was one of the radical natural-law
‘jurisprudes’ who drafted the Federal Marriage Amendment . . . .” (statement of Prof. Bradley)) (last
visited Dec. 21, 2006).
560. Id. (“The legislature has to decide if something which hitherto has been an incident of
marriage isn’t any longer, because we’re extending to any large number of people.”; “[I]nsofar as the
legislature takes something which had been an incident of marriage and extends it to people who are
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not fall within the purview of the FMA, and same-sex couples (and, according to
561
Bradley, anyone ) could take advantage of the right.
This is an odd argument—Bradley wants to have his cake and eat it, too.
First, Bradley supports a federal constitutional amendment to say—rather
emphatically—that same-sex couples may not “redefine marriage.” Yet, Bradley
also claims that same-sex couples can receive legal protections because they
can—and should?—petition legislatures to “redefine marriage” by determining
that certain rights are no longer “incidents of marriage.” So, which is it? Do
same-sex couples have the right to “redefine marriage,” or don’t they?
Moreover, Bradley fails to acknowledge the incredible political burden that
successfully defining away the “incidents of marriage” would impose upon
same-sex couples and their supporters.
The problem with all of these procedural arguments is not that religious
believers are civilly engaged in the marriage debate; I think most would agree
that civic engagement is a good thing. Rather, the problem is that religious
believers are trying to insinuate their religious beliefs into the law and impose
those beliefs on the larger society, without providing a genuinely secular justification
for doing so. While the procedural justification for the FMA is inherently secular,
as we have seen, the entire reason for enacting it is not.
B. Applying the Lemon-Endorsement Test
“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.’”
562
–Justice David H. Souter, in McCreary County v. ACLU

We have determined that the proffered purposes for the FMA—and for
same-sex marriage bans generally—are neither rational nor secular.
Nevertheless, the preservationists may soon divine an excuse for same-sex
marriage bans that passes the threshold question of secular purpose. As such, it
is important to briefly conduct a Lemon-endorsement analysis to determine
whether, despite the existence of a yet-undiscovered secular purpose, same-sex
563
marriage bans endorse or establish religion.
At the outset, it is important to note that only the secular-purpose question
can be characterized as a rational-basis inquiry with any confidence. The rest of
the Lemon-endorsement test probably constitutes some form of heightened
scrutiny, but it is unclear just how deferential this test is. For our purposes, the
test’s heightened aspects will permit some additional poking and prodding, but

not married, well, then, yes, by definition it’s no longer an incident of marriage, at least in that
jurisdiction.” (statements of Prof. Bradley) (alteration added)).
561. Id.
562. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
563. It is important to remember that the FMA has been used throughout this Article as
exemplary of all same-sex marriage bans. The arguments used to support the FMA are the same as
those used to support other bans. Certainly, it may seem cognitively silly to test the constitutionality
of a constitutional amendment, but the analysis presented here retains its legal force against all nonFMA bans, and as a method of argumentation generally. See also infra Part V.B.4.
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the level of deference will remain remarkably close to the rational-basis scrutiny
used earlier.
Now recall our three-part question from above: Does the FMA have the (1)
purpose or (2) effect of either endorsing or establishing religion, and (3) does it
divide society according to individual religious beliefs? Analytically, it is
simplest for us to divide the “purpose” and “effect” inquiries into two separate
parts for ease of application: It is one thing to have an express purpose of
endorsing or establishing religion, while it is another to have a primary effect of
doing so. The third and final part of the inquiry will focus on whether the
government’s action segments society into insiders and outsiders based upon
their religious beliefs.
1. What Does the Reasonable Observer Know About the Context and History of
Same-Sex Marriage Bans and the FMA?
As a threshold matter, it is important to determine what the reasonable
observer would know about the FMA, same-sex couples, preservationism, and
the history of marriage. First, she is “presumed to be familiar with the history of
564
the government’s actions and competent to learn what history has to show.”
Therefore, she knows the general history of the FMA and its various iterations.
She is also familiar with the justifications given for the FMA in congressional
debates and hearings, and she is well-versed in the preservationist arguments
against same-sex marriage. She is also aware of the dispute among scholars
regarding the exact meaning of the FMA—and particularly the dispute about its
“legal incidents thereof” clause; she knows that there is not one overriding
interpretation upon which a majority of commentators can agree. She is also
aware of the explicitly-religious credentials of the FMA’s main proponents.
565
Second, she is “familiar with implementation of government action.”
Therefore, she is aware of the history of federal same-sex marriage bans,
including the legislative history and passage of the federal DOMA. She is aware
of the religiously-based anti-gay justifications given in support of DOMA, and
she is aware that such arguments have largely been discarded during the FMA
debates and hearings in favor of more secular-sounding ones.
Third, she inquires as to “‘the historical context of the statute . . . and the
566
specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage.’” Therefore, she knows
that the FMA is intended to constitutionalize marriage for two reasons: (1) to
shore up any infirmities in the federal DOMA; and (2) to overrule the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Goodridge decision. She knows that the
FMA has come up for a vote twice in each chamber, that it has failed each time,
and that the text of the amendment has not changed significantly since it was
first introduced. She also knows that, despite nominal changes in language, each
iteration of the FMA is intended to accomplish the same purpose as the very
first: Ban same-sex marriage and impose a single, religiously-derived definition
of marriage on the entire nation. She is also aware of any obfuscation used to
564. Id. at 2737 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)).
565. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308 (internal quotation and citation
omitted)).
566. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987)) (alteration added).
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cover up the religious definition of marriage that the FMA contains—she
understands intuitively what the preservationists are trying to do.
Fourth, she is “‘deemed aware of the history and context of the community
567
and forum in which the religious display appears.’” Therefore, she is acutely
aware of the impact that the FMA has a federal constitutional amendment: As
the Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it would
dictate marriage policy to all fifty states, the federal government, and all
extraterritorial jurisdictions that are subject to United States federal law. She
understands that the “forum” of the FMA is the federal Constitution—the only
document to which all legal systems in the Union must swear allegiance. She
understands the process of both ratifying and repealing amendments to the
Constitution; she understands how difficult it would be to repeal the FMA if it
were ratified. She understands the political and social implications of using the
Constitution as a rights-restricting instead of a rights-expanding document for
the first time in the nation’s history.
As for the community, she understands that, as a federal constitutional
amendment, the community of the FMA encompasses the entire nation.
Therefore, she knows the history of same-sex marriage throughout America,
including the case law, the state-level DOMAs and constitutional amendments,
and the general religious sentiment against same-sex couples and
homosexuality in general. She knows of the long history of commingling
religious and civil marriage in America, and she is aware of the current diversity
of opinion among religious groups regarding the morality of homosexuality and
same-sex relationships. She is acutely aware of the ongoing sectarian debate
within a number of major religions, and she knows that several major Christian
and Jewish churches have made same-sex religious marriage available to gay
and lesbian couples.
2. Does the FMA Have the Purpose of Endorsing or Establishing Religion?
Armed with this knowledge, she must now ask whether the proponents of
the FMA have the purpose of endorsing or establishing religion. This is a tough
question. Facially, the FMA is completely neutral regarding religion, religious
belief, and homosexuality. Moreover, if asked, the proponents would probably
say, “Of course, there are secular purposes for having the FMA!” As discussed
above, the secular purposes underlying the FMA are tenuous at best—indeed,
we have to assume the existence of one here just to permit the inquiry.
Nevertheless, these facts give rise to the strong inference that the FMA does not
have the facial purpose of endorsing or establishing religion.
Moreover, the reasonable observer knows how adamantly the FMA’s
supporters have disclaimed a discriminatory purpose. Even so, she will discover
that several of the FMA’s key supporters have announced that they endorse the
FMA because it codifies a definition of marriage derived from a specific set of
568
Judeo-Christian beliefs. This sends up red flags.
567. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
568. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S7968 (2004) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (citing Matthew 19:4–6 as a
justification for adopting the FMA’s definition of marriage); id. at S7980 (statement of Sen. Santorum)
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As a result, she may be able to rationally determine that the law was
developed with a specific religious objective in mind: To insinuate an
identifiably-religious definition of “marriage” into the federal Constitution—
and by extension, to impose a sectarian religious belief on the entire nation.
However, to make this rational determination now might prove too much,
because the law is not facially sectarian. Therefore, she is going to reserve
judgment.
3. Does the FMA Have the Effect of Endorsing or Establishing Religion?
The reasonable observer must now discern whether the effect of the FMA is
to endorse or reject a religion or religious belief. The effect inquiry requires her
to know how various American religions conceive of marriage. She must then
determine whether the FMA has cherry-picked from among these religious
beliefs—the root of her inquiry to determine whether the FMA shows favoritism
to particular beliefs or, said differently, whether the FMA conveys disapproval
to others. If it does either of these, the government’s definition of marriage has
effectively endorsed one religion’s definition of marriage over another’s.
Religions are not of one accord regarding the definition of marriage and the
sanctity of same-sex marriages. From the brief survey of the major American
569
religions that we conducted above, it is clear that no single definition of
570
marriage prevails among religious believers. Two of these definitions are
relevant here: (1) marriage can only be between one man and one woman, and
(2) marriage is between two adults, regardless of gender. The beliefs that
underpin these two definitions are theologically at odds with one another and
are not easily reconcilable. It is unlikely that this theological crisis will be
resolved anytime soon.
Linking this dispute to the Establishment Clause is simple: When the
government takes sides in a serious theological dispute, it has effectively
571
endorsed the religion with which it sides. Moreover, when the government

(stating that the “definition of traditional marriage” is “truth that has been established in Biblical
times”); 150 CONG. REC. H7912 (2004) (statement of Rep. Pence) (stating that marriage “was ordained
by God”); id. at H7917 (statement of Rep. Hayes) (stating that marriage is a “covenant between one
man and one woman”); 152 CONG. REC. S5458 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Thune)
(noting that states “define marriage as a sacred union between a man and a woman”).
569. See supra Part I.B.
570. Some preservationists argue that, if this diversity of belief is the ground upon which we
allow same-sex marriage, then the government must logically accommodate all religious conceptions
of marriage: If a religious group believes that five adults and six children should marry eight horses,
then why should the government stand in their way?
This argument merely rehearses the slippery slope of perversity. See supra Part V.A.3.c. To briefly
reiterate that discussion here: The government has a rationally secular interest in retaining a
consensual, adult, two-party model of marriage. Adult-child-horse group marriage harms this
interest because it involves (1) parties to a marriage who are incapable of giving legal consent and (2)
a numerosity of parties to the relationship that harms the state’s rational interest in maintaining
“good order.” Same-sex marriage does neither of these. Therefore, the secular interests that justify
prohibiting adult-child-horse group marriage do not justify prohibiting same-sex civil marriage.
571. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2880 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that,
in light of the competing translations of the Ten Commandments, the use of one version of the
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attempts to conclusively resolve the dispute, it broaches on free-exercise
territory as well, because it is effectively telling the minority group what it
thinks the answer should be.
As discussed, a sectarian dispute is raging about the definition of
“marriage.” Same-sex marriage bans place the government in the middle of this
dispute. By choosing to ban same-sex marriage, the government is undertaking
a decidedly sectarian action—one that simultaneously discriminates against
same-sex couples and the religions that support them. These religions are
finding themselves told that their beliefs are less valuable to society because
572
they are more inclusive of same-sex couples.
Because the FMA enacts a religiously-derived model of opposite-sex
marriage, the reasonable observer has an even stronger case to rationally
conclude that it has the effect of endorsing those religions that believe in only
opposite-sex civil marriage, while simultaneously rejecting those religions that
believe in a broader definition of marriage. Indeed, she is getting very close at
this point.
4. Does the FMA Segment Society into Political Insiders and Outsiders
Based Upon Their Religious Beliefs?
“Government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without
sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or
less than full members of the political community.”
–Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
573
Pittsburgh Chapter

We have briefly mentioned that there may be two separate Establishment
Clause concerns with the FMA. The first claim is that the FMA is intended to
impose a religiously-derived definition of marriage upon the entire nation; this

Decalogue impermissibly placed the Texas government “at the center of a serious sectarian
dispute”).
572. To be fair, we should ask whether allowing same-sex civil marriage would implicate the
Establishment Clause analysis undertaken here. For starters, the test would be the same—as such,
the government would have to articulate a rationally-secular justification for allowing same-sex civil
marriage. It is likely that the government would have very little trouble doing so: (1) we have
identified a number of secular reasons for having civil marriage generally; (2) allowing same-sex
civil marriage broadens the right to marry; and (3) allowing same-sex civil marriage does not dictate
to any religion what it must believe or how it must practice that belief. Remember, even though civil
marriage permits divorce and remarriage, because the Catholic Church does not believe in divorce,
it is not required to perform re-marriage ceremonies.
Therefore, courts would probably perceive that, in allowing same-sex civil marriage, the
government has a generally-applicable, non-invidious purpose in mind: Of the two available
definitions, the preservationist definition fits within the advocate’s definition. As such, neither
preservationists nor advocates would be excluded from the definition of marriage if the advocates’
definition were chosen. Conversely, under the preservationists’ definition, advocates are expressly
excluded from the definition of marriage. It is this exclusionary effect that matters here: Because the
advocates’ definition is not inherently exclusionary—even though the preservationists might find it
offensive—it does not appear to be susceptible of the same concerns raised here.
573. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627–28 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal cross-references omitted).
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claim is the by far the more important of the two. However, the second possible
claim arises here, in the neutrality context.
The second claim is that the FMA is intended to choose one form of
religious marriage from all available definitions, and to then establish the
preferred definition. We have also shown that, to at least some extent, this is the
effect of the FMA. Choosing this religiously-derived definition of marriage runs
afoul of the neutrality requirement: Because the FMA would be enacted within
the context of an ongoing sectarian dispute, the reasonable observer cannot
conclude that the government is treating religions neutrally when it expressly
adopts the beliefs of some while rejecting the beliefs of others.
So what?, one might ask. The government needs some definition of
marriage, does it not? Indeed, that is true. However, the definition of marriage
that it adopts it must choose for rational, secular reasons. As discussed, the
definition that the FMA has chosen is neither rational nor secular as related to
the justifications given for the law. This is not to say that one-man, one-woman
marriage is never rational or secular; it is only to say that, insofar as the FMA’s
proponents have explained themselves, they have not given a convincing
account of why their definition is rationally secular.
Nevertheless, the reasonable observer’s inquiry is not complete: She must
finally determine whether the FMA creates a class of political outsiders.
Specifically, she must determine whether adherence to religious belief generally
574
is “relevant . . . to a person’s standing in the community.” She will have little
trouble concluding that the FMA has the effect of creating a sizeable class of
political outsiders—those who, whether for religious or irreligious reasons, do
not ascribe to the religiously-derived “one-man, one-woman” marriage model.
This includes same-sex couples, who by their very existence do not ascribe to the
religiously-derived definition of marriage; it also includes several major JudeoChristian groups. Finally, we cannot forget that it rejects the beliefs of the entire
family of Secularist groups, all of whom support same-sex marriage.
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement analysis sought to mitigate the “numerous
more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or
575
convey a message of disapproval to others.” Civil marriage is a bundle of
rights, benefits, and responsibilities that only the government can bestow. Its
very existence evidences a belief that the government prefers certain
relationship models over others. This is not inherently wrong: The government
can offer up a number of secular justifications for holding this preference. The
argument made here is that the FMA has failed to provide a rationally secular
justification for having this particular preference.
Adopting the FMA’s exclusionary definition of marriage constitutes the
very favoritism that O’Connor sought to avoid. At best, the FMA conveys an
undeniable message of disapproval religious believers who embrace the
theological validity of same-sex unions. At worst, the FMA is designed to
punish those religious believers for their beliefs by making them political
outcasts.

574.
575.

See id. at 625.
Id. at 627–28 (O’Connor, concurring).
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As discussed, the FMA was used in this paper as exemplary of all same-sex
marriage bans, whether those codified in judicial decisions, state Defense of
Marriage Acts, or state constitutional amendments. The preservationist
arguments discussed here are rehearsed ad nauseam on a microcosmic scale
within the states. Each ban has this same imposing purpose, makes this same
sectarian choice, and has this same alienating effect. As discussed, no rational
secular justification has been put forward to justify favoring the beliefs of one
religion over another. We can only conclude, then, that same-sex marriage bans
violate the Establishment Clause for their lack of neutrality toward religions and
religious beliefs.
VI. CONCLUSION: RESOLVING OUR DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.”
576
–Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in Palmore v. Sidoti

We return now to the definitional question that opened this paper: What is
“marriage”? As we have seen, “marriage” is what we make of it. The law is
clear—if we are going to base our definition of marriage on a traditionally
religious institution, we have to have a legitimate secular purpose for doing so.
The alternate course of action suggested here is to deliberately extricate
civil marriage from religious marriage. In doing so, our task will be to identify
normative reasons why a certain number and gender of individuals should be
allowed access to civil marriage. As part of this process, the government should
continue its course of re-conceiving of civil marriage as a legal system designed
both to secure legal benefits for families and to transfer property, wealth, and
inter-generational responsibilities. This secular, marriage-autonomy model
577
tracks nicely with the free market that already exists for opposite-sex couples.
Re-privatizing religious marriage should not sound scary: America’s freeexercise, free-speech, and freedom of association jurisprudence is strong. No
matter what civil definition of marriage we ultimately adopt, religious marriage
will always be free to continue in its own way, unfettered, because it will always
be based on the subjective beliefs of the particular adherents—Catholics can
continue to refuse to recognize divorce, Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints can
continue to believe in polygamy, and Unitarian-Universalists can continue to
believe in same-sex religious marriage.
Several of the preservationist arguments raised and dismissed above, while
being in and of themselves legitimate, are not rationally advanced by same-sex
marriage bans. As discussed, this Article is concerned primarily with the case
against same-sex marriage, not the case for it—as such, affirmative arguments in
favor of same-sex marriage are distinctly lacking, and for good reason: They
serve to distract from the laser-sharp perceptiveness that we must wield in
identifying and exposing the religious foundations of same-sex civil marriage
bans. Whether the cure for this constitutional infirmity comes in the form of civil

576.
577.

466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
See supra note 54.
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marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, or an as-yet-unknown legal
relationship—that is a question for another day.
Sedimentation theory shows that the preservationists have begun to dig
deep to find adequately secular justifications for imposing a sectarian definition
of marriage on the entire nation. Because these justifications come up short
every time, the invidious religious purpose underlying same-sex marriage bans
is usually revealed upon even a cursory logical inquiry. According to McCreary
County, this religious objective cannot be adequately extinguished by simply
varnishing the truth—we must politely request that it retire itself to the private
sector of religious belief. Brave same-sex couples around the nation have made
incredible sacrifices in the process of starting this conversation about reprivatizing religious marriage.
One might question why it’s such a problem to base our nation’s definition
of marriage on an historically religious one that reflects the religious beliefs of a
majority of Americans. For those who believe that majorities should always
have their way simply because they are majorities, there is no ready answer to
this dilemma. So far, all of the supposedly secular reasons advanced to support
an opposite-sex-couples-only definition of marriage appear to be mere pretexts
for religiously-based anti-gay bigotry. Moreover, the arguments against samesex marriage are becoming more and more attenuated; mere creativity or
reinvention seems unable to eradicate the religious objective that originally
underpinned these bans.
Invoking the Establishment Clause to strike down same-sex marriage bans,
therefore, deports these religious beliefs back to the pews where they belong. As
mentioned, this leaves religious beliefs unmolested, and religious adherents will
remain free to believe whatever they choose about homosexuals and to practice
those beliefs unfettered by government interference.
Additionally, denying same-sex couples access to a genuinely secular
definition of civil marriage perpetuates bigotry and homophobia at a tangible
cost to these couples and their families. As the Andrew Sullivan-Gerard Bradley
debate demonstrates, opponents of same-sex marriage have offered up no
response to explain why this hardship should continue. Whether their purpose
is as invidious as Sullivan perceives it to be is not the point—when
preservationists are asked what help they would give to strengthen same-sex
families, they simply remain silent. Just as rational-basis review does not justify
abdicating the judicial role, neither does utter silence justify perpetuating harm
to children. If the children of heterosexual parents really do deserve better
treatment and more security than the children of homosexual parents, it is
important for preservationists to explain why.
Until they do, we will be left to wonder: Preservationists claim that
marriage is about protecting children. If marriage is really about protecting
children, then it would be about protecting all children, not just those of
heterosexual parents—right? Preservationists claim that marriage is about
encouraging the creation of families. If marriage is really about encouraging the
creation of families, then it would be about encouraging the creation of all
families, not just those falling within a vaguely-stated hetero-normative
“ideal”—right? Preservationists claim that marriage is about social stability and
values-transmission. If marriage is really about engineering social stability, then
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we should be undertaking to prohibit divorce, adultery, and pre- or extramarital sex—right?
It is not believable that the preservationists spouting off about “ideal
environments,” “gender complementarity,” and “values transmission” in
congressional testimony have genuinely secular objectives in mind. No
Secularist has been put forward to lend credible support to the “family values”
talk that preservationists are constantly regurgitating to Congress and state
578
legislatures. Much like drawing a fish in the sand, this rhetoric is—and always
will be—a coded message of bigotry passed between religious believers,
conveniently cloaked in the secular-sounding rhetoric of pseudo-scientific
claims about children and social stability.
It is likely that enforcing the Establishment Clause against same-sex
marriage bans will remain politically unpalatable to judges for some time—
particularly to those state-court judges who answer to their electorates. Should a
court strike down a ban on Establishment Clause grounds, the initial backlash
will not be easily withstood.
Preservationists may accuse me of being hostile toward religion. Nothing
could be further from the truth. I believe in returning religion to its rightful
sphere in which individuals practice autonomously-chosen beliefs in private,
without being permitted to impose those beliefs on government, society, or the
nation. I believe in the Framers’ ideal of keeping divine authority separate from
secular authority. Adhering to this ideal is hardly hostile to religion—indeed, it
is democracy-saving: Democracy suffers when any religion hijacks our secular
government, even if that religion claims to represent the beliefs of the majority
of Americans. Returning religion to the pews and returning secularity to the
government is good for both. Giving legal force to religious ideology perverts
both the law and religion, and religious tyranny in any form subverts the
promises of our Constitution.
We must extricate civil marriage from religious marriage. If we are going to
deny same-sex couples the right to marry, we must have a genuinely—and
rationally—secular reason for doing so. As discussed, that ship has likely sailed,
for the stain of a religious objective will not easily be bleached away:
Preservationists would commandeer the government to impose their religious
beliefs on the nation. Moreover, the government would choose between
competing religious beliefs about the definition of “marriage” and then reward
adherence to the chosen belief with “insider” status. This violates basic
neutrality principles, endorses one religion over others, and creates a
significantly-sized class of outsiders. The Establishment Clause cannot abide
such an abuse of power: It is exactly the kind of religious tyranny the
Establishment Clause was intended to prevent.

578. In the days of the early church, back when Christians were genuinely persecuted for their
beliefs, they drew fishes in the sand to identify one another. One person would draw the top arc of
the fish with his foot, and the second person would use his foot to draw the bottom arc of the fish. If
the second person did not complete the drawing, the first person pretended that his own arc was just
a doodle in the sand. Religious Tolerance.org, Christian Symbols: Fish (Ichthus), Cross & Crucifix,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/chr_symb.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).

